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 Geographically focused police crackdowns have widely diffused amongst larger 
American police departments in the past decade and have been recently cited in a Police 
Executive Research Forum survey as the most commonly used tactic to combat violent 
crime. Evidence from a number of randomized control trials, systematic reviews, and 
meta-analyses suggests that these interventions have the ability to reduce crime without 
displacing it to nearby locations. However, virtually every study of crime displacement in 
response to a geographically concentrated police intervention focuses on small buffer 
zones immediately surrounding the intervention location. While crime may not displace 
just around the corner, to date, few studies have tested displacement beyond this limited 
geographic constraint. 
During the summer of 2011 the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington 
D.C. implemented a geographically focused arrest-driven police crackdown called the 
Summer Crime Initiative (SCI). The current work aims to examine the impact of the SCI 
on the volume and placement of robbery through a quasi-experimental research design. 





local and non-local crime displacement are tested. The results of this study confirm prior 
research on crime displacement. Despite reductions in robbery, there is no evidence that 
these offenses or offenders were displaced within or beyond two blocks of the 









GENERAL AND SPECIFIC DISPLACEMENT EFFECTS OF POLICE 










Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of the 
University of Maryland, College Park, in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree of  






















Professor Lawrence W. Sherman, Chair 
Professor Tom Loughran  
Professor Jean McGloin 
























© Copyright by 










I would like to take this time to acknowledge the support I received throughout 
the writing of this dissertation and my graduate studies more generally. First, I would like 
to acknowledge the support of the Metropolitan Police Department (MPD). Specifically, I 
would like to thank Police Chief Cathy Lanier for opening up her staff and data for this 
project, John Foust for helping broker this practitioner-researcher partnership, and Sean 
Goodison and Brenda Eich for helping pull the requisite data from the MPD records 
management system. 
Additional thanks are in order to my committee. I would like to thank Dr. 
Kiminori Nakamura for encouraging me early on in the project and providing valuable 
guidance on the non-adjacent linkage between people and places. Dr. Jean McGloin was 
extremely responsive to my emails and phone calls, always offering discerning 
comments. She also really helped shape the analytic framework of this project and for 
that I owe her my gratitude. Tom Loughran and Peter Reuter were helpful in particular 
with my analytic approach. And to Dr. Lawrence Sherman for originally planting this 
dissertation topic in my head back in August 2010 when I first became his Research 
Assistant. 
Finally, I am deeply grateful for the support of my friends and family. Mike, you 
probably read this dissertation more than anyone else—thanks for your feedback and 
insights. Brad, you really helped work through some issues with my introduction and 
literature review when I first started working on this dissertation. Cody, you steered me 
toward some useful empirical work on hot spots policing that was invaluable. And to my 







Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgements ............................................................................................................. ii 
Table of Contents ............................................................................................................... iii 
Chapter 1: Introduction ....................................................................................................... 1 
The Promise of Geographically Based Policing Interventions ....................................... 1 
Hot Spots Policing .......................................................................................................... 3 
Crime Displacement and Methodological Limitations ................................................... 5 
Research Question .......................................................................................................... 8 
Chapter 2: Literature Review ............................................................................................ 11 
Crisis in Policing Confidence ....................................................................................... 11 
The Promise of Hot Spots Policing ............................................................................... 12 
Theoretical ................................................................................................................ 15 
Impact Evaluations.................................................................................................... 19 
Crime Displacement...................................................................................................... 26 
Crime Displacement Empirical Findings ...................................................................... 29 
Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses................................................................... 33 
Measuring Crime Displacement Using Buffer Zones ............................................... 34 
Weighted Displacement Quotient ............................................................................. 37 
Qualitative Approaches ............................................................................................. 38 
Buffer Zone Approaches: Limitations and New Directions ..................................... 39 
Theories of Robbery Placement and Displacement .................................................. 40 
Situational Action Theory and Routine Activities Theory ....................................... 43 
Characteristics of Places That Attract Crime (Issue 1) ............................................. 45 
Characteristics of Places that Attract Robbers (Issue 1) ........................................... 48 
Characteristics of Robbers Who Will Relocate Their Offending (Issue 2) .............. 60 
Chapter 3: Description of the Study City and Intervention .............................................. 71 
Crime............................................................................................................................. 72 
Metropolitan Police Department ................................................................................... 73 
Metropolitan Police Department Summer Crime Initiative .......................................... 74 
Management .............................................................................................................. 74 
Identification of Crime Hot Spots ............................................................................. 75 
Unit of Analysis ........................................................................................................ 76 
2011 SCI Dosage ...................................................................................................... 78 





Chapter 4: Data and Methods ........................................................................................... 83 
Data ............................................................................................................................... 83 
Arrests and Offenses ................................................................................................. 83 
Calls for Service ........................................................................................................ 87 
Area Level Demographics ........................................................................................ 87 
Place-Based Characteristics ...................................................................................... 88 
Outcome Variables.................................................................................................... 89 
Methods......................................................................................................................... 90 
Selection of Control Sites ......................................................................................... 91 
Equivalence of Control and Target Hot Spots .......................................................... 94 
Analytic Approach to Examine Whether the Intervention Reduced Robbery ........ 100 
Analytic Approach to Examine Changes in the Placement of Crime ..................... 103 
Crime Displacement (Individual Level) ................................................................. 105 
Chapter 5: The Impact of the Summer Crime Initiative on the Volume and Placement of 
Robbery ........................................................................................................................... 111 
The Impact of the 2011 SCI on Citizen-Generated Robbery CFS .............................. 112 
The General and Specific Displacement of Robbery .................................................. 115 
General Displacement ............................................................................................. 116 
Specific Displacement ............................................................................................ 120 
Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions .......................................................................... 128 
Limitations .................................................................................................................. 131 
Future Research .......................................................................................................... 134 
Policy Implications ..................................................................................................... 138 
Appendix ......................................................................................................................... 141 







List of Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Analytic Functions of Computers in Local Police Departments .......................... 4 
Table 2: Interpretation of Weighted Displacement Quotient ............................................ 38 
Table 3 Motivation for Robbery ....................................................................................... 64 
Table 4: Washington DC Police Service Area Demographics ......................................... 76 
Table 5: 2011 Summer Crime Initiative Hot Spots Size................................................... 77 
Table 6: 2011 Summer Crime Initiative Dosage Comparison .......................................... 81 
Table 7: Citywide DC Code Arrests: 2010 – 2011 ........................................................... 85 
Table 8: Part I Crime: Citywide DC Code Offenses: 2010 – 2011 .................................. 86 
Table 9: Part II: Citywide DC Code Offenses: 2010 – 2011 ............................................ 87 
Table 10: Calls for Service ............................................................................................... 87 
Table 11: 16 Month Hot Spot Offense Averages (n=160) ................................................ 94 
Table 12: Un-Weighted Demographic Averages (Target n=23; Control n=18) ............... 96 
Table 13: Weighted Demographic Averages (Target n=23; Control n=18) ..................... 97 
Table 14: Target v. Control Hot Spot Dosage .................................................................. 98 
Table 15: Percentage of 2011 Arrests by SCI Target Versus Control Hot Spot ............... 99 
Table 16: Frequency of 2011 Arrests by SCI Target Versus Control Hot Spot ............... 99 
Table 17: Arrest Dosage by Location (n = 30) ............................................................... 100 
Table 18: 16 Month Target and Control Hot Spot Buffer Zone (1000 feet) Offense 
Equivalence (n = 160) ..................................................................................................... 104 
Table 19: Pre-Intervention Buffer-Zone Parallelism (All Crime) .................................. 104 
Table 20: Equivalence of Robbers Pre-Intervention (n = 475: 244 control, 231 
experimental): 1995 – April 2011 ................................................................................... 105 
Table 21: Change in Total Citizen-Generated Robbery Calls for Service...................... 113 
Table 22: Robbery Calls for Service Per Hot Spot Per Month ....................................... 114 
Table 23: Robbery Per Hot Spot Per Month Difference in Differences ......................... 115 
Table 24: Total Number of Citizen-Generated Calls for Service in Hot Spot Buffer Zones
......................................................................................................................................... 117 
Table 25: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences All Calls for Service ......... 118 
Table 26: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences Robbery Calls for Service 119 
Table 27: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences Instrumental Crime Calls for 
Service............................................................................................................................. 120 
Table 28: Rearrest Rates (Any Offense) (n=475) ........................................................... 122 
Table 29: Rearrest Rates (Instrumental Crime) (n=475) ................................................ 122 
Table 30: Rearrest Rates (Robbery) (n=475) .................................................................. 122 
Table 31: Changes in Offense Location Distance (Meters) (All Cleared Offenses) ...... 123 
Table 32: Changes in Offense Stream (All Cleared Offenses) ....................................... 124 
Table 33: Changes in Offense Stream New Locations (All Cleared Offenses) .............. 125 








List of Figures 
 
 
Figure 1: The Buffer Zone Methodology .......................................................................... 35 
Figure 2: Washington D.C. Property and Violent Crime Rate 1960 – 2010 (Part I 
Offenses) ........................................................................................................................... 72 
Figure 3: MPD Arrests 2011 ............................................................................................. 79 
Figure 4: Pre-Intervention Parallelism ............................................................................ 102 
Figure 5: Pre-Intervention Robbery Parallelism ............................................................. 103 
Figure 6: Total Number of Citizen-Generated Robbery Calls for Service ..................... 112 














Appendix 1: DC Code and UCR ..................................................................................... 141 
Appendix 2: Hot Spot and Control Census Tract Crosswalk ......................................... 142 
Appendix 3: Average Arrests Per Month in SCI ............................................................ 143 
Appendix 4: Hot Spot City Comparison ......................................................................... 144 
Appendix 5: Experimental and Control Hot Spots Demographics ................................. 146 
Appendix 6: Pre-Intervention Buffer-Zone Parallelism (Robbery) ................................ 166 
Appendix 7: Pre-Intervention Buffer-Zone Parallelism (Instrumental).......................... 166 
Appendix 8: Targeted Cohort Characteristics by Hot Spot ............................................ 167 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
The Promise of Geographically Based Policing Interventions 
In the current fiscal climate of austerity and deficit reduction, local, state, and 
federal criminal justice agencies in the United States are looking to squeeze every dollar 
they can out of their budgets. Police departments have not been immune to this 
downsizing, and many notable examples exist of large urban police departments being 
forced to release a non-trivial number of officers. For example, in January 2011, Camden 
New Jersey laid off 163 police officers, nearly half its force, leaving the city guarded by 
the fewest number of officers since 1949 (Goldstein, 2011). In November 2010, Newark 
laid off 167 police officers, the largest single reduction in 32 years (Friedman, 2010). 
And in Trenton New Jersey, 105 were laid off in 2011 (Zdan, 2011). The story is similar 
in other states as well. In 2010 Oakland California laid off 80 officers and 21 cadets 
(Kuruvila, 2012), Tulsa Oklahoma 124 (Barber, 2010), and Jacksonville Florida 48 
(Schoettler and Patterson, 2011). Yet, the public’s demand for safe communities has not 
declined. In light of this demand for equal service, despite reduced resources, the police 
more than ever need to get “smart” on crime by taking an evidence-based approach. 
Perhaps no model of policing offers more promise and evidence to effectively and 
efficiently use resources than hot spots patrols
1
, an approach which focuses police patrol 
in the places crime is most likely to occur. Indeed, based on the findings from a number 
of experimental and quasi-experimental evaluations, the National Research Council 
Committee to Review Research on Police Policy and Practices (2004, p.50) concluded, 
“…studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provided the strongest 
                                                 
1
 Hot spots policing is a general classification of directed police activities that may include 1. problem-
oriented policing 2. increased patrol 3. drug enforcement operations 4. increased gun searches and seizures 





collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available.” While it has long been 
a concern that interventions, such as hot spots policing, which concentrate police 
resources in one area will simply spread crime to another (Chaiken et al., 1974; Lateef, 
1974; Mayhew et al., 1976; Press, 1971; Reppetto, 1976), recent empirical explorations 
challenge this notion. The new, evidence-based assumption, is that displacement from 
focused crime prevention interventions is, “seldom total and often inconsequential 
(Weisburd et al., 2006, p.551).” Therefore, hot spots policing would seem like a logical 
solution to the challenge of the current fiscal restraints imposed on federal, state, and 
local police departments. 
However, there is reason to claim that the displacement hypothesis has not been 
robustly explored, with empirical tests relying on methodologies that only examine 
immediately adjacent crime displacement to small typically two block buffer zones. 
Related to this argument, these tests of crime displacement have been limited by a lack of 
integration from recent advances in our knowledge of offender decision-making, target 
selection, and criminological theory. Such information could inform a framework for 
measuring crime displacement that provides for a broader set of possibilities. Given the 
widespread adoption of hot spots policing and its prominent usage among departments to 
deter violent crime (PERF, 2008), it is critical to explore the possible displacement 
effects thoroughly. 
This dissertation proposes to more rigorously test the displacement hypothesis by 
examining it both locally and non-locally. Specifically, the current work seeks to examine 
the impact of the 2011 Metropolitan Police Department Summer Crime Initiative’s (SCI) 





police, testable hypotheses are developed and examined based on what is known about 
offender target selection and decision making. This approach thus links those offenses 
actually prevented to a theoretically and empirically informed framework used to test 
displacement. Finally, by following a cohort of active robbers the current work is able to 
extend previous analysis by examining the relocation of crime anywhere in a jurisdiction 
in addition to local changes in adjacent buffer zones. 
Hot Spots Policing 
 
Hot spots policing is an approach informed by relatively recent empirical and 
theoretical advances. In 1989, Sherman and colleagues first documented the high degree 
of spatial crime clustering in Minneapolis Minnesota (see also Sherman, 1987). Just five 
percent of street addresses were responsible for over half of all calls for service. And 
while theories of crime for much of the 20
th
 century were focused on individual level 
factors, Ron Clarke (1980), Cohen and Felson (1979), and other scholars proposed to 
shift the emphasis to crime generators at the micro level. The coalescence of these two 
streams of research made it highly sensible for police to focus a disproportionately large 
amount of resources within small crime clusters. 
In the wake of this evidence, and less sanguine findings about the efficacy of 
random preventative patrol (Kelling et al., 1974), rapid response to calls for service 
(Spelman and Brown, 1984), and investigations (Greenwood et al., 1975), hot spots 
policing diffused rapidly among larger American police departments. According to the 
2007 Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics Survey, over half of 
all police departments serving a population of $50,000 or more utilized computers to 





populations served. For example, among departments serving cities with a population 
between 100,000 and 249,999, 66% identify hot spots, between 250,000 and 499,999, 
80%, and between 500,000 – 999,999, 100% use computers to identify crime hot spots. 
Table 1: Analytic Functions of Computers in Local Police Departments 
Population Served 2003 2007 % Change 
All Sizes 11% 13% +18.18% 
1,000,000 + 56% 92% +64.29% 
500,000 – 999,999 54% 100% +85.19% 
250,000 – 499,999 63% 80% +26.98% 
100,000 – 249,999 54% 66% +22.22% 
50,000 – 99,999 40% 56% +40.00% 
25,000 – 49,999 29% 31% +6.90% 
10,000 – 24,999 17% 19% +11.76% 
2,500 – 9,999 8% 9% +12.50% 
Under 2,500 3% 5% +66.67% 
Source: Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics 
 
Further evidence from Weisburd and Lum (2005) and a recent Police Executive 
Research Forum survey document how departments are not only mapping crime hot 
spots, but are using this information to direct patrol. Weisburd and Lum surveyed a 
random sample of 125 police departments with 100 or more sworn officers
2
 asking a 
variety of questions about the adoption of computerized crime mapping. Findings from 
their pilot survey were able to draw a direct link between the diffusion of computerized 
crime mapping and hot spots policing. Of those departments utilizing computerized crime 
mapping, the most common response was “to facilitate hot spots policing.”  
Similar results were reported in a survey of 176 police agencies by the Police 
Executive Research Forum (2008, p.3). In response to an earlier survey documenting 
increases in homicide and other violent crime, PERF asked these 176 agencies about the 
types of programs they were implementing to reduce these increases. Hot spots policing 
                                                 
2
 The authors drew their sample from the complete list of law enforcement agencies with 100 or more 





was by far the most common response, being listed by 63% of agencies. Additional 
responses were much lower: 37% cooperation with other departments, 20% hiring or 
recruiting more officers, 17% federal grants such as weed and seed, and 15% cited 
technologies such as cameras. Thus, hot spots policing has diffused rapidly, particularly 
among larger agencies, and is the main tactic used by departments to combat violent 
crime, such as robbery. 
Crime Displacement and Methodological Limitations 
 
Criminologists have been concerned about these types of geographically focused 
policing interventions causing crime displacement—a geographic shift in crime from the 
target site to non-treated areas—since at least the 1970’s (Reppetto, 1976). Indeed, in the 
very first randomized hot spots experiment it was commonly articulated by the 
participating Minneapolis Police Officers that crime would, “just move around corner” 
(Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). Because of this concern, displacement is frequently 
measured in studies of hot spots policing, with few studies actually documenting 
statistically significant displacement (see Bowers et al., 2011).  
These examinations almost always rely on a buffer zone approach—generally 
small catchment areas, 2-3 blocks beyond the target perimeter, drawn immediately 
adjacent to the target location. These buffers are meant to “catch” any crime spillover 
caused by the intervention. In one of the earliest examinations of crime displacement, the 
researchers in the Jersey City Drug Market Experiment drew two block buffer zones 
around the treatment locations, finding no evidence of displacement (Weisburd and 
Green, 1995). Weisburd and colleagues again in Jersey City (2006), Braga and Bond in 





Jacksonville, Florida (2011) all utilized similarly sized buffer zones and all came to 
similar conclusions about displacement.  
However, this approach is only appropriate for measuring displacement to areas 
immediately adjacent to the target locations. Therefore, it can more appropriately be 
stated that there is limited evidence that crime is displaced to areas immediately adjacent 
to hot spots during crackdowns. Recent advances in our knowledge about offender 
movement (Tita and Griffiths, 2005; Van Koppen and Jansen, 1998; Wiles and Costello, 
2000), non-adjacent spatial ties between places (Mears and Bhati, 2006; Tita and Radil, 
2011), and the specific motivations and target selection procedures of robbers (Conklin, 
1972; Feeney, 1986; Gill, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Matthews, 2002; Morrison and 
O’Donnell, 1994; Wright and Decker, 1997) challenge the notion of using this type of 
methodology suggesting that displacement may not be best measured using small 
catchment areas. 
For example, Tita and Radil examine both traditional conceptualizations of spatial 
relationships, those which examine the influence of immediate neighbors, but also 
consider more distant influences in their study of the distribution of gang violence (2011). 
They argue that gang rivalries may be related to their proximity of one another, but found 
the social networks they are embedded in, many of which are non-adjacent ties, were also 
influential. These networks linked individuals within one community, but also those 
separated by larger distances. Similarly Mears and Bhati (2006) argue that beyond spatial 
similarity, social similarity is also important in determining the influence between 
locations, with places that are more homogeneous having greater influence. By 





similar communities, the authors demonstrate how both contexts matter. While resource 
deprivation in one location influenced homicides in neighboring locations, it also had 
statistically significant impacts in social similar, but not adjacent locations. 
Specifically, the motivations and target selection procedures of robbers indicate 
that they may not be fully deterred by a police crackdown. There is evidence to suggest 
that some robbers are strongly motivated to continue their offender through a “pressing 
need” for cash that is likely to exist before, during, and after any law enforcement 
crackdown in a crime hot spot (Wright and Decker, 1997). Additionally, when 
opportunities are blocked in one location, robbers exhibit characteristics that make non-
adjacent offense relocation probable. Evidence suggest that many robbers’ journey-to-
crime extends well beyond the small two block buffer zones used to capture displacement 
(Capone and Nichols, 1976; Van Koppen and Jansen, 1998; Wiles and Costello, 2000), 
robbers may be able to familiarize themselves with opportunities in previously unknown 
locations with little effort (Deakin et al., 2007), and when examining the target selection 
procedures of robbers, discernible patterns emerge which afford the potential to predict, 
measure, and perhaps prevent such non-adjacent relocation. 
 The buffer zone approach and other techniques which rely on selecting adjacent 
areas to measure displacement are only adequate if the sole concern of police crackdowns 
is their ability to displace crime literally around the corner, typically just a few blocks 
from the treatment location. This view is an oversimplification of the problem. Scholars 
have taken the “move around the corner” problem quite literally and have neglected to 
examine non-adjacent displacement. As Guerette and Bowers have stated, “the proximity 





theories that are largely untested (2009, p.1356).” The current work takes a more nuanced 
look at crime displacement, by arguing certain types of offenses and offenders, such as 
robbers, are more displaceable. By focusing on the unique characteristics of these 
offenders, the places they target, and the impact produced by the intervention under 
study, the current work is able to develop a broader range of displacement possibilities. 
While short of developing a theory of crime displacement, the current work links the 
theories and empirical findings of Situational Action Theory (Wikström et al., 2012) and 
Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) to develop a theoretically and 
empirically informed set of testable hypotheses regarding the displacement of crime.  
These are important contributions to the displacement literature, as they aim to 
advance our understanding of not just how adjacent communities influence one another 
(the traditional approach in crime displacement research), but how those which are more 
distant geographically are linked socially. For spatial displacement scholars these 
findings are important as they demonstrate that crime interventions located in a given 
area may have benefits (or consequences) in locations that are not just immediately 
adjacent. Thus, crime displacement may not be best thought of in terms of immediate 
spatial displacement, but a more nuanced and contextualized process. 
Research Question 
 
This dissertation examines how the structure of a communicated criminal sanction 
threat by police affect offender decisions about whether, when, and where to commit 
robbery. Specifically, what do robbers do when police increase arrests in mezzo-areas of 
elevated crime, and robberies in those areas decline? The argument this dissertation 





failed to fully capture the phenomenon since they rely on small buffer zones unable to 
document behavior that is non-adjacent. Furthermore, by frequently taking a one size fits 
all approach to displacement, researchers wind up treating all crimes as being equally 
displaceable. This dissertation provides a more robust test of the crime displacement 
hypothesis by examining the phenomenon at both the specific (within individual) and 
general (within small buffer zones) level. Moreover, it focuses on the displacement of 
robbery as this dissertation argues many robbers are strongly motivated (Conklin, 1972; 
Feeney, 1986; Gill, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Matthews, 2002; Morrison and 
O’Donnell, 1994; Wright and Decker, 1997) and that this motivation is not likely to cease 
in the face of police action. Additionally, robbery is a crime that is displaceable based on 
the nature of the sanction threat communicated by police during the 2011 SCI, the 
intervention this research examines. The visibility of street patrol is more likely to drive 
robbers from these areas, than thieves who operate indoors. 
By examining displacement both locally and non-locally at the individual level, 
using data from the Metropolitan Police Department of Washington DC’s 2011 SCI, this 
dissertation will answer the question of whether a crackdown targeted in one set of places 
moved offenders from those place to other places within the city, both adjacent to and 
distant from the targeted hot spots. The question will be posed about a crackdown that 
occurred between May 1
st
 and July 31
st
 of 2011, when the department focused 24 hour 
police patrols in five crime hot spots. Officers in these locations largely relied on 
intensive patrolling tactics and increases in arrests. According to the Metropolitan Police 
Department’s 2012 Annual Report, the 2011 Summer Crime Initiative reduced robbery. 





experimental framework. After confirming this reduction in robbery, a focus is applied to 
whether this reduction in robbery led to crime displacement.  
Examining whether crime is displaced non-adjacently is important for a number 
of reasons. Hot spots policing is widely practiced among American police departments 
and, according to a recent PERF survey, is the most widely used tactic to combat violent 
crime (2008). At a time when police resources are stretched due to the current fiscal 
crisis, police cannot afford to be using resources inefficiently. Indeed, these departments 
may in fact be spreading crime around to other areas in greater numbers than are even 
reduced in the target locations, and even worse, may transfer crime to more vulnerable 
populations such as the elderly and communities with inadequate resources to respond. 
By documenting non-spatial displacement, police may be able to anticipate the locations 
crime is mostly likely to be displaced. And when displacement is more accurately 
measured, it can help refine our knowledge about the efficacy of hot spots policing and 





Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Crisis in Policing Confidence 
 
If there was any doubts about the police’s role in society, that doubt was clearly 
and bluntly dispelled in the Johnson Crime Commission Report, The Challenge of Crime 
in a Free Society (1967, p.92-93). 
“The police did not create and cannot resolve the social conditions that stimulate 
crime. They did not start and cannot stop the convulsive social changes that are 
taking place in America. They do not enact the laws that they are required to 
enforce, nor do they dispose of the criminals they arrest… the fact remains that the 
mission of the police is not to remove the causes of crime, but to deter crime, and 
to deal with specific criminals whoever they are, and with the specific crimes 
whenever, wherever and however they occur.”  
However, in the 1970s, there was growing skepticism within the United States 
questioning the ability of the police to even prevent crime. Findings from a number of 
empirical studies indicated that core strategies in what has been called the “standard 
model of policing” (see Weisburd and Eck, 2004) were unsuccessful in reducing crime. 
Among these bedrock assumptions challenged were random preventative patrol (Kelling 
et al., 1974), rapid response to calls for service (Spelman and Brown, 1984), and police 
investigations (Greenwood et al., 1975). Indeed even noted police scholar David Bayley 
concluded, 
“The police do not prevent crime.  This is one of the best kept secrets of modern 
life.  Experts know it, the police know it, but the public does not know it.  Yet the 





argue that if they are given more resources, especially personnel, they will be 
able to protect communities against crime.  This is a myth” (1994, p.3). 
This sentiment of “nothing works” was not restricted to policing, but was a general 
malaise felt throughout the criminal justice system, notably memorialized in an 
influential report by New York Sociologist Robert Martinson (1974), who exclaimed, 
“with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far 
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism” (p.25).  
If the police cannot address the root causes of crime, and if their tactics used to 
deter crime are ineffective, what should they do? In order to adapt to the challenges 
presented by these less sanguine findings, and the zeitgeist of nothing works, it has been 
argued that the field of policing moved into a period of almost unprecedented innovation, 
which was not merely technological, but fundamentally changed how the police operated 
(Weisburd and Braga, 2006). 
The Promise of Hot Spots Policing 
 
Among the many policing innovations developed in the wake of the Martinson 
era, hot spots policing is perhaps the most lauded, receiving both theoretical and 
empirical support. Indeed, it has been cited as one of the few policing innovations to have 
been widely adopted on the basis of research evidence, as opposed to ideology and other 
non-empirical mechanisms (Weisburd and Braga, 2006). This may seem logical, but 
many innovations are widely adopted despite a lack of evidence of their efficacy (Rogers, 
2003). To this day it is still a commonly held belief among law enforcement agencies that 
rapid response can increase arrests (Telep and Lum., in press) despite empirical evidence 





While there is no standard definition of hot spots (Chainey and Ratcliffe, 2005) or 
hot spots policing, the concept generally refers to focusing police resources on an area 
smaller than a neighborhood or police beat, which contains a disproportionate amount of 
crime. For example, Sherman and colleagues refer to these places that are, “a fixed 
physical environment that can be seen completely and simultaneously, at least on its 
surface, by one’s naked eyes (1989, p.31).” However, in a more recent articulation by 
Jerry Ratcliffe and colleagues at Temple University and the Philadelphia Police 
Department, they identified hot spots containing multiple intersections that were not all 
visible from one single epicenter. Their study of foot patrol in crime hot spots identified 
120 locations, which contained an average of 14.7 street intersections and 1.3 miles of 
streets (Ratcliffe et al., 2011). Similarly, in Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2001), police 
focused on four beats in two areas of the city comprising approximately 4.6 square miles.  
Documenting the amount of police resources expended in these areas is another 
heterogeneous measure in the research. While the length of the initiative may offer the 
most convenient measure, this is a very crude proxy for the dosage of a hot spots policing 
initiative. A more appropriate comparison would be an examination of the actual increase 
in the police force on the street or changes in productivity. This comparison is 
complicated by the ability of researchers to directly measure police dosage. Sherman and 
Weisburd (1995) were some of the first researchers to tackle this problem. In the 
Minneapolis Hot Spots Experiment Sherman and Weisburd (1995) worked with a large 
grant from the National Institute of Justice, and were thus able to conduct 7,542 hours of 
systematic observations to document police activity. From these data they were able to 





minutes of observations compared to .7 to .8 minutes in ten among control locations. This 
increased dosage was highly variable however, ranging from as high at 6:1 down to 1:1. 
In Philadelphia researchers were also able to conduct field observations, but not in 
a sufficient amount to produce any “robust measure of dosage” (Ratcliffe et al., 2011, 
p.820). The authors noted that each of the 60 experimental locations was supposed to be 
patrolled by two pairs of officers in a morning (10am – 6pm) or evening (6pm – 2am) 
shift Tuesday through Saturday nights for three months. Theoretically, this has the 
potential of 57,600 hours of patrol, however, there was some evidence that the 
experiment may have been subverted as field observers “reported that only a few foot 
patrol boundaries were rigidly observed… several officers—either through boredom or a 
perception that they were displacing crime to nearby streets would stray for a time if they 
were aware of areas of interest just beyond the foot patrol area” (p.806).  
Similarly in Jacksonville (Taylor et al., 2011), researchers noted that the 21 
saturation locations were supposed to receive an average of 53 officer hours per week 
over three months. This is far lower than the 160 officer hours per week in Philadelphia 
(16 hours per day * 2 officers * 5 days a week = 160 officer hours per week per hot spot). 
However, Jacksonville lacked any independent observation of police presence. 
Given these challenges, a few studies attempt to indirectly measure police 
presence through changes in their productivity such as arrests, traffic citations, and 
vehicle stops. For example, McGarrell et al, 2001 examined the number of arrests, traffic 
citations, warning tickets, vehicle stops, and gun seizures in Indianapolis
3
. Additionally, 
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they created standardized metrics of these data controlling for area, number of residents, 
and project duration in order to compare the dosage in Indianapolis to another gun 
crackdown in Kansas City (see Sherman and Rogan, 1995).  
Other studies, while focusing police efforts in hot spots, are perhaps less 
appropriate to compare to the current works dosage. Several of these studies (see 
Weisburd and Green, 1995; Braga and Bond, 2008) focus on Problem Oriented Policing 
efforts, not just mere officer saturation. Thus, a dosage comparison may not be 
appropriate, because the dose used in POP changes how officers police, not how many 
police. For example, The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment sought to 
develop new strategies for addressing street-level drug problems beyond standard patrol 
saturation. 
 While the heterogeneity in units of analysis and dosage may be problematic when 
assessing the utility of these approaches, they all offer a relatively new tactic in policing 
around directed enforcement—a stark contrast to the more traditional random 
omnipresence of resource allocation that dominated policing from the 1920s to 1980s 
(see Kelling and Wycoff, 2001). The following section examines both the theoretical and 




For much of the 20
th
 century, theoretical criminologists were focused on 
identifying factors related to criminal offending irrespective of geography (Weisburd and 
Braga, 2006), such as self-control (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), social bonds (Hirschi, 





Rosenfeld, 1994), and deterrence (Becker, 1968). Beginning in the late 1970s a renewed 
interest
4
 among academics began to incorporate the importance of place within 
theoretical thinking, leading to the emergence of what is sometimes referred to as 
environmental criminology.  
Every crime has three elements: suspects, victims, and places of occurrence. 
Environmental criminology focuses on this last element and attempts to change the nature 
of the places that generate crime. Among the earliest academics to refocus on place were 
Cohen and Felson (1979), who noted that there was an over-emphasis on individual 
criminal motivation to the neglect of other elements in the “crime equation.” They argued 
that beyond motivated offenders, a suitable target and lack of capable guardian also 
needed to be present in time and space for crime to occur. In other words, the 
opportunities for crime where not ubiquitously distributed in space. Similarly, Ron 
Clarke and other British scholars began to focus on the role opportunity played in 
fostering and inhibiting crime. They believed that if the situations which increased the 
probability of crime could be altered, as opposed to rehabilitating individual offenders, it 
could have a significant impact on crime (Clarke, 1980). This approach became known as 
situational crime prevention. 
Situational Crime Prevention encompasses a host of techniques which fall under 
the domain of secondary prevention—they are geared toward changing the features of 
place which are either already crime hot spots or at risk of becoming ones. Whereas 
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 Scholars had previously examined the importance of crime and place in the 20
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 century. For example, 
Shaw and McKay analyzed the characteristics of neighborhoods which led otherwise normal individuals to 
get tied up with the criminal justice system (1942). However, there is a fundamental distinction between 
these earlier uses of crime and place, from the later advancements in the 20th century. More recent 
theoretical work focused on micro places such as a handful of intersections, whereas Shaw and McKay 





primary prevention programs aim to make large scale sweeping changes to an entire 
neighborhood, situational crime prevention tactics generally focus on a specific area 
attempting to change its environment in a way which makes offending less attractive. 
Thus, situational crime prevention rests on the notion that offenders are rational decision 
makers who respond to opportunities and changes in risks (Lab, 2010).  
A number of techniques have been developed over the years aimed at reducing 
place based situational inducements to crime. Cornish and Clarke (2003) have published 
a comprehensive list of these techniques under five broad categories: 1. Increase the 
effort 2. Increase the risk 3. Reduce the rewards 4. Reduce the provocations and 5. 
Remove excuses. A number of studies have examined the impacts of these measures with 
varying findings.
5
 Despite criticisms that Situational Crime Prevention cannot explain the 
causes of crime, does not address these root causes, and merely displaces crime, it has 
gained wide support among criminal justice agencies.  
Oscar Newman, an architect by trade, developed an approach called Crime 
prevention through environmental design (1972, 1996). This theory is based on the 
concept of defensible space which Newman sees as the physical extension of the 
communities desire to minimize the probability of crime. This physical extension limits 
the amount of crime opportunities through four elements identified by Newman (1972): 
territoriality, natural surveillance, image, and milieu. 
One way to create defensible space and incorporate these elements is to create 
“mini-neighborhoods”. This can be achieved in a number of ways, and generally involves 
reducing the amount of shared space and access to the area by non-residents. Newman 
argues that this will increase neighborhood cohesion among residents which fosters social 
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ties, collective efficacy, and informal social control. Mini-neighborhoods minimize the 
number of strangers within a given area and create a more intimate environment. This 
reduce anonymity makes it more difficult for strangers to enter a space and get away with 
committing a crime. Finally, it also increases a sense of ownership of a location. When 
individuals have more control over an area, particularly if it is their own personal space, 
they are more likely to maintain and guard the location. Through a series of case studies 




While these theories differ on the approaches taken, they each acknowledge that 
place is an important determinant of crime, and that by focusing resources in these 
locations, significant crime reductions can be achieved. However useful these types of 
micro approaches were in developing hot spots policing, their explanatory power is 
generally weak when juxtaposed with other units of analysis. In an examination of 
criminological research’s explanatory power of articles published in Criminology 
between 1968 and 2005, Weisburd and Piquero (2008) document that as much as 80-90% 
of the variability remains unexplained, with no improvement over time. And the results 
from specific research at the micro place (address or street segment)
 7
 are among the 
poorest, with, “higher units of aggregation generally yield[ing] a higher average” (p.12). 
This is not an exhaustive evaluation of each of the aforementioned theories, but it may 
more generally suggest that our knowledge of why crime clusters at the micro place is 
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separating out the effects of each strategy (Eck, 2002). 
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 It should be noted that only one study at the micro place was included in their analysis and that many 
evaluations of Routine Activities Theory and Rational Choice Theory were done at a macro or individual 






limited at this point in time, needing further theoretical refinement in order to provide 
more nuanced recommendations to policy makers and practitioners beyond what has been 
offered  
Impact Evaluations 
There is a growing body of evidence indicating that hot spots policing deters 
crime. Indeed, in a 2004 review, the National Research Council concluded that 
“…studies that focused police resources on crime hot spots provided the strongest 
collective evidence of police effectiveness that is now available” (p.250). Similar 
conclusions have been drawn from Anthony Braga’s Campbell Collaboration Systematic 
Review (2007), documenting that seven of the nine studies examined had statistically 
significant crime reduction effects. When focusing on studies using an experimental 
design, moderate mean effect sizes were noted, leading Braga to conclude, “extant 
evaluation research seems to provide fairly robust evidence that hot spots policing is an 
effective crime prevention strategy” (p.18). In a 2012 update to this Campbell Review, 
Braga and colleagues again documented “noteworthy crime and disorder reductions” 
(p.6) in 20 of 25 tests of hot spots intervention. 
The first randomized experiment studying hot spots policing occurred in 
Minneapolis Minnesota in the late 1980’s. Utilizing a relatively new technology, 
computerized crime mapping, Sherman and Weisburd (1995) randomly selected 55 out of 
110 of the cities hot spots to receive, on average, twice
8
 as much observed patrol. These 
hot spots were usually centered around a particular intersection and expanded out in all 
directions, but only as far as the eye could see. While officers were directed to stay in 
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these locations more often than their controls, they were given complete discretion as to 
what they actually did while there
9
. Over 7,542 systematic observations verified their 
increased presence as well as the nature of their activities ranging from proactive problem 
solving to passively sitting in their patrol car.  
When comparing the impact on calls for service between the experimental and 
control areas over the course of a year, total crime was reduced in absolute terms between 
6.3 and 13.1 percent, soft crime calls (e.g., break-in alarms, disturbances, drunks, noise, 
unwanted persons at businesses, vandalism, prowlers, fights, and person down) declined 
between 7.2 and 15.9 percent, and hard crime calls (holdup alarms, burglary, shooting, 
stabbing, auto theft, assault, and rape) were lower in the hot spots receiving extra patrol 
compared to those not receiving extra patrol, by a difference of between 2.6 and 5.9 
percent depending on the reporting period examined
10
 (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). 
Prior to hot spots policing, the conventional wisdom on police patrol’s efficacy 
was based on findings from the Kansas City Preventative Patrol Experiment (Kelling et 
al., 1974), which documented the police’s inability to reduce crime or victimization when 
doubling or removing a random patrol presence. However, that study has since been 
criticized for its poor methodology and implementation, including its low dosage and 
statistical power (see Larson, 1975; Sherman and Weisburd, 1995). This last point is 
particularly important, because while Kelling et al (1974) documented a 300 percent 
increase in robberies reported in areas less heavily patrolled, the result was not 
statistically significant because of the low base rates of the offense (Sherman and 
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While beyond the scope of the current dissertation, evidence is beginning to suggest that a problem-
oriented approach is most effective. 
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Weisburd, 1995, p.627). Regardless, in light of the discovery of crimes concentration 
among a small number of places, random preventative patrol makes little sense.  
Kansas City conducted the first randomized experiment of police raids, randomly 
assigning officers to raid 104 of the city’s 207 eligible crack houses. While crime was 
reduced, effects were small. Researchers noted a net reduction of 8 percent in calls for 
police service, which translates into 85 adverted calls. This amounts to less than one call 
prevented per raid conducted. Importantly, the work demonstrated the potential for these 
types of efforts to have fleeting effects. Results from the study showed that while the 
initial reductions were large, and continued to increase for two days, the effect declined 
thereafter and finally disappeared after 12 days (Sherman and Rogan, 1995). 
The Jersey City Drug Market Analysis Experiment sought to develop new 
strategies for addressing street-level drug problems. After identifying 56 drug hot spots, 
officers were randomly assigned in statistical blocks to half of these locations to 
implement the treatment. This treatment followed a step-wise problem oriented fashion. 
In the “planning stage” the team collected information on the physical, social, and 
criminal characteristics of these places. In the “implementation stage” officers utilized 
community and business engagement as well as police crackdowns to reduce drug related 
offenses in these areas. Finally, in the “maintenance stage” officers sought out ways to 
maintain the gains which had previously been made (Weisburd and Green, 1995). Results 
indicate that experimental hot spots had consistent and strong reductions in disorder-
related calls for service when compared to control locations. 
Similar results were found in Lowell, Massachusetts, where a problem-oriented 





spots (Braga and Bond, 2008). Despite officers engaging in what was classified as 
“shallow” problem solving, relying more closely on a general policing strategy, the 
evaluators noted a statistically significant 20% reduction in crime and disorder calls for 
service when comparing treatment to control hot spots. More specifically, the strategy 
worked best when utilizing situational crime prevention tactics as opposed to 
misdemeanor arrests or social services. 
Building on these findings, the Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office in the city of 
Jacksonville Florida became the first police department to experimentally test the 
differential impact of different policing strategies across hot spots (Taylor et al., 2011). 
Eighty-three violent crime hot spots were randomly assigned to one of three conditions: 
40 control hot spots, 21 saturation / directed patrol hot spots, and 22 problem-oriented 
policing hot spots. After an experimental period of 90 days, the authors compared the 
outcomes of the three conditions. Although the results failed to show any statistically 
significant crime declines during the experiment in either the saturation or problem 
oriented locations, after a 90 day follow up period, street violence declined by a 
statistically significant 33% in the problem oriented locations. Results from this study 
indicate that problem oriented approaches in hot spots are more advantageous compared 
to saturation. Importantly, these efforts require more time to take root.  
Utilizing the data collected in Sherman and Weisburd’s (1995) Minneapolis Hot 
Spots Experiment, Christopher Koper (1995) was able to determine the optimal amount 
of time officers could spend at each crime hot spots. Specifically, Koper examined the 
duration police spent at each hot spot for each site visit. He then examined the amount of 





next crime. Using survival analysis, he was able to discern that each additional minute 
officers spent in a hot spot increased the amount of time which passed before another 
crime occurred by 23%. Interestingly, after 14-15 minutes, there were diminishing 
returns, meaning longer doses of time spent at the site did not lead to greater returns on 
the amount of time which passed before the next crime. This ideal time frame of 15 
minutes is frequently called the “Koper Curve,” an idea not all that dissimilar from one 
articulated by Sherman that crackdowns need to be, “intermittent, unpredictable, 
repetitive, and brief…on constantly shifting targets” (1990, p.37). 
The validity of this finding was experimentally assessed by the Sacramento Police 
Department (Telep et al, 2012). While officers were not specifically told to employ a 
particular policing strategy while in the hot spots, they were given a random order to 
visit, and told only visit each site for 12-16 minutes. Researchers were able to verify the 
officers rotated approach and time spent using automated vehicle locators. When 
comparing the difference in differences between experimental and control sites, 
statistically significant reductions in calls for service and Part I offenses were noted. 
Hot spots approaches were also tested in Philadelphia using foot patrol (Ratcliffe 
et al, 2011). The conventional wisdom at the time was that while foot patrols could 
improve the community perception of police, and reduce fear of crime, they were unable 
to reduce crime itself (Kelling, 1981). However, these approaches were not applied in 
micro settings until the Philadelphia Foot Patrol Experiment. This experiment reported on 
the work of 200 foot patrol officers randomly assigned to patrol hot spots in the summer 
of 2009. Target areas experienced a relative reduction in violent crime of 23% when 





threshold of pre-intervention violence, those hot spots in the top 40 percent of pre-
treatment violent crime counts. 
It should be noted that these studies are a non-random sample of the research. 
Thus, drawing conclusions on the effectiveness of hot spots policing based on this 
research alone would be inappropriate. Therefore, it is necessary to capture a broader 
scope of the research more generally. Appropriate, results from a two recent meta-
analyses of some of the most rigorous hot spots policing studies, including several of the 
studies previously mentioned, was recently made available by Anthony Braga and 
colleagues (2008, 2012). Their findings indicate that, “focusing police efforts on high-
activity crime places can be used to good effect in preventing crime” (2008, p.23). Seven 
of the nine studies included in the review found statistically significant reductions in 
crime and disorder. Additionally, Braga also examined these interventions impact on 
crime displacement, finding no evidence of the phenomenon in the five studies which 
permitted examination. 
Similar conclusions were drawn in Braga and colleagues 2012 updated Campbell 
Review. Given the importance of this systematic review’s contribution to the research 
base, it is worthwhile to discuss in more detail. Campbell Reviews are rigorous and 
transparent procedures for synthesizing the best research to date on a given intervention 
or policy, and can thus be said to represent our “best guess” as to the true impact in the 
general population. In an exhaustive search of fifteen crime databases, past narrative, 
empirical, and Campbell review bibliographies, searches through works that cited 
seminal hot spots studies, and hand searches of top rated journals in criminology and 





this list down to just 19 which met their inclusion criteria which consisted of studies that 
were quasi or random experiments, examining interventions that were police-led
11
, in 
“units of analysis smaller than a neighborhood or community” (p.13), that measured the 
impacts of the intervention using officially recorded crime. 
 Since many studies do not prioritize the outcomes they report on, nor do they 
report all outcomes examined, Braga and colleagues analyzed the effect sizes using three 
approaches to help guard against creaming: 1. Overall mean effect size. 2. Largest effect 
size. 3. Smallest effect size. Regardless of which approach was taken, the authors noted 
effect sizes that favored the treatment in each instance, with an overall standardize 
difference in means of .184 (p-value .000), a difference of .276 (p-value .000) using the 
largest reported effect size, and a difference of .155 (p-value .000) using the smallest. 
Importantly, their review also compared the effect sizes of hot spots interventions by 
program type. Braga and colleagues compared five different types of programs: problem-
oriented policing, increased patrol (foot or car), drug enforcement operations, increased 
gun searches and seizures, and zero-tolerance policing, finding that the effect size for 
problem-oriented policing programs (.232) were twice as large as those for increasing 
patrol (.113).  This is an important advance because while it has long been known that 
crime clusters in small micro places, it has been less clear what the police should do 
about it. Evidence from Braga’s reviews indicate that, “the problem-oriented policing 
approach holds great promise in developing tailored response to very specific recurring 
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problems at crime hot spots...even “shallow” problem solving better focuses police crime 
prevention efforts at crime hot spots” (2012, p.32). 
Indeed, the empirical literature on the effectiveness of geographically focused 
police-led interventions is relatively strong. A growing body of evidence suggests that 
interventions in which officers apply problem-oriented tactics (even if shallow), or in 
rotating random patrols of 15 minutes each, within crime hot spots, may be most 
impactful. Indeed, the weight of this evidence has partially led prominent scholars 
Durlauf and Nagin (2011) to conclude criminal justice funding would be better spent by 
shifting resources from imprisonment to policing. However, as alluded to by Lawrence 
Sherman (paper presented to the University of Minnesota Law School Robina Institute, 
2012),  
“There is good reason to extend the hypothesis from the level of hot spots to the 
level of large areas using hot spots policing. Reason, yes. Evidence, no. The only 
way to tell whether a policy of hot spots policing will reduce crime is to compare 




However, without adequately examining the potential of this policing tactic to 
cause crime displacement, even a reason to generalize may be lacking. 
Crime Displacement 
 
While there are a number of criticisms of the hot spots policing approach 
(Rosenbaum, 2006), perhaps the most commonly articulated is the potential for 
geographic crime displacement—a spatial shift in crime from the target location(s) to 
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untreated areas (Barr and Pease, 1990; Eck, 1993; Hakim and Rengert, 1981; Reppetto, 
1976).  Crime displacement has long been a concern among criminologists and criminal 
justice practitioners. Almost four decades ago, Thomas A. Reppetto wrote about the 
phenomenon in an influential article for Crime & Delinquency (1976). Since Reppetto’s 
statement of the displacement hypothesis lays the foundation for most empirical 
assessments of the phenomenon, it deserves further discussion. 
First, Reppetto notes that there are actually five types of potential displacement 
and discusses each in detail: temporal, tactical, target, functional, and territorial. 
Temporal displacement is a shift in time from when an offender commits their crimes. 
Tactical displacement is a shift in the methods used by an offender. Target displacement 
is a shift in the victim. Function displacement is a shift in the types of crimes committed. 
Finally, territorial displacement is a shift in the location of the offense. It should also be 
noted that these types of displacement can co-occur. For example, an offender may 
change their methods, targets, and offenses simultaneously, all of which complicate the 
quantification of displacement (Hesseling, 1994). While these differences are important, 
there has clearly been an emphasis on territorial displacement in the contemporary 
literature.  
Second, Reppetto draws a distinction between those interventions which are more 
likely to lead to crime displacement. Interventions which target the root causes of crime, 
such as social welfare, can reduce crime in an absolute sense; however, those which 
merely reduce opportunities or increase risk do not offer the same security of absolute 





securely locked or a street that is well patrolled does not lessen an offender’s crime 
propensities in an absolute sense, but only vis-à-vis those targets” (1976, p.167). 
However, reducing an individual’s motivation for crime is quite difficult given 
both the ambiguity and complexity of its causes, as well as the difficult task of changing 
these factors once identified. Those interventions which reduce opportunity or increase 
risk, which Reppetto dubs “mechanical,” are generally more manageable for criminal 
justice agents to enact. Therefore, Reppetto understands why these types of interventions 
would be attractive to interventionists. Since these mechanical interventions cannot be 
omni-present in a community, there will always be a degree of disparity within a given 
environment. It is at this point Reppetto (p.167) asks the logical follow up question, 
“Given the differential and no reduction in the offender population [since mechanical 
interventions do not address root causes], will not the foreclosure of one type of criminal 
opportunity simply shift the incidence of crime to different forms, times, and locales?” 
This latter point is important, since most hot spots policing interventions utilize 
“mechanical” approaches. It would seem then, from Reppetto’s perspective, that they are 
likely to lead to crime displacement since they do not address the root causes of crime. 
It should be noted that even when displacement does occur, it may still provide 
some aggregate benefit. For example, if 100 crimes are displaced into an adjacent control 
area, but 200 crimes were prevented in the experimental location, there was still a net 
decrease of 100 crimes. Additionally, these 100 crimes displaced may be less harmful 
than those 200 prevented, which may also classify as being “benign” (Guerette and 
Bowers, 2009). Guerette and Bowers argue that benign displacement could reduce overall 





victims to reduce the frequency of repeat victimization, transfer the crime away special 
populations which may be more vulnerable such as children and elderly, and finally, 
displace crime where it is less harmful to the community. For example, a drug market 
may be displaced to a less densely populated area thus affecting fewer denizens. 
Malign as opposed to benign displacement occurs when it increases the amount of 
harm; the opposite process to that described above. It can occur in a number of ways such 
as when the amount of crime prevented is outweighed by the amount of crime 
displacement, when the types of offenses are more harmful, such as the reduction of 
burglaries leading to a displacement of robberies, or for example, when the victims are 
particularly vulnerable populations. 
When the benefits of a place-based initiative outweigh the harms and displaced 
harms, it can be said to be effective. The challenge rests on being able to quantify both 
the benefits and harms. The next section reviews how studies of crime displacement 
typically quantify the harms and benefits, outlines the findings of these evaluations, and 
discusses the shortcomings of the one approach almost universally used to document 
displacement—buffer zones.  
Crime Displacement Empirical Findings 
 
While all geographically focused interventions ostensibly concentrate their efforts 
on a relatively “micro” area
13
, the tactics used vary widely. Within the displacement 
literature, these interventions can usually be classified as falling into either situational 
crime prevention (Cornish and Clarke, 2003) or policing-led efforts (Bowers et al., 2011). 
While these two approaches are not necessarily mutually exclusive, as police-led 
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interventions could be considered a way to increase formal surveillance under Cornish 
and Clark’s SCP taxonomy, it provides a way to draw a contrast between those 
interventions which are largely police-based, such as the 2011 SCI, versus those that are 
based on changing the physical environment
14
. Given the current works focus on police-
led interventions, the review of the displacement literature will focus on empirical 
evaluations of police centric tactics. 
Many of the aforementioned impact evaluations of police-led hot spots 
interventions also examined crime displacement. The collective wisdom from these 
studies, as well as from systematic reviews and meta-analyses, has led most scholars to 
conclude that crime does not “just move around the corner.” 
The Jersey City Drug Market Experiment examined the spread of crime calls to 
buffer zones (areas immediately adjacent to the drug hot spots) finding no evidence of 
crime displacement in experimental versus treatment control sites. Indeed, the authors 
found what has been termed a “diffusion of crime control benefits.” Calls for narcotics 
and public morals had decreased in the experimental buffers compared to the control, 
despite the lack of increased police presence in these areas. The authors further examined 
any potential displacement by looking for the emergence of new crime hot spots. Using 
this approach, researchers did note some evidence of new hot spots, but this type of 
displacement was more than twice as likely to occur near a control versus experimental 
location. Thirty-six new hot spots were identified within one block of control locations, 
compared to 19 new hot spots within one block of experimental locations (Weisburd and 
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Green, 1995). In addition, 18 other newly identified segments were found post-
intervention. 
However, without being able to follow specific individuals, it is hard to determine 
whether these increases are due to offenders being displaced from experimental versus 
control sites. Increases in the control locations could arise from displaced treatment 
offenders. Moreover, relying on statistical thresholds to identify new hot spots presumes 
that any displacement which occurs will cluster, when in fact displaced individuals may 
be displaced stochastically. That total sum of displacement may be high, but if it is not 
concentrated in the same location, it would be hard to detect using the researchers 
approach. 
In Massachusetts Braga and Bond (2008) used a similar buffer zone approach, 
examining displaced crime in two block catchment areas around all 34 hot spots. While 
all calls for service categories (assault, burglary/breaking and entering, larceny theft, and 
disorder) had small increases in experimental compared to control buffer zones, none 
were statistically significant. While this may suggest a modest degree of displacement, 
the authors point out that these small increases do not outweigh the reductions achieved 
in the treatment locations.  
Taylor and colleagues (2011) examined displacement, again, using a buffer zone 
approach. Researchers examined crime displacement in adjacent areas between 100
15
 and 
500 feet, finding neither problem oriented policing, or patrol saturation, produced 
statistically significant changes in UCR property or violent crime. However, problem 
oriented policing buffer zones experienced a 29% increase in any violence (including 
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domestic violence) and 31% increase for street violence calls for service. The researchers 
argue that the POP intervention made residents more sensitive, more engaged with the 
ongoing policing efforts, and thus more likely to report crime. Given the unfiltered nature 
of calls for service, and the high false positive rate, they are not necessarily a valid 
measure of displaced crime. 
In Sacramento, the analysis of displacement was limited, given that many of the 
control and experimental hot spots were in close proximity of one another. Thus, one to 
two block catchment areas could not be calculated for most of the hot spots. Of the 83 hot 
spots in the study, only 11 treatment and 9 controls could be contrasted. While increases 
were noted in the treatment catchment areas, and reductions in the control catchment 
areas, none of the differences were statistically significant (Telep, et al., 2012). 
Weisburd and colleagues (2006) in Jersey City conducted the first study 
specifically designed to examine crime displacement, overcoming a number of 
limitations of prior evaluations (see Weisburd and Green, 1995). The study focused on 
two street level crime hot spots (one with drug crime and one with street-solicitation for 
prostitution), relying on a mixture of patrol saturation, chronic offender targeting, 
physical disorder clean up, and linking prostitutes to community social supports. Similar 
to most methods use to examine crime displacement, authors relied on a buffer zone 
approach. However, researchers also relied on a unique combination of data to examine 
whether targeted policing interventions displace drug crime or prostitution including 
social observations, arrestee interviews, and ethnographies. 
Findings indicate that target locations experienced reductions in crime, and that 





qualitative data allowed researchers to examine the mechanisms by which crime was not 
displaced. Interviews of prostitutes were revealing in that they cited the difficulty it was 
to simply move their operation to another part of the city. They could not impede on 
another prostitutes turf and they could not work in areas they were unfamiliar with. 
Prostitutes need to be familiar with area in order to work there. 
Systematic Reviews and Meta Analyses 
 
Perhaps the best synthesis of the police led crime displacement literature is the 
Campbell Collaboration systematic review by Kate Bowers and colleagues (2011). 
Systematic reviews use transparent guidelines to select, evaluate, and synthesize the 
results of a given body of literature. Campbell Collaboration reviews also search for 
unpublished research to avoid publication bias, rely on at least two reviewers working 
independently to identify eligible studies, and undergo peer review (Campbell 
Collaboration, 2013). It is these qualities which make this type of synthesis more 
objective, especially when compared to narrative reviews. 
While not the first review of crime displacement (see Barr and Pease, 1990; Eck, 
1993; Hesseling, 1994), Bowers et al., improved on these earlier reviews in a number of 
ways. First, all the reviews are quite dated given the myriad of research that has been 
conducted in the 16 years since the most recent review. Second, all the reviews were 
descriptive in nature, not relying on more common meta-analytic techniques used in 
many criminological systematic reviews. Third, the weight displacement quotient, a 
standard statistical tool to measure displacement and diffusion of crime control benefits 





After an exhaustive search of the literature, 44 studies were included for review, 
of which, 16 contained enough information to be included in a meta-analysis. Results of 
this analysis indicate that geographically focused policing interventions are associated 
with statistically significant crime reductions with some evidence (non-significant, but in 
the right direction) of diffusion of crime control benefits. Among the policing led 
approaches, problem-oriented policing appeared most closely related to a diffusion of 
crime control benefits than other tactics. 
Measuring Crime Displacement Using Buffer Zones 
 
During the first randomized experiment of hot spots policing in Minneapolis 
Minnesota (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), officers commonly remarked that crime 
would, “just move around the corner” in response to the police crackdown. This maxim 
offered a simple yet testable hypothesis which has been reiterated in some form since 
Reppetto’s first formal statement of the problem in 1976. In his influential article, he 
argued that robbers and burglars seemed tied to smaller geographic areas. When 
examining the crime patterns of individual offenders, Reppetto noted that they all seem to 
cluster suggesting individuals are not highly mobile. Thus, if crime is to be displaced, it 
likely will not move far away from the treatment area due to this immobility of offenders. 
Furthermore, Reppetto discussed how interventions which reduce crime in one 
neighborhood may cause adjacent ones to, “experience a crime wave” (p.168). 
There have been relatively few methodological advances in the study of crime 
displacement since the 1990s, when the phenomenon started receiving widespread 
empirical evaluation. With a handful of exceptions, virtually every published study 





zones, sometimes referred to catchment areas, are drawn around the experimental 
location to “catch” any spillover from the treatment location. Typically, “a buffer is most 
commonly visualized as a uniform polygon shape that extends around an object” 
(Ratcliffe and Breen, 2011, p.234). 















                                      Catchment area 
 




While this approach was probably adopted because of its simplicity, there are 
some technical challenges in selecting an appropriate catchment area. As Weisburd and 
Green (1995) have articulated, it is a balance of selecting a size that is not so large that it 
will “wash out” any displacement effect, but large enough to detect such displacement if 
it in fact occurs. Large crime reductions within the hot spots, which may be statistically 
significant, are likely to be washed out when compared to totals in the catchment area. 
For example, Weisburd and Green (1995) noted that a reduction of 49 crime calls in one 





significant, would be unlikely to amount to much effect if displaced to a buffer zone with 
1,116 crime calls per year.  
A second issue also highlighted by Weisburd and Green (1995, p.727) is the 
“displacement contamination” effect of selecting non-mutually exclusive displacement 
buffer zones, control sites and or experimental sites. When these sites are close enough in 
space it makes separating the effects of crime reduction, displacement, and diffusion of 
benefits particularly thorny (see Telep et al., 2012). This can be easily overcome if the 
control and experimental sites are far away from each other, but in the end how far is far 
enough is a had to discern. Similarly, Ratcliffe and Breen argue that buffer zones that are 
too large will incorporate crime events generated by local contextual factors, not by 
displaced offenders from the treatment area. Buffers that are too small may miss 
displaced offenders (or diffusion of benefit effects), and may spill into the control areas if 
they are both small and proximate to controls (2011). Importantly, when examining 
displacement or diffusion, the researcher should be cognizant that reductions in the buffer 
zone may be unrelated the treatment intervention, and instead be a product of crime 
prevention measures in the buffer zone. 
Finally, when selecting a buffer zone natural boundaries must be considered. If a 
target location is near a river or park, it probably does not make sense to draw a buffer 
around the treatment area as these natural boundaries may increase the risk and effort of 
committing a crime. Ratcliffe and Breen (2011) take this a step further, arguing that 
“perceptual” boundaries, those which are not easily visible like a river or highway, 
should be recognized when making buffer zone boundary decisions. Buffers which 





population, or a location with a different gang territory, need to be factored into this 
selection process. 
Weighted Displacement Quotient 
 
A newer and increasingly used technique to measure displacement, the weighted 
displacement quotient, has been described by its developers as providing, “a systematic 
way of measuring the geographical displacement of crime” (Bowers and Johnson, 2003, 
p.300). The WDQ addresses a number of measurement critiques of the standard buffer 
zone methodology by examining both the potential success and displacement of the 
intervention simultaneously, examining relative changes in crime and displacement, and 
standardizing the calculation by using crime rates, thus making it possible to compare 
across interventions. 
To calculate a WDQ requires the selection of three areas: 1. The target area where 
the intervention is employed. 2. A buffer zone estimated to be the most likely location 
where crime would be displaced and. 3. A control area to provide a counterfactual to the 
treatment location. 
 
     
               
               
 
 
A: frequency of crime in intervention location 
B: frequency of crime in buffer location 
C: frequency of crime in control location 
t1: time of the intervention period 






1. Over any given time period, buffer zone B will account for a particular proportion 
of the crime committed within a control area (C). 
2. If geographic displacement does occur it should displace from the intervention 
(A) into the buffer zone (B) that surrounds it; and 
3. If displacement does occur, then, relative to the control area (C), crime in the 
buffer zone (B) should increase while crime in the action area (A) should 
decrease. 




WDQ > 1 
WDQ near 1 
1> WDQ >0 
WDQ=0 
0> WDQ >-1 
WDQ near -1 
WDQ<-1 
Diffusion greater than direct effects  Positive net effect of the program 
Diffusion about equal to direct effects 
Diffusion, but less than direct effects 
No displacement or diffusion 
Displacement, but less than direct effects 
Displacement about equal to direct effects No net benefit to program 
Displacement greater than direct effects Program worse than doing nothing 




Finally, it should be noted that at least one piece of research relied, in part, on 
ethnographies of offenders to study crime displacement. In Jersey City New Jersey 
Weisburd and colleagues (2006) consulted an independent ethnographer to interview 49 
prostitutes in order to provide a non-bias sample of offenders in the targeted areas
16
. 
Interestingly, the ethnographer found that many prostitutes were changing their methods 
by moving business indoors, utilizing phone or beepers to arrange meetings, quizzing 
clients, and disguising their own looks.  
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This seems to indicate a degree of resilience to the offenders, a concept not often 
invoked in the displacement literature. When police conducted a crackdown on 
prostitution, the targets of this intervention were able to adapt to a degree and continue 
their illegal behavior. Therefore, it does not seem all that illogical that perhaps one 
method of adaption was to shift their territory to non-adjacent areas. However, the 
authors of this research are unable to determine this based on their methodology—they 
only interviewed individual’s active in the target locations. Moreover, there were no 
interviews conducted with Johns to determine if their behavior had changed as well.  
While qualitative approaches are important and provide context to the study of 
crime displacement, the current work focuses on the quantification of crime 
displacement, by far the most common approach to assessing displacement. However, at 
least in the context of Weisburd et al., (2006), ethnographic studies provide a degree of 
support to the notion that crime may be displaced through the resilience of offenders and 
their ability to adapt their modus operandi. 
Buffer Zone Approaches: Limitations and New Directions 
  
The buffer zone approach and other approaches which rely on selecting adjacent 
areas to measure displacement (WDQ) are only adequate if the sole concern of police 
crackdowns is their ability to displace crime literally around the corner, typically just a 
few blocks from the treatment location. This view is an oversimplification of the 
problem. Scholars have taken the “move around the corner” problem quite literally and 
have neglected to examine non-adjacent displacement. As Guerette and Bowers have 
stated, “the proximity hypothesis of displacement is the outgrowth of theories on crime 





takes a more nuanced look at crime displacement, by arguing certain types of offenses 
and offenders, such as robbers, are more displaceable. By focusing on the unique 
characteristics of these offenders, the places they target, and the impact produced by the 
intervention under study, the current work is able to develop a broader range of 
displacement possibilities. While short of developing a theory of crime displacement, the 
current work links the theories and empirical findings of Situational Action Theory 
(Wikström et al., 2012) and Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) to 
develop a theoretically and empirically informed set of testable hypotheses regarding the 
displacement of crime.  
Theories of Robbery Placement and Displacement 
 
The coupling of crime to place at what has been termed crime hot spots creates a 
framework for understanding both the placement and displacement of crime. As 
documented previously, a growing body of research indicates that much crime tightly 
clusters in micro-places, that these clusters are “placed” in relation to certain opportunity 
and social conditions, and that these clusters are relatively stable over time (see Weisburd 
et al., 2012). These facts suggest there are unique features of these places which attract 
crime to occur there rather than elsewhere. Therefore, displacement from these locations 
by governmental actions to lower crime may be, in theory, less likely to occur if one 
assumes the relevant features of hot spots are unavailable in other areas. 
While there is a growing body of research on the placement of crime, less 
scholarly attention has been given to changes in these locations in reaction to a police 
crackdown. There are generally two competing hypotheses about the effects of increased 





clearly theoretical terms. These hypotheses are, simply stated, that the effect of increased 
threats to apprehend criminals in places will: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Deter crime at the place for a brief time before that effect decays, 
but not spatially displacing crimes that would have happened without increased 
threats  
Hypothesis 2: Deter crime at the place for a brief time before that effect decays, 
with some or all of the crimes deterred in that place displaced elsewhere because 
of the increased threats. 
 
As discussed above, the empirical work on these competing hypotheses generally 
shows that there is minimal displacement of criminal events into immediately adjacent 
areas that are within two blocks of the targeted locations (see Bowers et al., 2011). 
However, to date, no piece of research has tracked individual offenders to look outside 
this two block box surrounding targeted hot spots. The current work plays the devil’s 
advocate by more closely examining this alternative hypothesis (hypothesis 2) that has 
been neglected, by asking whether crimes will be displaced beyond these small buffer 
zones amongst a sample of active robbers, and if so, where such offenses are likely 
relocated. 
 Scholars have studied robber’s target selection, placement of crime, movement 
patterns, and motivations (Conklin, 1972; Feeney, 1986; Gill, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 
1999; Matthews, 2002; Morrison and O’Donnell, 1994; Wright and Decker, 1997), but no 





under which these specific offenders might be deterred or displaced by increased police 
presence or activity. A more developed theoretical view of the possible relationship of 
sanction threats to crime placement can attempt to incorporate a broader range of 
possibilities. Indeed, there is evidence from the target selection research that challenges 
the micro deterrence hypothesis (Hypothesis 1). This evidence suggests that there are 
unique characteristics of places which attract crime, that some individuals are highly 
motivated to commit robberies, that this motivation is likely to endure beyond a police 
crackdown, and that these individuals have the means to displace their offending from 
previously active locations that are beyond small buffer zones.  
The next section, while short of developing a comprehensive theory of robbery 
displacement, suggests that as a potential outcome of police crackdowns, displacement is 
unlikely to be fully captured using small buffer zones. While no such theory exists to 
guide the current work’s more global measurement of robbery displacement, if one did, it 
would have to address two main issues: 
 
Issue 1: What are the characteristics of places that attract crime and robbery more 
specifically? [presumably these are the places to which crime would relocate as 
well] 
Issue 2: Are there characteristics of robbers which prevent them from being 
deterred in the face of a police crackdown, and would these qualities lead them to 






In the next section these two hurdles for developing a theory of crime 
displacement amongst active robbers are explored. Again, while short of developing a 
theory for crime displacement, the next section aims to more fully examine such 
potential. Its method of predicting where robbers might displace their offending is to 
develop a list of places they are most logically to offend if blocked by police action in 
areas where they were previously active. To do so, the applicable theories and empirical 
findings of Situational Action Theory (SAT) (Wikström et al., 2012) and Routine 
Activities Theory (RAT) (Cohen and Felson, 1979) are leveraged. The section concludes 
that if displacement is going to occur, it is more likely to happen amongst a group of 
active robbers who will relocate their crime to locations with a specific set of 
characteristics. Both SAT and RAT are helpful in examining the two issues crime 
displacement theory must address. And both are further explored to create a framework 
for measuring such behavior among active robbers.  
Situational Action Theory and Routine Activities Theory 
 
In an effort to link theories of why certain individuals are more crime prone with 
place-based features that make crimes occurrence more likely, Wikström developed what 
he calls Situational Action Theory (SAT) (Wikström et al., 2012). This interaction is 
described as a perception-choice process with two basic constructs: (1) propensity, which 
depends on a person’s level of morality and self-control and (2) exposure to criminogenic 
environments, which is measured using various forms of social cohesion and informal 
social control. To test his theory Wikström and colleagues (2012) collected a 
comprehensive longitudinal data set on 716 randomly selected young people living in the 





calendars over a seven year period. SAT provides strong evidence on the characteristics 
of places where crime clusters more generally (Issue 1) as well as fleshing out the types 
of offenders who would likely remain undeterred by police activity (Issue 2). Findings 
from this work indicate that crime is most likely to occur in situations that lead crime- 
prone people to come into contact with crime-prone places. SAT helps us understand the 
characteristics of such places and people. Drawing on the routine activities of robbers 
helps undercover which of these crime-prone places crime-prone robbers are most likely 
to target (and presumably relocate their offending), and whether such places are likely to 
exist outside of the buffer zones used to measure crime. 
Routine Activities Theory (RAT) was developed by Cohen and Felson (1979) to 
explain the increase in crime during the 1960s, a time when social and economic 
conditions were improving. More specifically, the theory seeks to explain how macro 
level factors, such as the changing role of women in the workplace, led to micro level 
changes in a person’s or place’s daily activities. The theory states that crime is the 
product of the interaction of three factors: 1. A motivated offender 2. A suitable target 
and 3. The lack of capable guardians. The theory as originally conceived was largely 
silent on explaining offender motivation, instead focusing on “the manner in which the 
spatio-temporal organization of social activities helps people to translate their criminal 
inclinations into action” (p.589). Such an approach suggests that crime clusters are a 
result of these different spatio-temporal clusters of opportunities, operationalized as 
motivated offenders, suitable targets, and a lack of capable guardians. Targets have often 
been college students walking home alone down a dark street talking on their smart 





control of “place managers,” “handlers” and “general guardians.” Place managers may 
watch over specific locations such as stores, banks, or transit stations. Handlers such as 
probation officers or parents may supervise potentially motivated offenders. General 
guardians such as the police or citizen passers-by may be paid or volunteer to patrol 
particular street segments (Felson and Boba, 2010). 
Cohen and Felson (1979), in introducing RAT, were able to link changes in 
guardianship and target attractiveness to increases in crime. During the 1960s, when the 
price of goods per pound rose, and women began entering the workforce in large 
numbers, there were more suitable targets to steal, such as light portable electronics, and 
fewer informal social controls or place managers in the home to guard them, since they 
were increasingly entering the workplace. Findings for RAT have been widely 
documented beyond this initial introduction (Clarke and Felson, 1993; Roncek and 
Maier, 1991; Weisburd et al., 2012). In the current work, RAT helps to frame the 
movement and relocation patterns of robbers specifically, to document where they spend 
their time, where they target victims due to the spatial-temporal clustering of 
opportunities, and whether their activity patterns will relocate their offending to areas 
beyond the two block buffer zones typically used to capture displacement. In what 
follows both SAT and RAT are further explored to develop specific hypotheses regarding 
the displacement of active robbers. 
Characteristics of Places That Attract Crime (Issue 1) 
 
The work of Wikström and colleagues in Peterborough (2012) provides strong 
evidence regarding the characteristics of places where crimes cluster in space. Wikström 





conditions exist that encourage certain people to break the law. According to their theory, 
the degree to which a place is criminogenic depends on its “moral contexts, that is 
different moral norms and levels of enforcement (through formal and informal 
monitoring and intervention and their associated potential consequences), which means 
they differ in the extent to which they encourage or discourage breaches of rules of 
conduct…” (p.16). To examine the place-based characteristics of crime clusters in 
Peterborough, Wikström and colleagues collected a wide range of longitudinal data at the 
neighborhood level of various measures of land usage, social disorganization, crime and 
disorder. Results from a path analysis in Peterborough found five statistically significant 
place-based characteristics that are related to crime: (1) social disadvantage, (2) ethnic 
diversity, (3) residential instability, (4) collective efficacy, and (5) non-residential land 
usage. 
 First, social disadvantage (1) is the degree to which a community lacks social and 
economic resources. It was measured as a factor score of the percentage of an area’s 
residents who are working class, percentage with no or low educational qualifications, 
percentage who reside in social housing, percentage unemployed, and percentage who 
reside in detached houses. Findings in Peterborough indicate that as social disadvantage 
increases so does the frequency of crime in a location. (2) Ethnic diversity is the degree 
to which a location’s residents vary in terms of race or ethnicity. Wikström and 
colleagues hypothesize that ethnic heterogeneity may influence the “social milieu” of a 
neighborhood by impacting its “social cohesion” and the degree to which behavior is 
controlled through informal social control (p.176). In Peterborough, as ethnic diversity 





residential turnover in a location. Wikström and colleagues argue that instability may 
“impede the development of local ties and trust between residents and their neighbors or 
communities, undermining social institutions and hampering the creation of social 
cohesion and the efficacy of informal social control” (p.174). Wikström and colleagues 
found the greater the turnover, the higher rates of crime. 
These three characteristics of place (social disadvantage, ethnic diversity, and 
residential instability) each had a direct impact on crime, but their effects were mediated 
by collective efficacy (4), which Wikström and colleagues define as “residents’ 
willingness to intervene for the common good (i.e. their potential to exercise informal 
social control if needed) as a result of shared expectations and mutual trust in the 
community” (p.34). Originally conceived by Sampson et al (1997) as a way to explain the 
mechanism linking structural sources of social disorganization (such as residential 
instability) with crime in Chicago, low collective efficacy prevents neighbors from acting 
cohesively to establish and enforce norms within a neighborhood. Similar findings have 
been noted in other cities such as Seattle (Weisburd et al., 2012). 
While each of these factors were related to the frequency of crime by location, the 
place-based characteristic with the largest impact on crime was (5) non-residential land 
usage—the larger the proportion of a location’s land that is used in non-residential ways, 
the more crime. Schools, shopping, or city centers are examples of land uses predicting 
more crime. Wikström and colleagues theorize these types of settings may have greater 
numbers of people, and thus more opportunities for crime, per square foot. These places 






In order to develop a set of testable hypotheses amongst one particular type of 
crime, this study will examine the active robbers targeted by the 2011 SCI in Washington 
DC. In framing the research to understand their crime placement and displacement, the 
next section links the findings in Peterborough (2012) to illustrative and quantitative 
research on robbery more generally. 
Characteristics of Places that Attract Robbers (Issue 1) 
 
To understand where robbers may relocate their offending, it is useful to examine 
the decisions and methods they use to select their initial targets. If their offenses are then 
relocated after a police crackdown, they will presumably use similar decisions and 
methods to select targets if their offenses are relocated. To do so the current work 
leverages what is known about robbers and their routine activities, integrating this 
information with previously discussed findings from Peterborough (2012) regarding the 
places offenders more generally target. Routine Activities Theory helps shape our 
understanding of how robbers select targets, how this decision-making may be influenced 
by police action, and how this process may result in non-adjacent displacement. This 
work is compatible with SAT in that both theories argue crime is the product of 
interactions between motivated offenders and unique environments containing 
opportunities for crime that are shaped by the social structure of society. Findings from 
Peterborough point to specific types of places where crime clusters. By understanding 
robbers routine activities it helps place them in these crime prone settings, which is where 
such offenses are likely to relocate. 
Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979) claims that robbery is based, 





individuals (Deakin et al., 2007; Wright and Decker, 1997). Robberies occur when 
potential offenders come into contact with a suitable target with a lack of a guardian. This 
intersection of offender, target, and guardian is not a purposive selection, but occurs by 
convenience as robbers move about their daily lives. This theory has also been referred to 
as being on “alert” (Jacobs, 2010). Robbers, regardless of their level of motivation, are 
always on alert for opportunities throughout the course of their normal routine activities.  
An examination of the empirical literature on robbers helps develop a picture of 
their routine activities, and the specific locations and degree to which they will seek out 
opportunities for crime in the face of a police crackdown. Specifically, there are three 
characteristics of robber’s target selection, that when viewed within a routine activities 
context helps develop a framework for measuring their displacement: (1) effort, (2) risk, 
and (3) reward. When integrating these findings with those in Peterborough, a more 
developed picture of where robbers may relocate their crime emerges. 
 
(1) Effort 
The first characteristic is effort or the amount of time and resources required to 
travel to a given location to offend. Robbers who are more transient probably come into 
contact with more opportunities for crime, ceteris paribus. The majority of empirical 
evaluations of geographically focused policing to date presume that individual offending 
patterns are local in nature, thus any displacement will be captured using the 
aforementioned buffer zone approach (Weisburd et al., 2006). Indeed, offenders do tend 
to favor targets near their home, but this choice is relative, and seldom at the scale which 





suggests that robbers’ routine activities allow them to travel beyond these small buffer 
zones, which is one primary issue to address in developing a theory that could explain 
non-adjacent spatial displacement. 
A number of studies have documented the degree to which robbers will travel 
from their homes to offend (Capone and Nichols, 1976; Van Koppen and Jansen, 1998; 
Wiles and Costello, 2000). For example, Van Koppen and Jansen (1998) studied 434 
robberies amongst 585 robbers that were convicted in a Dutch trial court in 1992, finding 
that close to 70% traveled over 2 kilometers (1.24 miles) to commit their crimes. 
Similarly, Capone and Nichols (1976) studied 642 cleared robberies representing 825 
robbery trips that occurred in the Miami metropolitan area in 1971, finding that close to 
70% of all trips were over one mile, with the average trip being 2.47 miles. These 
distances must be viewed in context with the buffer zones that are usually constructed to 
capture displacement. The typical buffer zone analysis has a two block radius (see 
Bowers et al., 2011), which in Washington D.C. would translate to about 1000 feet or 
.189 miles. Many offenders appear willing to travel beyond the micro geography that 
surrounds their home (Capone and Nichols, 1976; Van Koppen and Jansen, 1998; Wiles 
and Costello, 1998). Thus, much of their displaced offending may not be captured.  
This distance is much greater than the typical buffer zones used, but these travel 
patterns are not so great to preclude their being measureable within the boundaries of 
Washington D.C. Wiles and Costello, for example, examined burglary and taking of 
autos without owners consent (TWOC)
17
 data from South and North Yorkshire police 
forces, finding that over 50% of all offenses were within two miles, and nearly 70% 
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within three. Importantly, the low levels of effort offenders are willing to put into travel 
from their home tethers the majority of them to locations within Washington DC
18
. 
Indeed, it has been a long documented finding that robbers and offenders more generally 
follow a distance decay pattern when selecting targets (Conklin, 1972; Van Koppen and 
Jansen, 1998). Therefore, while many are likely to offend beyond small buffer zones, the 
probability becomes increasingly small as the distance away from their home increases, 
to the point where offending for many of the robbers in this study beyond the D.C. city 
limits is unlikely. This evidence does not lead to any specific hypotheses regarding the 
relocation of robbers’ offending. It does, however, suggest that the vast majority of crime 
displacement studies to date are unable to capture the full spectrum of crime 
displacement due to the methodological limitation created when measuring such behavior 
within small two block buffer zones.  
Effort is also related to the degree with which one is familiar with a place. 
Offenders whose routine activities place them in contact with a large number of 
opportunities will require less effort to leverage them compared to offenders who are less 
wide-ranging. Thus, mobility helps offenders construct opportunities. Some will “bank” 
potential “deposits” of suitable targets where capable guardians are lacking. Indeed, 
evidence suggests that a robber’s ability to commit crime and displace their spatial 
selection is bounded by their degree of familiarity with a place (Deakin et al., 2007; 
Reppetto, 1976; Wiles and Costello, 2000; Wright and Decker, 1997). According to 
interviews of robbers conducted by Wright and Decker (1997), robbers did not select 
opportunities at random, but were bounded by locations they were already familiar with. 
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Nearly all the robbers interviewed explained they chose places they were “acquainted” 
(p.74) with where they knew the points of entry and exit.  
 While offenders may not travel to a specific location for the purpose of 
committing a crime, they are constantly on the lookout for a good opportunity. For 
example, when examining the reasons why the 70 Sheffield-based convicted burglars and 
car-jackers interviewed by Wiles and Costello (2000) were initially in the area where 
they ultimately offended, close to 70% said they were there for reasons other than 
offending. Indeed, approximately 30% (of the 70%) claimed they were in the area to visit 
friends, for shopping or leisure, or just happened across the target by chance. While this 
sample was not exclusively amongst robbers, it does suggest the opportune nature of 
many criminals which further suggests that they look for opportunities for crime during 
the course of their routine activities. This seems supported by Wright and Decker’s 
interviews with burglars who claim to always be “half looking” (Wright and Decker, 
1994, p.79). This is also true among the robbers they interviewed, who would encounter 
opportunities for crime during the course of their everyday routine activities (1997). 
Understanding the routine activities of robbers is thus important when attempting to 
develop a framework for studying crime displacement.  
Robbers’ routine activities tend to place them in locations near their current and 
previous homes. Using a stratified random sample of 4,410 offenders arrested for 
burglary, theft from a car, robbery, or assault in The Hague, Bernasco (2010) examined 
the impact of offenders’ residential histories on the probability of choosing such past 
locations for crime. He found that offenders are more likely to choose locations where 





where they have never lived. Specifically, robbers are over four times as likely to choose 
their current home area compared to areas they have never lived, and similarly are nearly 
three times as likely to choose an area they formerly lived compared to areas they have 
never lived.  
This research indicates that if robbers are blocked from committing a crime in one 
of the SCI areas, they are more likely to select their next offense in places they are 
familiar with through their routine activities. This may include their current and previous 
homes, and perhaps locations where they have previously been arrested or committed 
crime. These places may also serve as a proxy for the places they generally “hang-out,” 
since many offenders are stopped and arrested by the police in such places. A person’s 
routine activities and the degree to which they encounter opportunity are not static. When 
offenders move their residences they develop new travel patterns and familiarities, but 
that does not necessarily “knife off” their knowledge and ability to leverage past spaces 
and travel patterns for offending. 
These findings are similar to those amongst offenders more generally in 
Peterborough, where a large percentage of young offenders’ crime was located near 
where they lived. Among all violent offenses, such as robbery, nearly 56% were 
committed within 1000 meters of a young person’s home (Wikström et al., 2012, p.243). 
While other more distant locations are also targeted, as discussed below, a prime location 
to search for displaced robbers is near where they live, where they previous lived, or 
where they have been arrested or previously offended. 
Offense type displacement is also a common theme in robbery ethnographies 





willingness to displace their behavior to other crimes when robbery opportunities are 
blocked. While the robbers in Wright and Decker expressed their desires, rationales, and 
expertise in committing robbery, many argued that in times of “financial desperation,” 
which indeed classifies a large number of robbers, they might select viable alternatives 
such as theft, motor vehicle theft, or burglary. Moreover, there is evidence from a range 
of studies which supports the cafeteria style nature of offending (Piquero, 2000; Piquero 
et al., 2007; Sampson and Laub, 1993). Thus, the current work examines not only 
whether active robbers displace their behavior to robbery elsewhere, but whether they 
displace any instrumental offending both locally and non-locally. Based on the 
aforementioned empirical findings on robbers’ target selection in The Hague (Bernasco, 
2010), and the ethnographic work on offense type displacement (Deakin et al., 2007; 
Wright and Decker, 1997), the following two hypotheses on crime displacement are 
derived: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Robbers respond to a police crackdown in one place by relocating 
their offending to places they formerly lived or currently live, and locations they 
have previously been arrested or previously committed a crime.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Individuals who are blocked by increased police patrols from 
committing robberies in one location will displace their behavior to other 






Opponents of the locational displacement hypothesis often argue that because 
most people’s routine activities are limited, they are not and cannot become familiar with 
new places and opportunities easily. There is evidence to the contrary. The likelihood of 
finding another opportunity may be directly related to number of places with which a 
person is familiar. A person may be half-looking, but if this occurs in the same two 
locations, their likelihood of finding another opportunity is smaller when compared to an 
offender looking in 10 places, ceteris paribus. Importantly, beyond examining the 
reasons for being in the area, Wiles and Costello (2000) also identified the extent of 
offenders’ familiarity with places. Over half of offenders interviewed had lived in more 
than two neighborhoods, saying they were familiar with 14 of the 23 areas of the city 
shown to them on a map, with the city center being known by all offenders. At least 
seven areas were known by over 66% of offenders. This suggests that an offender’s 
routine activities may not be as limited as suggested by studies which rely on buffer 
zones, thus providing these individuals with the familiarity of alternative opportunities 
for crime that enables them to displace there offending. 
 In addition, while the robbers interviewed by Wright and Decker (1997) chose 
locations with which they were familiar, 32 of the 81 interviewees were highly transient, 
rarely sleeping in the same place longer than a few consecutive nights. Offenders 
preferred this nomadic lifestyle, with many of them having a number of resting spots at 
their parents, girlfriends, and friend’s houses. If this highly mobile lifestyle is 
generalizable beyond 32 robbers in St. Louis—which is unknown—it is likely that at 
least some offenders are familiar with more than a handful of places in the city and thus 





Even amongst those offenders who are not highly transient, it is still possible that 
highly motivated offenders can learn of new opportunities relatively easily. Deakin and 
colleagues (2007) interviewed 20 robbers incarcerated or under community supervision, 
finding that many of them had a “patch” they preferred to operate where they believed 
there would be a crop of suitable victims. In many instances these victims were students 
or individuals who appeared affluent. However, while offenders favored their patch, they 
also indicated the ability to quickly become familiar with places previously unknown, 
suggesting the familiarity of place is an easy barrier to overcome. Of the robbers “still 
active” (p.64) at the time of the interviews, they acknowledged noticing the presence of 
police when police held campaigns targeting hot spots. They also said, however, that it 
did little to deter their offending. This may merely be bravado, which is why the current 
work attempts to empirically test such claims. Indeed, several offenders commented they 
could easily travel to other locations to commit robberies that were policed less, or 
simply displace their offending to burglary. While acting on such claims may be related 
to the degree to which robbers are crime prone, the analysis of the effort needed to 
displace criminal behavior seems plausible. It at least provides some basis for 
understanding how robbers select targets, how familiar they are with many areas of the 




Risk, as theoretically perceived by a motivated potential offender, is the 





officer or will stand out in some other way, calling attention to their movements and 
behavior (Felson and Boba, 2010). Regardless of how familiar a person is with a given 
place, or the degree to which they are willing to travel from their home, they prefer to 
offend in locations where they blend in. Offenders feel the need to fit in to the location 
they are targeting, believing it reduces suspicion and red flags amongst would-be 
guardians who are likely to report their activity to the police. Additionally, fitting into the 
natural backdrop of the location affords an offender the necessary time to become 
familiar with the targets more intimately if necessary. Guardians cannot be capable if 
they are unable to recognize a robber or moreover, unusual behavior, amongst 
themselves. Robbers often cite sticking to places with a similar social and racial makeup 
to blend in (Wright and Decker, 1997). 
These claims have been tested empirically. Of the 75,078 geocodable robberies in 
Chicago between 1996 and 1998, Bernasco and Block (2009) examined 18,017 offender-
offense robbery arrests, finding a preference toward choosing locations with social 
characteristics similar to their own. When racial and ethnic dissimilarity between an 
offender’s home location and a location with potential targets change from being 
completely similar to dissimilar, the odds of them picking this location decrease by 58%. 
While the mechanism is different, this robbery-specific finding and hypothesis is 
in line with the results in Peterborough—locations with a higher percentage of working 
class, low educational qualifications, subsidized housing, and unemployed population had 
higher rates of crime (Wikström et al., 2012, p.203). In Washington DC and amongst the 
areas and robbers in the current study, these are indeed locations that are high in social 





the locations that are high in social disorganization are likely the very same locations 
robbers in the current cohort will “fit in.” Therefore, robbers may believe the risk of 
apprehension is lower and thus displace their offending to areas with a similar economic 
and racial background as their own because they “fit in.” They may also choose these 
locations, as SAT implies, because they are socially disorganized and thus unable to 
establish the social norms and informal social control necessary to deter crime. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Robbers faced with a police crackdown will relocate their 
offending to areas with a similar economic and racial background as their own, 
which are areas high in social disorganization 
 
(3) Reward 
Robbers choose locations where they are likely to find suitable targets such as 
victims who carry cash and other valuable goods (Deakin et al., 2007; St. Jean, 2007; 
Wright and Decker, 1997). Places near ATMs, check cashing outlets, pawn shops, and 
bars have been linked to an increase in robberies (Roncek and Maier, 1991). Indeed, the 
“most popular” sites selected by robbers in Wright and Decker’s sample were around 
check cashing places and ATMs (p.77). Similarly, in an examination of Chicago Police 
Beats, St. Jean found that robbers primarily targeted locations where cash transactions 
were the norm (2007). College students are viewed as being the best targets, because they 
were likely to be carrying cash or other valuable goods, likely to be intoxicated, and less 





Similarly, in Wikström et al (2012), the place-based characteristic with the largest 
impact on crime was non-residential land usage. These are places which attract people 
for, “shopping, eating out, consuming alcohol, and other pastimes (e.g. going to the 
cinema, bowling, ice skating (p.295).” In Washington DC these would be places like 
Chinatown, which contain a similar set of activities and concentrations of people. 
Findings from Peterborough indicate the “vast majority (p.243)” of offending by youth 
occurred in city centers, which importantly, attracted youth from all over the city. These 
are places that likely contain the opportunities which attracted robbers interviewed by 
Wright and Decker and found in the empirical work by Roncek and Maier (1991). The 
evidence from Peterborough (2012) also indicates that these types of settings most likely 
involve unstructured activity, which they found to be directly related to crime. Indeed, 
nearly all youth crime occurred during semi or unstructured activities, which are often 
concentrated in city centers. Therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest the following: 
 
Hypothesis 4: Areas within 1000 feet of a bar, ATM/bank, liquor store, or college 
campus, are more likely to attract displaced robbers. 
 
The previous section developed four hypotheses regarding the likely relocation of 
robbers if they were to displace their offending both in adjacent and non-adjacent ways in 
the face of a police crackdown. However, these characteristics of place are only one of 
two pieces needed to develop a framework for understanding and testing the 
displacement of active robbers. As Wikström and colleagues have documented, crime is 





environment. The rate of crimes per 1,000 person hours in Peterborough was greatest 
when high risk youth (propensity) spent time in high risk environments (criminogenic 
environments). Importantly, “young people with a low crime propensity did not offend 
under practically any circumstances” (p.363). Thus, based on SAT it can be hypothesized 
that displacement will only occur if a person’s propensity toward crime is relatively 
strong and that such a person comes into contact (or interaction) with criminogenic 
environments. This interaction is similar within RAT, where areas with a lack of capable 
guardians and presence of suitable targets must come into contact with a motivated 
offender (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Beyond documenting the types of criminogenic 
places where crime and specifically robbery concentrates (and is thus most likely to 
relocate), it is necessary to examine whether robbers contain enough crime propensity or 
motivation to relocate their offending in the aforementioned ways.  
Characteristics of Robbers Who Will Relocate Their Offending (Issue 2) 
 
Police crackdowns arguably re-shape the opportunity structures which have 
supported crime in the past. For criminal events to be displaced in response to a changed 
opportunity structure, offenders must have sufficient motivation to deviate from their 
“normal” offending patterns. Moreover, these targets must exist, and must not require a 
more elaborate skill set or more intensive level of effort. These requirements can be 
inferred, for example, from the changes in suicides in England and Wales, which took a 
dramatic drop in the 1960s and 70s. This drop has been explained by the removal of 
carbon monoxide from the public gas supply. While method displacement to hanging or 
poisoning was still available, no relatively quick and easy method such as domestic gas 





take advantage of their gas stove, but not so motivated or skilled to hang or poison 
themselves.  
For robbers to displace their offending, they must be motivated enough to 
continue offending in the face of a police crackdown. The motivation necessary for 
displacement to occur is explored in the next paragraphs. By drawing largely from 
ethnographies of robbers both on the street and incarcerated, a wealth of information 
regarding what has been referred to as “the immediate social context in which offenders 
construct criminal decisions” (Hochstetler, 2001, p.737) is provided. The goal of this 
section is to deduce whether robbers targeted by the SCI have enough crime propensity or 
motivation to relocate their offending.  Understanding a robber’s motivation helps build a 
case for testing their displacement.  
Offender motivation is often neglected in the criminology of place and frequently 
assumed to be a given if the right set of situational inducements are present. For example, 
routine activities theory assumes offenders are motivated, and instead focuses on the 
presence of suitable targets and capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979). Crime will 
only occur if a location has suitable targets and a lack of capable guardians in the 
presence of a motivated offender. Luckily, more information can be leveraged from SAT. 
Wikström and colleagues argue that a person will choose to break a law if the opportunity 
arises and that person has a high crime propensity, which is determined by their degree of 
morality and self-control. Morality is the degree to which it is important to a person to 
obey laws more generally (and with respect to specific actions such as violence) and the 
strength with which one adheres to these beliefs—as indicated by any shame or guilt they 





their executive functioning abilities and incident- specific factors such as their degree of 
intoxication or emotional state.  
While the degree of morality and self-control of offenders in the current study 
cannot be directly measured, it may be a moot point. It can be argued that being an active 
robber likely already qualifies them as crime-prone according to SAT. Therefore it may 
be useful to re-frame SAT’s crime propensity in terms of whether it is maintained in the 
face of the SCI crackdown blocking opportunities. While all active robbers selected in the 
current work arguably are already crime prone, how strong are these beliefs and how 
strongly will they adhere to them? 
There is little research on what robbers say they would do in the face of a 
geographically focused police crackdown (see Deakin et al., 2007 for an exception). 
Therefore, the next section attempts to hypothesize what they would do before 
empirically testing changes in their actual behavior. These hypotheses draw on evidence 
that is consistent with the displacement hypothesis, for the sake of framing and testing 
these statements. This research suggests that robbers are motivated to commit their 
crimes for a variety of reasons, and for many, this motivation seems pressing, enduring, 
and unlikely to be repressed by a police crackdown. These offenders are likely the most 
displaceable. Indeed, this evidence suggests that many robbers are not deterrable in the 
face of a police crackdown, and will merely relocate their offending to new locations. 
The following section outlines three primary motivations amongst robbers which speaks 







Money for Life’s Essentials 
Robbers often cite money as a primary motivation (Conklin, 1972; Feeney, 1986; 
Gill, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Matthews, 2002; Morrison and O’Donnell, 1994; 
Wright and Decker, 1997). Indeed, through interviews of 86 active robbers, Wright and 
Decker (1997) noted that their sample committed their offenses out of a “pressing need” 
for cash. Moreover, many “complained bitterly about the constant pressure of bills,” with 
several of the individuals interviewed by Wright and Decker citing specifically using the 
proceeds to pay bills that were often well past overdue (p.43). Similarly among the 113 
northern California robbers examined by Feeney (1986), many “stressed the difficulty of 
their situations” (p.55) further citing they were “desperate” (p.57). This is also true for 
the 340 convicted armed robbers Matthews (2002) examined, who noted that the 















Table 3 Motivation for Robbery
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psychic rewards 
1 6  
 
Other 
 29 36 
 
Money for Drugs 
 
Often the money obtained is used to support a substance abuse problem, which 
usually far outstrips a person’s ability to support through legal employment (Conklin, 
1972; Feeney, 1986; Shover, 1996; Tunnell, 1992; Wright and Decker, 1997; Wright et 
al., 2006). Wright and colleagues (2006) noted that offenders in their sample frequently 
cited the need for money, but that many cited this need for purposes other than 
purchasing food or paying bills. Amongst their sample of 27 incarcerated robbers in 
Wales and England, 25 mentioned robbing to get money to buy drugs and 20 to buy 
alcohol.  
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 Totals may not add up to 100% as some offenders indicated multiple reasons for committing their crimes. 
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 Of the entire sample interviewed by Wright and Decker, 81 made reference as to their motivation. 
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 Adults only. 
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Jacobs (2000) was able to identify 29 active robbers in St. Louis who targeted 
drug dealers as robbery victims as a means to both obtain cash to purchase illicit mind-
altering substances as well as to obtain drugs from the dealers directly. Offenders often 
cited this need for drugs as constant and pressing throughout the day, with the craving 
wholly consuming their lives and only worsening as their tolerance increases over time. 
The offenders interviewed by Jacobs often did not even conceive of a legal means to 
obtain the money to support their habit, as their neighborhoods were often overrun with 
an ample supply of drug dealers and other opportunities for a quick score of cash and 
drugs. As one offender interviewed stated, “you don’t have to made your mind up, your 
mind already made [sic].” (p.25).  
This evidence suggests the degree to which some robbers are caught up in their 
drug usage and a cycle of crime. It is clearly illustrated in one of the United States’ most 
prolific bank robber Eddie Dodson, who robbed over 60 banks in the mid-1980s to 
support a drug habit (Rehder and Dillow, 2003). This class of robbers, who desperately 
need money, are not likely to stop until this need is met. 
 
Illegal v. Legal Means 
Robbery is also likely to be the primary means many of these offenders have (or 
believe) to obtain the money they crave, often filling in the void of legal income. Many 
robbers are unemployed or underemployed, with poor job prospects given their limited 
education and unstable employment experience and history. Of the 113 robbers from 
northern California examined by Feeney, no juveniles and only 20% of adults who said 





positions (1986). Moreover, robbers often rejected legal means to obtain this money, 
believing robbery was much more lucrative (Jacobs, 2000; Morrison and O’Donnell, 
1994). And despite the associated risks, robbers were often happy with the amount of 
money they obtained. In a sample of 100 incarcerated London robbers, approximately 
54% noted that the money obtained was greater than or equal to what they expected to 
obtain. Whether the money they obtained was in fact equal to or more than what they 
expected does not necessarily matter; what may matter most is what offenders believe 
they will obtain, which is likely to sustain their offending. The offenders examined by 
Morrison and O’Donnell believed their robberies were profitable and because of this may 
be the most motivated to continue their offending.   
 Many robbers are pressed for cash and likely have few legitimate avenues to 
fulfill this need. This motivation is not likely to be deterred or resolved through an arrest 
focused police crackdown. The 2011 Summer Crime Initiative was not focused on 
providing employment services through certifications, internships, resume building, or 
work-force development more generally, nor did it provide offenders with addiction 
treatment. For those robbers who need jobs, and indeed, there are many, this need is 
likely to remain during and after the SCI. Thus, this group of offenders is likely 
displaceable. 
 
Keeping Up Appearances and The Street Culture 
Individuals also use the proceeds they obtain from robbery to maintain a 
particular standing they have become accustomed to through “non-essential status 





commonly robbed individuals of their cars, gold, and designer clothes which they used to 
impress others and inflate their own self esteem. These goods gave them a certain 
reputation amongst their friends and in the neighborhood more generally that they would 
maintain through more robberies. Similarly, in interviews conducted by Conklin (1972), 
many of the robbers indicated they used the proceeds to purchase nice clothes and other 
“little extras” which would indicate to their friends and others that “they were doing 
alright” (p.69). 
For many robbers the money obtained from their crimes would often not last long. 
Indeed, many offenders cited going on binges of food, drugs, alcohol, and women until 
the money was gone. One convicted robber interviewed by Matthews (2002) said the aim 
of robbery was to “earn it and burn it” (p.32). Robbers often get caught up in this lifestyle 
that values the possession and flaunting of material goods obtained through robbery. 
Offenders deeply committed to keeping up appearances are probably less deterrable, but 
smart enough to relocate their offending in the face of blocked opportunities and 
increases in the risk of apprehension.  
 
Excitement 
Finally, a small proportion of offenders cited the psychological rewards that come 
from robbery, notably the excitement and thrills gained when committing the crime 
(Katz, 1988; Wright et al., 2006). Wright et al 2006 noted that offenders cited the 
pleasure they got when intimidating and controlling their victims. This “buzz” (p.9) was 
also obtained in the fighting that would sometimes ensue when a victim resisted, where 





primary motivation for one robber interview by Wright and Decker (1997), several noted 
psychic rewards as being an ancillary benefit. Indeed, while obtaining money was the 




The degree to which an offender is motivated is likely a strong indicator of 
whether robbers will be un-deterred by police crackdowns and thus relocate their 
offending. While these motivations are varied, evidence suggests that certain robbers are 
strongly motivated to commit robbery and may be the most displaceable. Specifically, 
robbers with a strong, immediate, and pressing need for cash, robbers deeply committed 
to a street culture that values material goods, quick scores, and a loose accounting of 
money, and robbers who gain an emotional satisfaction from their crime, are most likely 
to displace their offending. Robbers appear to be strongly motivated to commit crime and 
may thus be more displaceable than individuals who are prone to fighting, vandalizing, or 
loitering.  
Motivation cannot be directly measured through surveys of self-control and 
morality. Given the criminal history of the population under study, however, each robber 
likely contains varying degrees of situationally-specific crime propensity to relocate their 
offending. Moreover, there are certain characteristics of place and offender decision 
making which help shape crime displacement’s spatial distribution. Offenders are most 
likely to displace their behavior to locations where they can fit in, locations where they 





beyond their routine activities, and locations where there are suitable targets. Based on 
these target selection criteria the current work developed a number of testable hypotheses 
regarding the displacement of robbers in the face of a police crackdown.  
To conclude, the current work proposes to test a number of hypotheses 
(renumbered from above) both regarding the impact of the 2011 SCI and the potential 
diminution of that impact by displacement of all kinds. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The 2011 SCI will reduce robbery offenses in the target locations 
relative to controls during the three month treatment period 
 
Hypothesis 2: These impacts will decay soon after the crackdown ceases, to the 
point where treated and control sites will exhibit statistically indistinguishable 
levels of robbery 
 
Hypothesis 3: As a result of these reductions in robbery, crime in buffer zones 
immediately surrounding the SCI targeted sites will experience increased levels of 
robbery and instrumental crimes relative to control buffers, but show no 
appreciable differences when examining crime in its totality 
 
Hypothesis 4: When tracking a cohort of active robbers, those targeted by the SCI 
will displace their behavior in ways unable to be captured within a two block 
buffer zones. Places such non-adjacent behavior is most likely to occur includes: 





with a similar economic and racial background as their own, which are areas high 
in social disorganization; areas they formerly lived or currently live, and areas 





Chapter 3: Description of the Study City and Intervention 
 
The city of Washington D.C. covers approximately 68 square miles and is situated 
at the confluence of the Potomac and Anacostia rivers. In 2010 the city had a population 
of approximately 601,723, an increase of five percent since 2000, the first increase since 
the 1950s (United States Census). The District has a diverse population with over 60% 
constituting a racial minority group, but this population has a degree of segregation, with 
a disproportionate amount of Whites living in Ward 3, west of Rock Creek Park, and 
similar disproportions of African Americans living in Wards 7 and 8, east of the 
Anacostia River. 
Washington DC is not unlike other major cities included in the hot spots 
displacement literature. When comparing DC to a select group of cities with a well cited 
and well-designed study of hot spots policing (Philadelphia (Ratcliffe et al., 2011), 
Sacramento (Telep et al., 2012), Jacksonville (Taylor et al., 2011), Lowell (Braga and 
Bond, 2008), Jersey City (Weisburd and Green, 1995; Weisburd et al., 2006), 
Minneapolis (Sherman and Weisburd, 1995), Kansas City (Sherman and Rogan, 1995), 
and Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2001), D.C. shows few unique features (Appendix 4: 
Hot Spot City Comparison). 
Of the nine cities selected DC ranks 4
th
 in population, 3
rd
 in density, 6
th
 in land 
area, 3
rd
 in % of the population with at least a high school degree, and 3
rd
 in % of the 
population below the poverty level. However, DC is the only minority majority city, with 
just over 50% of the city’s population being African American. It has the highest median 
household income, and has the largest percentage of its population with at least a 





aggregations, and offer no information about the contextual features of the micro-places 
targeted by police. This level of analysis is explored in Chapter 4. 
Crime 
 
Crime in the District has mimicked that of many other large cities in the United 
States over the past few decades. Violent crime rose to a peak in the early-to-mid 1990s 
partly fueled by the crack epidemic, and then steadily declined (Johnson et al., 2000). 
Once labeled the murder capital of the United States, DC is in the midst of an economic 
and re-development boom. It is hard to travel to any part of the city without seeing a 
skyline filled with cranes. Indeed, according to the Office of the Deputy Mayor for 
Planning and Economic Development (2012), there is currently more than 60 billion 
dollars in commercial, residential, and institutional projects that have been constructed, 
planned, or proposed in the District of Columbia. One area of improvement often 
highlighted by the Metropolitan Police Department is the record lows in homicide in 
recent years. For example, in 2011 there were 108, the lowest number since 1963.  
 
Figure 2: Washington D.C. Property and Violent Crime Rate 1960 – 2010 (Part I 
Offenses) 
 












































































































Metropolitan Police Department 
 
MPD is both a large and diverse police department with 3,814 sworn and 488 
civilian personnel in 2011. While both the number of sworn personnel and budget were 
down approximately 2.5% from calendar year 2010 – 2011 (MPD Annual Report, 2012), 
in terms of full time sworn personnel, the Metropolitan Police Department is still the six 
largest local force in the United States, and has more officers per capita, than any other 
force in the top 50 (Reaves, 2011). In 2011 23% of its sworn personnel were female and 
60% were African American. MPD is also home to one of the few female Police Chiefs 
of a large urban police department. According to a 2008 survey conducted by the 
National Center for Women and Policing, less than 2 percent of the total number of chiefs 
was female (2013). 
Like almost all police departments in the United States MPD is organized 
hierarchically with a Chief of Police at top and five Assistant Chief’s immediately below 
who oversee a number of specialized units such as internal affairs, professional 
development, homeland security, patrol services and school security bureau, and strategic 
services. MPD divides the management of the city into 7 districts with each District being 
further subdivided into at least five police services areas for a total of 46
23
. 
Washington D.C. is also home to more law enforcement agencies than perhaps 
any other city in America. Beyond the Metropolitan Police Department, a number of 
other agencies have jurisdiction in the District including the District of Columbia 
Protective Services Police Department, Federal Bureau of Investigation Police, Metro 
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 On January 1, 2012 MPD realigned patrol-service boundaries due to an imbalance in the workload of 
patrol. Boundaries were realigned based on an evaluation of crime, calls for service, economic development 
and road-construction plans, and community concerns. Based on this evaluation the number of police 





Transit Police Department, Military Police Corps, Smithsonian Police, Supreme Court 
Police, United States Capitol Police, United States Marshals, United States Mint Police, 
United States Park Police, United States Secret Service, United States State Department 
Diplomatic Security Service, and Washington National Cathedral Police. While this 
makes the study of policing in the District complex, the Metropolitan Police Department 
is the flagship department, with all arrests going through their intake processing unit. 
Thus, any arrest for DC Code violations, including UCR Part I and II offenses, will be 
captured by MPD and included in the current analysis. 




, 2011, the Metropolitan Police Department launched the Summer 
Crime Initiative, codenamed, ICE (Increased Community Enforcement). The 2011 
Summer Crime Initiative sought to reduce violent crime, gun-related offenses, and drug 
related offenses, through a targeted enforcement approach within crime hot spots. 
Beginning in 2010 the initiative has become an annual summer crime reduction tactic for 
Chief Lanier and MPD. 
Management 
During the 2011 SCI, an Inspector was placed in charge of each of the five target 
locations and was responsible for managing the intervention in that hot spot. While the 
Inspector had a degree of discretion as to the response within their area, they generally 
relied on patrol saturation and access to specialized units such as canine, swat, and 
narcotics to suppress crime. Each Inspector placed a team of officers on rotated 12 hours 





officers were free to respond to calls for service outside of the designed hot spot, they 
were given maps of the areas and instructed to preserve the integrity of these boundaries 
as much as possible. 
Identification of Crime Hot Spots 
In order to identify hot spots of crime, MPD relied on Kernel Density Estimation 
(KDE) techniques. Kernel density estimation is a technique commonly used in the 
identification of crime hot spots. The technique places a symmetrical surface over the 
study area, examines the distance of each point (crime) to each cell, and calculates a 
density based on a mathematical function (Levine, 2010). Analysts in the Strategic 
Services Bureau examined concentrations of the offenses assault with deadly weapons, 
carjacking, robberies, and sounds of gun shots in the months prior to the intervention. 
They also included arrests for crack cocaine and PCP, both possession and distribution. 
While analysts did not document the choice of bandwidth, method of interpolations, or 
minimum sample size, it is likely they chose default settings in ArcGIS. 
Finally, the MPD Intelligence Unit augmented the concentrations produced by the 
kernel density techniques by providing street level data on emerging crime problems 
including violent crime, gun, and drug offenses, which may not necessarily be captured 
by reported crime data. This latter approach is unique in that many evaluations of crime 
hot spots only rely on official counts of arrests and calls for service, not tapping into 
street level intelligence. This is important because approximately ½ of all violent crime 
goes unreported (Mosher et al., 2011), thus, any analysis that relies on official data, may 





 The five hot spots are located throughout Police Districts 5, 6, and 7 in DC, which 
are fairly homogeneous when viewed in the context of the whole city. These Police 
Districts are generally viewed as being home to the most serious crime problems in the 
city. While area specific data do not exist for these hot spots, it can be extrapolated from 
the police service area they are located within.  
 
Table 4: Washington DC Police Service Area Demographics 
Police Service Area 501 504 602 604 706 
Population 21,556 14,829 16,802 16,399 18,829 
%AA 81.50% 93.07% 97.72% 98.12% 96.62% 
%Hispanic 4.19% 1.32% 0.82% 0.51% 1.00% 
%White 14.17% 5.12% 0.79% 0.33% 0.73% 
%Under 18 20.57% 24.76% 28.25% 30.98% 35.00% 
%Male 48.19% 45.13% 45.71% 43.80% 43.42% 
Avg HH Income $34,982 $25,436 $27,079 $27,924 $24,492 
%Graduate Degree 9.2 2.25 1.95 2.7 2.08 
%College Degree 14.2 8.89 10.7 8.65 7.12 
%HS Degree 47.02 50.77 53.41 55.92 56.17 
Violent Crime Jan-
April '11 
82 91 104 72 97 
VC rate per 100k 380.4045 613.6624 618.9739 439.0512 515.1628 
Source: Neighborhood Info Washington DC 
Unit of Analysis 
 
Criminologists have long been concerned with geographic concentrations of 
crime and the specific characteristics of place which facilitate crime. These were, 
however, traditionally larger units of analysis such as neighborhoods (see Shaw & 
McKay, 1942). The current work studies the impact of a geographically focused policing 
intervention in five smaller locations. MPD has labeled these locations as crime hot spots. 
However, given the lack of a standard definition of crime hot spots, both in terms of the 





The term hot implies there needs to be some degree of elevated crime and the term spot 
implies that this elevation is concentrated in a particular location.  
Academic criminologists most commonly conceptualize hot spots as micro areas, 
usually street intersections, which extend no further than line-of-sight (see Sherman and 
Weisburd, 1995, p.630). However, there is variability in the extant literature. For 
example, in Philadelphia Jerry Ratcliffe and colleagues at Temple University and the 
Philadelphia Police Department identified hot spots containing multiple intersections that 
were not all visible from one single epicenter. Their study of foot patrol in crime hot 
spots identified 120 locations, which contained an average of 14.7 street intersections and 
1.3 miles of streets. And in Indianapolis, police focused on four beats in two areas of the 
city comprising approximately 4.6 square miles (McGarrell et al., 2001). 
The Metropolitan Police Department hot spots would probably be considered 
large among academics, but not necessarily among police professionals, who anecdotally 
use the term to refer to larger units such as neighborhoods and police service areas. In 
Washington DC these hot spots were smaller than neighborhoods, but not necessarily 
smaller than the traditional conception of a hot spot.  
 
Table 5: 2011 Summer Crime Initiative Hot Spots Size 
Hot Spot Area (sq miles) Square Feet Square Meters 
501 0.4795 13,370,347.6092 1,242,150.9073 
504 0.5248 14,632,363.5582 1,359,396.4945 
602 0.1593 4,441,503.3588 412,630.8147 
604 0.1956 5,454,141.7807 506,708.3788 
706 0.3683 10,269,608.6167 954,081.6764 
Total 1.7275 48,167,964.9236 4,474,968.2717 
Average .3455 9,633,592.985 894,993.6543 
City 61.4   






Despite these hot spots being larger than many of the studies in the academic literature, 
they are still relatively small locations (especially when compared to neighborhood 
approaches), containing just 2.67% of the cities land. This figure is similar to that used in 
Lowell, Massachusetts, where the police identified crime hot spots comprising 2.7% of 
the city’s 14.5 square miles.  
2011 SCI Dosage 
 
The 2011 Summer Crime Initiative is similar to a number of prominent hot spots 
policing programs in terms of the length of the initiative as previously discussed in 
Chapter 2. MPD’s hot spots crackdown ran three months between May and July of 2011, 
the same length as interventions in Philadelphia (Ratcliffe et al., 2011), Jacksonville 
(Taylor et al., 2011), Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2001), and Sacramento (Telep et al., 
2012). This three month span was utilized for two reasons: first, MPD noted violent 
crime spikes specifically during these three months based on an analysis of previous 
year’s data. Second, the department could only reasonably maintain this increased level 
of patrol saturation for three months without outside funding. 
While recent technological advances have enabled researchers to document the 
location of police more accurately and more cost effectively using automated vehicle 
locators, this technology has not been widely adopted. This is true in the current work 
and is further complicated by the observational nature which prevents any systematic 
social observations to occur as well. However, given the main tactic of the 2011 SCI was 
patrol saturation, arrests can be used as a proxy in lieu of these measures to capture 






Figure 3: MPD 2011 Arrests in Targeted SCI Hot Spots 
 
The ½ mile buffer was calculated using ArcGIS 10.0 (Environmental Systems Research Institute, 
2011) 
 
A few things become apparent when looking at the number of arrests over a given 
year by MPD. First, there is a pronounced spike in arrests between April and May of 
2011 in the hot spots targeted by the SCI. Indeed, between these two months there was a 
42.7% increase in arrests in the hot spots. When comparing the whole three months of the 
intervention to the three preceding months, the increase is similar at 41.41%. This 
suggests there was a high degree of patrol saturation in the hot spots when the initiative 
began in May. The increase in arrests is largely concentrated amongst quality of life and 
low level traffic violations (see appendix). 
Second, and importantly, this dramatic increase in arrests is only noted in the hot 
spots. When examining crime in a ½ mile buffer zone around the target locations, there 
was a mere 3.6% increase in arrests between the three preceding and intervention months. 
Similarly, these results are mimicked when examining all areas outside of the hot spots, 














































intervention with the three months during the SCI, there was a mere 2.4% increase in 
arrests.  
Finally, the increased arrests of the SCI were limited to the three intervention 
months. When comparing these months to the three months following the intervention, 
there was a noted reduction of 37.6%, a level almost equal to the initial increase. Thus, 
the patrol dosage seems to have returned to normal after the intervention period ended. 
This is important for assessing post intervention residual deterrence and deterrence decay. 
To ensure the treatment was contained within these hot spots, officers were given 
maps of the locations and stressed to “preserve the integrity” of these locations. The 
examination of changes in arrests above seems to provide some reassurance that this 
integrity occurred. Arrests increased by over 40% during the initiative, and in the three 
months immediately after reduced to nearly pre-treatment levels. However, arrests within 
a ½ mile buffer zone surrounding these areas noted a small 1.5% increase during the 
initiative. 
How does the dosage of the 2011 SCI compare to other police crackdowns? 
Based on the arrest information it is reasonable to conclude that there was a sudden and 
dramatic increase in arrests to a degree greater than at least one prominent police 
crackdown. When compared to Indianapolis (McGarrell et al., 2011), a study with a 
similar operationalization of dosage, the dosage in DC was nearly four times greater than 
in Indianapolis based on arrest data. While population estimates are not available for the 
SCI areas, it is possible that they are less sparsely populated than the beats targeted in 
Indianapolis. Thus, additionally controlling for population, the dosage disparity per 





square mile may be more relevant theoretically, since it indicates the probability of arrest 
in a given area for a constant time period. By this measure, SCI had five times the arrest 
dosage per square mile month as Indianapolis. 
 
Table 6: 2011 Summer Crime Initiative Dosage Comparison 
City Arrests Arrests per square 
miles 
Arrests per square 
mile per month 
Indianapolis 992 215.652 71.884 
Washington DC 1810 1052.33 350.76 
 
The measurement of dosage in studies of police crackdowns seems to be a 
problem in need of further discussion. Technological advances that allow researchers the 
ability to track the exact location of police vehicles may be a quick fix to a more complex 
operationalization. While the location of police cruisers absent any social observations 
may help pin down the locations of at least the vehicle, they are unable to document what 
police are actually doing while in the hot spot. While this work is unable to document the 
activities and behaviors of police during the SCI directly, based on the arrest data it 
appears the dosage was on par or greater than other prominent police crackdowns. 
Currently there is limited evidence regarding the fidelity of “treatment” needed to cause 
crime reductions (see Koper, 1995 for an exception) within crime hot spots. 
On the other hand, it can be argued that arrest crackdowns are theoretically 
different from “presence” crackdowns (Sherman, 1990). Comparisons of dosage across 
crackdowns must in any case be distinguished based on what was measured. There is 
neither theory nor evidence to compare the relative effectiveness of increased police 
presence to increased arrests, with or without increased presence. If future research 
combines or systematically separates these two kinds of police activity, more progress 





Outcomes of SCI 
 
In their 2012 annual report, MPD claimed the SCI reduced robbery. However, 
these conclusions are drawn from a non-experimental study which compared robbery 
from the intervention period (May – July 2011) to the same period one year earlier (May 
– July 2010). Such a research design is highly susceptible to many threats to internal 
validity, which is why these types of designs have been referred to as almost 
“uninterruptable” by Cook and Campbell (1979). Therefore, before the current work 
examines displacement as a result of the SCI, it will first confirm whether robberies were 
actually reduced using a more robust quasi-experimental research design. Indeed, crime 











Chapter 4: Data and Methods 
Data 
A variety of data were obtained in order to answer the proposed research 
questions in the current work. Specifically, there are four sources of data utilized: 1) The 
Metropolitan Police Department; 2) the Office of Unified Command; 3) the United States 
Census; and 4) the District of Columbia Office of the Chief Technology Officer. The 
following chapter describes the process by which these data were obtained, how the data 
are coded, and how they are analyzed. 
Arrests and Offenses 
 
The Metropolitan Police Department provided two data elements for the current 
work: 1) arrests and 2) offenses. Both elements were obtained for calendar years 2010 
and 2011 and serve as the primary dependent and independent variables. Arrest and 
offense data were obtained through a special Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) made with 
the department, since the information requested could not be obtained through public 
repositories MPD currently provides. Data that are publicly available are geocoded to the 
nearest intersection to protect the privacy of the victim. While this information may be 
useful for aggregated analyses, it can be problematic when examining specific micro 
level interventions such as the 2011 SCI. A recent analysis by Andy Brumwell of the 
West Midlands Police in the United Kingdom compared official crime locations to the 
“snap location” used by Police.uk, a public repository for police data in England and 
Wales. His comparison of the “true location” versus the snap location revealed an 





obtaining “true locations” for the current analyses given the small geographic areas 
targeted by the police during the 2011 SCI. 
In addition, the current work tracks individual level offending patterns requiring 
otherwise redacted information to be released. On the condition that no personal 
information will be revealed in this work and that analyses will be aggregated to secure 
specific individuals from being identified, MPD agreed to share 2010-2011 arrest and 
offense data. All data were obtained from MPD’s Research and Analysis Branch, which 
serves as the evaluation arm of the department. While Washington DC has over 20 law 
enforcement agencies, MPD formally processes these cases through their intake unit. 
Thus, all arrests, regardless of jurisdiction, are processed by MPD and captured in their 
data. 
Arrests were classified according to the most serious offense based on DC Code. 
Variables in the arrest database include: arrest date/time, arrest location, top charge, 
arrestee name, date of birth, home address, and a criminal complaint number (CCN). The 
last element, CCN, provides a link back to the original offense which led to the arrest. 
This is important because it gives the current work the ability to link offenses to arrests. 
Thus, if an individual targeted by the SCI is arrested anywhere in the city, their offending 
pattern can be reconstructed. Without this link the current work would be hamstrung 
given that in many instances the arrest and offense location are different, which would 
make the analysis of crime displacement difficult
24
. Additionally, it allows the current 
work to separate police generated offenses from citizen-generated calls for service. As 
further explained in the Outcome Variables section of this chapter, this separation is 
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important in that it allows for a clearer separation between the treatment (Arrests) and 
outcome (crimes). Below is a summary of the arrest data provided. 
 
Table 7: Citywide DC Code Arrests: 2010 – 2011  
Arrest Charge 2010 2011 
Aggravated Assault  1,428  1,571  
Arson  14  13  
Burglary  306  382  
Disorderly Conduct/POCA  5,213  4,384  
Forgery/Uttering Check  40  17  
Fraud  85  167  
Gambling  5  15  
Homicide/Manslaughter  95  117  
Larceny/Theft  1,311  1,428  
Liquor Laws  84  47  
Narcotic Drug Laws  9,688  9,823  
Offenses Against the Family and Children  44  80  
Other Felonies  1393  382  
Other Misdemeanors  5,212  2,877  
Prostitution & Commercialized Vice  1,422  950  
Rape/Sexual Abuse  11  131  
Release Violations/Fugitive  4,371  6,713  
Robbery/Carjacking  901  1,041  
Sex Offenses  205  244  
Simple Assaults 5,633  5,958  
Stolen Property  295  272  
Theft from Auto  69  67  
Traffic Violations  11,680  11,916  
Unauthorized Use of a Vehicle (UUV)  630  654  
Vandalize/Tampering w/ Auto  537  681  
Vending Violations  484  609  
Weapons  999  1,005  
Total  52,155  51,54 
 
Similarly, offenses were captured using the most serious crime based on DC 
Code. All serious offenses are captured in these data with some additional minor offenses 
including drugs (possession and distribution of controlled substances), prostitution, and 
weapons related offenses (e.g., carrying a pistol without a license). While DC Code and 





offenses are captured under DC Code in the current works data, as well as several Part II 
offenses. For full documentation of the definitional nuances please refer to the appendix. 
 
Table 8: Part I Crime: Citywide DC Code Offenses: 2010 – 2011  
Offense 2010 2011 
Homicide/Manslaughter 132 108 
Rape/Sexual Assault 141 174 
Robbery
25
 4026 4207 
Aggravated Assault 2621 2520 
Violent Crime 6920 7009 
Burglary 4221 3948 
Larceny/Theft 9104 10206 
Theft from Vehicle 6999 7839 
Stolen Auto 4133 3820 
Arson 44 39 
Property Crime 24501 25852 
 
While Part II offenses are captured by MPD, according to senior level 
management, the specific offense is not as reliably coded as the offense category (violent, 
property, drugs, weapons, prostitution, and other). Therefore, Part II offenses are coded 
using the following offense classification:  violent (simple and other assaults), property 
(forgery and counterfeiting, fraud, embezzlement, stolen property, receiving/possessing 
stolen property), drugs (possessing or distributing), weapons (carrying a deadly weapon, 
carrying a pistol without a license, possession of a prohibited weapon (A), possession of a 
prohibited weapon (B)
26
), prostitution (including solicitation), and other (vandalism, 
gambling, offenses against the family and children, liquor laws, drunkenness, disorderly 
conduct, vagrancy, all other offenses (except traffic), suspicion, curfew and loitering law 
violations, runaway). 
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 While MPD classifies robbery as a violent crime, the current work examines it within the context of 
instrumental related offenses, since a primary motive behind robbery is to obtain items for monetary gain 
(see Wright and Decker, 1997). 
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Class B weapons generally include knives whereas Class A covers a variety of firearms including 






Table 9: Part II: Citywide DC Code Offenses: 2010 – 2011  
Offense 2010 2011 
Violent 1046 1114 
Property 8753 9152 
Drugs 7415 7072 
Weapons 517 565 
Prostitution 1295 816 
Other 2003 2415 
 
Calls for Service 
 
Calls for service (CFS) data are obtained by the Office of Unified Command 
(OUC) which manages emergency (911) and non-emergency (311) calls in the District of 
Columbia. OUC manages approximately 1.8 million emergency calls per year and helps 
shape policy, maintain technology, and develop standards in the city concerning public 
and non-public safety communications (2012). Data from OUC were obtained from 
2010-2011 and are used to help construct the dependent variable. Since the initiative 
focused resources in areas with a disproportion amount of violent and gun related 
offenses, including sounds of gunshots, these data are needed to capture the full spectrum 
of offenses targeted by the 2011 Summer Crime Initiative. 
 
Table 10: Calls for Service 
 2010 2011 
Sounds of Gunshots 6286 4819 
 
To be clear, the OUC CFS data also includes the aforementioned offenses in Tables nine 
and ten, however, the sole source of the sounds of gunshots information is through OUC. 
Area Level Demographics 
 
The 2010 United States Census was utilized in order to construct control groups 





income. These data were downloaded from the American Fact Finder tool on the US 
Census Bureau’s website (2010). While data were not available at the hot spot unit of 
analysis, census tracts were aggregated which fall within the target locations since they 
are the closest unit of analysis containing area level data on a variety of demographics 
(See hot spot and Census Tract cross walk in the appendix). Data were also obtained from 
the US Census for the purposes of comparing and contrasting Washington D.C. to some 
of the other jurisdictions where prominent policing crackdowns have occurred. These 
comparisons help frame the context of the current study and attempt to provide some 
sense of how similar and dissimilar the current context compares to other cities 
prominently featured in the empirical literature. 
Place-Based Characteristics 
 
Data on many of the place-based characteristics hypothesized to attract robbers 
who relocate their offending in the face of the 2011 SCI are derived from the Washington 
DC Office of the Chief Technology Officer (OCTO), who is responsible for maintaining 
the city’s technology infrastructure as well as providing support to District agencies on 
technology policy and standards. For several years OCTO has also served as a repository 
for publicly available spatial data through their Data Catalog (OCTO Data Catalog, 
2013). These data include information on the location of every bar, atm/bank, liquor 
store, or college campus within the District of Columbia. These data are available in 
several formats, importantly as .shp files, which allow them to be easily imported into 







While the SCI sought to reduce robbery, crime cannot be used to directly measure 
the impact of the intervention without modification. Given the arrest-driven approach and 
its subsequent impact on the volume of these activities in the targeted versus control 
locations, crime is likely confounded with the outcome of interest—the more police 
activity the more offenses they are likely going to uncover. Therefore, to parse the impact 
of the initiative from the treatment, changes in citizen-generated calls for service (CFS) 
are examined among the treatment and control locations. Calls for service data are 
provided by the Office of Unified Communications and allow for the separation of 
citizen-generated versus police-generated calls based on response time. By separating 
police generated calls for service, the current work is able to more directly measure the 
impact of the SCI on crime versus the impact of the SCI on police activity. Such data are 
also used to examine both the impact on crime in the areas targeted as well as on local 
and non-local displacement. 
Specifically, the 2012 MPD Annual Report (MPD, 2012) claimed that the 2011 
SCI reduced robbery. While these offense types were the primary target of the 2011 SCI, 
it should also be acknowledged that crime reductions and displacement may not just 
occur geographically, but also in terms of offense type. For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, many offenders claim to displace their robberies to other instrumental crimes 
to meet their needs, which often arise out of a “pressing need” for cash (Wright and 
Decker, 1997). If their attempts to commit robbery are blocked, they claim to switch to 
other cash-securing offenses. In the current work, these instrumental crimes include 









The current work relies on a quasi-experimental approach to test what affect the 
2011 SCI police crackdown had on the volume and placement of crime
27
. A quasi-
experiment shares many properties of experimental approaches except on one key 
condition: the treatment is not randomly assigned. Therefore, this approach seeks to 
establish causal inference by establishing a counterfactual through the careful selection of 
a control group (Shadish et al., 2002). This type of research design improves upon the 
non-experimental approach taken by MPD in their 2011 Annual Report. Indeed, Cook 
and Campbell (1979) considered this type of design uninterpretable; therefore, the 
conclusions drawn from such an approach are untenable. The current work, by measuring 
crime before, during, and after the intervention in multiple treatment and control sites, 
rules out many threats to internal validity which plague non-experiments including 
history, maturation, selection, and regression to the mean, therefore increasing the 
interpretability of its findings. 
Utilizing a contemporaneously measured control group is particularly important 
in the current context. There are many moving parts to the District of Columbia Criminal 
Justice System not to mention other important institutions such as school, religion, and 
the economy, all of which may have an impact on crime in the District (Messner and 
Rosenfeld, 1994). Given the multitude of agencies within the criminal justice system and 
beyond that are simultaneously operating during the 2011 SCI, it is important to control 
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for these macro level effects to help isolate the impact of the SCI from all other 
influences. Period effects of the summer also underscore the need for a control group. It 
is common knowledge that certain offense types increase during the summer due to 
changes in individuals routine activities. Thus, any intervention conducted during the 
summer is at a disadvantage if simple pre-test / post-test measures are used. Also 
problematic, but for different reasons, is the gradual decline in crime throughout the city 
since the mid-to-late 1990s. Given that crime has been declining when measured city-
wide it is likely that any pre/post-test measure with no control group is likely to find 
reductions regardless of whether the policy or program under study actually works. 
Finally, DC is undergoing a period of large scale economic development and 
gentrification. The 2010 Census was the first in over a half a century which indicated a 
population increase. This influx of new residents is pushing out many older citizens in 
certain communities, driving up real estate prices, and changing the makeup of 
communities. As previously noted, the Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and 
Economic Development estimates there is currently more than 60 billion dollars in 
commercial, residential, and institutional projects that have been constructed, planned, or 
proposed in the District of Columbia (2012). While the impact gentrification has on crime 
is open for debate (see Matsuda, 2009), it at least underscores that the city is not a static 
organism. This constant change and evolution has potentially confounding effects on any 
single group research designs.   
Selection of Control Sites 
 
While it is not possible to simultaneously expose the SCI hot spots to both control 





of a counterfactual. Ideally, this is done through the random assignment of treatment and 
control among a sample of eligible locations. However, given the observational nature of 
the current work this approach is not possible. Therefore, the selection of control sites 
must be based on factors that are observable. Three are utilized in the current work: 
1. Crime 
2. Demographics (population, housing, employment, and income) 
3. Dosage (Arrests) 
The first step in selecting appropriate controls retraces the procedures used by 
MPD to identify the five SCI areas. These five hot spots are paired with five similarly 
sized locations based on concentrations of offenses used by MPD in the original selection 
of the treatment locations: assault with deadly weapons, carjacking, robbery, sounds of 
gun shots, and crack cocaine and PCP arrests (both possession and distribution). 
Additionally, the same Kernel Density Estimation (KDE) procedure utilized by MPD is 
also implemented in selecting the control locations (see Chapter 3). However, exact 
parameterization of the procedure was not documented by MPD. Thus, the current work, 
while relying on KDE techniques, must choose a method of interpolation, choice of 
bandwidth, and minimum number of points independently (Levine, 2010). The current 
work found useful results using a normal method of interpolation, fixed interval 
bandwidth, and an interval width of 50 meters. These parameters provided results precise 
enough to parse out various clusters of crime, without too much aggregation. The KDE 
provided useful guidance in selecting control locations, but the final outlines of the 





cell boundaries are arbitrary, control location edges are drawn based on the natural 
physical boundaries such as a river or highway—procedures used by MPD as well.  
Second, the areas context, as measured by the age, race, gender, housing, and 
economic factors are examined. Areas that are located within the same police district are 
given priority when selecting controls. These areas are more likely to provide similar 
contextual matches and also help ensure the police response more generally was uniform 
in the pre-test and post-test periods since these areas were policed by the same 
Commander. Additionally, sites that were too close (within 1-10 city blocks) were 
excluded since there may be treatment contamination issues. After implementing the 
KDE procedure with these criteria, five potential controls were identified. 
Figure 4: Washington DC 2011 SCI Target (1-5t) and Controls (1-5c) with 1000 
Foot Buffer 
                 
As noted above, six of the 10 hot spots are located in Wards 7 and 8, with the remaining 
four scattered amongst Wards 1, 2, 5, and 6.  











Equivalence of Control and Target Hot Spots 
 
Baseline measures of all observable characteristics between the control and target 
hot spots are examined to ensure the groups are similar prior to the SCI. To examine the 
equivalency of target and control hot spots a series of t-tests are conducted. First, offenses 
are broken down by monthly averages per each of the 10 hot spots (5 SCI locations and 5 
controls) over the 16 prior months for a total sample of 160. 
 
Table 11: 16 Month Hot Spot Offense Averages (n=160) 
Offense Targeted (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
Part I    
Homicide/Manslaughter 0.3250 (.2422) 0.2650 (.6231) 0.4244 
Rape/Sexual Assault 0 0 -- 
Robbery 9.775 (8.5402) 10.2 (9.0251) 0.7601 
Aggravated Assault 4.8250 (3.4212) 4.3250 (4.1313) 0.4057 
Burglary 6.0250 (7.2328) 6.1750 (7.5342) 0.8448 
Larceny/Theft 7.0277 (7.2429) 8.4177 (15.3242) 0.4642 
Stolen Auto 5.4875 (4.9278) 5.0375 (5.2374) 0.5765 
Arson 0 0 -- 
Part II    
Violent 9.2155 (7.2342) 8.9250 (8.6322) 0.8178 
Property 75.7091 (43.8346) 73.4693 (38.6599) 0.7322 
Drug 9.475 (7.9855) 5.9 (3.5926) 0.0004 
Weapons 1.0125 (1.3923) 0.8750 (.7234) 0.4343 
Prostitution 1.1250 (1.6272) 1.2750 (1.7261) 0.5725 
Other 19.2342 (15.7939) 17.2342 (12.9864) 0.3830 
OUC    
Sounds of Gun Shot 3.0120 (.9682) 2.8970 (.4972) 0.3461 
 
Of the crimes examined only drug related offenses showed a statistically 
significant difference, with fewer crimes counted in the controls than in the SCI areas. 
However, it is important to note that drug offenses were not specifically targeted by the 
SCI and therefore did not play a role in the selection of either the intervention or control 
locations; indeed, drug offenses per se are almost entirely a reflection of proactive 





arrests for crack cocaine and PCP were also used to select sites, these are a very small 
percentage of the total offenses used to identify the treatment and control locations. And 
when broken down by drug type, there are no statistically significant differences between 
the treatment and control areas in crack cocaine and PCP arrests at baseline (p-value = 
.1465). 
Second, demographics are examined. The greatest challenge in identifying 
matching control locations to those selected by MPD for the SCI lies in developing area 
level measures from US Census Data, whose boundaries do not align with each hot spot. 
As noted previously, the hot spots targeted by MPD do not align perfectly with Census 
Tract boundaries, thus, it is difficult to extract data directly from the source without 
thoughtful aggregation. The current work utilizes Census data to gain target and control 
hot spot level measures through an un-weighted and weighted average approach. Given 
the alignment issues, Census Tract data are also weighted based upon the proportion of 
each hot spot they occupy. For example, if hot spot A has four census tracts (1-4) located 
within its boundaries, and tract 4 occupies 75% of the hot spot, demographic, economic 
well being, and other data are weighted in proportion to the area the tract occupies within 
the hot spot. While still prone to aggregation bias, given the authors working knowledge 
of each hot spot and control, these approaches seem to provide a reasonable method for 
parsing and aggregating Census Tract data to each hot spot and control. 
When examining the un-weighted average of all the Census Tracts in the target 
(23) versus control hot spots (18), only the percentage of the population which is 






Table 12: Un-Weighted Demographic Averages (Target n=23; Control n=18) 
Variable Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
Avg Square Miles 0.3456 (0.1584) 0.3144 (0.1116) 0.6557 
% Pop: 15-24 8.8043 (2.3007) 11.1944 (7.9602) 0.1776 
% Pop: 25-29 9.6304 (4.6304) 11.4555 (5.0267) 0.2349 
Median Age 32.926 (4.4427) 31.2722 (4.2387) 0.2348 
% Pop: 18+ 77.2304 (7.6595) 77.4 (8.1965) 0.946 
% Pop: 62+ 11.987 (3.8136) 10.3666 (3.5682) 0.1729 
% Male Pop 46.0348 (3.5511) 46.7777 (4.0999) 0.538 
% Male Pop: 15-19 4.0565 (2.5156) 3.5388 (1.2645) 0.4307 
% Male Pop: 20-24 3.9 (1.0005) 4.9055 (3.0028) 0.1398 
% Male Pop: 25-29 4.3608 (2.5743) 5.48333 (2.9776) 0.2034 
% White 12.4478 (15.57) 16.2666 (18.0551) 0.4717 
% Black or AA 80.8565 (20.9173) 71.4888 (29.526) 0.2416 
% Hispanic 8.3217 (3.8458) 11.4055 (15.1548) 0.085 
% Occupied Housing 87.6826 (4.7944) 88.8222 (3.5481) 0.4043 
% Vacant Housing 12.3174 (4.7944) 11.1777 (3.5481) 0.4043 
Rental Vacancy Rate (%) 8.6391 (3.822) 7.8444 (2.7558) 0.4619 
% Own Occupied Housing Units 33.7826 (14.3701) 28.7888 (10.8394) 0.2277 
% Rent Occupied Housing Units 66.2174 (14.3701) 71.2111 (10.8394) 0.2277 
% 16+ Unemployed 17.613 (8.5743) 14.7888 (6.8676) 0.2614 
% Persons w/o HS Diploma 21.7478 (7.8976) 25.4444 (8.2834) 0.1534 
Poverty Rate (05-09) 30.0435 (11.035) 26.2277 (9.284) 0.2466 
Median Household Income 39251 (19801) 40705 (11541) 0.7836 
 
However, weighing each Tract by the proportion of the target or control hot spot reduces 













Table 13: Weighted Demographic Averages (Target n=23; Control n=18) 
Variable Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
Avg Square Miles 0.3456 (0.1584) 0.3144 (0.1116) 0.6557 
% Pop: 15-24 8.5675 (1.5848) 8.9248 (2.2391) 0.5532 
% Pop: 25-29 9.0886 (3.9621) 10.0488 (4.8063) 0.4863 
Median Age 33.5841 (3.8518) 31.8084 (3.8982) 0.1531 
% Pop: 18+ 76.0726 (7.0161) 75.071 (7.1308) 0.6549 
% Pop: 62+ 12.592 (3.488) 11.0475 (3.4248) 0.2834 
% Male Pop 46.1645 (3.4315) 45.85503 (4.02) 0.7918 
% Male Pop: 15-19 3.7772 (1.3732) 3.8234 (1.1186) 0.9085 
% Male Pop: 20-24 3.8488 (1.0234) 4.196 (1.6424) 0.4116 
% Male Pop: 25-29 4.1338 (2.3148) 4.645 (2.8755) 0.5317 
% White 9.91 (7.91) 9.8515 (11.8511) 0.9846 
% Black or AA 80.4683 (17.2043) 78.2029 (24.5393) 0.7302 
% Hispanic 9.5335 (2.6524) 11.9155 (12.9701) 0.3945 
% Occupied Housing 87.6147 (4.2887) 89.5838 (2.8661) 0.102 
% Vacant Housing 12.3852 (33.6679) 10.4161 (22.2524) 0.8317 
Rental Vacancy Rate (%) 9.0024 (4.7451) 7.6466 (2.2825) 0.2493 
% Own Occupied Housing Units 33.7438 (14.1466) 28.7329 (10.4643) 0.2165 
% Rent Occupied Housing Units 66.2561 (14.6951) 71.267 (10.1664) 0.2251 
% 16+ Unemployed 18.445 (8.1966) 16.1207 (6.1659) 0.3339 
% Persons w/o HS Diploma 23.1753 (6.9463) 25.0662 (7.1961) 0.3997 
Poverty Rate (05-09) 30.1698 (11.1463) 27.8218 (8.8463) 0.4692 
Median Household Income 38618 (14463) 38834 (10713) 0.9585 
 
Given these baseline similarities, any post intervention differences in crimes 
noted can be more confidently attributed to the intervention as opposed to pre-treatment 
demographic differences. While not all characteristics of these areas can be observed, and 
the attribution of Census data gathered at one unit of analysis on the intervention and 
control locations may be imprecise, it provides a basic check of the counterfactual logic. 
Finally, dosage is examined. It is important to document the lack of crackdown in 
the control locations to ensure there is no contamination of treatment. When comparing 
the two types of locations (target versus control), it becomes clear that the dramatic 
increase in arrests noted during the SCI in the targeted locations does not occur in the 





SCI, control locations actually experienced a decrease of 5%. This decline is interesting 
in that not only does it indicate that the controls selected received no increased police 
presence or contamination from the SCI areas, but that they also seemed to receive less 
attention given the general increase in arrests city-wide over this period. When examining 
all arrests in the city outside of the SCI targeted locations, an increase of 6% is noted. 
After the SCI initiative ended, arrests were back up in the control locations to pre-
treatment levels. Again, perhaps this indicates that as resources were shifted to the SCI 
areas, resources may have been pulled from other hot spots. 
 
Table 14: Target v. Control Hot Spot Dosage 
 Within .5 mile buffer Outside 
 Target Control Target Control Target Control 
Frequency of 
Arrests Three 








months after SCI 
 














































































































The differences in arrest dosage are fairly dramatic when examined graphically. Whether 
examining the percentage of arrests by each target or control hot spot over 2011, or by 





control exhibits a rather stable dosage over the course of 2011. Additionally, while the 
SCI locations evidence a spike, it diminishes over the course of the intervention and may 
indicate a loss in treatment fidelity. 
 
Table 15: Percentage of 2011 Arrests by SCI Target Versus Control Hot Spot 
 
 
Table 16: Frequency of 2011 Arrests by SCI Target Versus Control Hot Spot 
 
 
While there were fewer arrests in the control locations at any point in time compared to 
the SCI areas, the differences are only statistically significant when comparing the three 
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Table 17: Arrest Dosage by Location (n = 30) 
 Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
3 month prior average 85.8 (62.42) 62.93 (30.35) 0.2124 
3 month during average 116.4 (83.31) 59.46 (34.54) 0.0210 
3 month post average 74 (60.16) 62.66 (32.09) 0.5250 
 
Analytic Approach to Examine Whether the Intervention Reduced Robbery 
 
As stated previously, the current work relies on a pre-test post-test in multiple 
treatment and comparison groups, which were matched based on crime, demographic 
features of place, and arrests. Equivalence between the treated and control hot spots has 
been documented above, therefore, to discern whether the SCI had an impact on citizen-
generated robbery calls for service, changes in the mean level of these calls during and 
after the treatment are analyzed. To do so the current work examines the differences in 
the means during and after the intervention through t-tests, and the difference in 
differences (see Bushway, 1998; Card and Krueger, 1994; Cook and MacDonald, 2011; 
Grogger and Willis, 2000; Telep et al., 2012). There are two steps to this approach. First, 
the difference in citizen-generated calls for service before and during the SCI in the 
locations targeted by MPD is calculated. Second, the same difference is calculated for the 
control locations, and the difference between these two differences is computed to arrive 
at the difference in differences.  
This approach is advantageous in the current work for a number of reasons, 
helping to account for omitted variable bias that would plague the results of any non-
experimental approach. First, simply examining the experimental locations pre/post 
difference (step 1 from above) ignores the gradual and steady crime reduction occurring 
on a city wide basis in Washington D.C. Given this dynamic almost any area of the city 





likely be found. Difference in difference estimations are not as vulnerable to this problem 
since the method requires contemporaneous control sites to be selected that should 
experience the same city-wide drop. Similarly, difference in differences estimates are 
better situated to control for natural summer increases in crime that may also occur for 
similar reasons. Second, since the control groups were selected in a way as to make them 
equivalent on all observable characteristics pre-treatment, any reductions in crime can 
more confidentially be attributed to the SCI versus baseline differences. Regardless, the 
method has the ability to be incorporated into a regression framework that can control for 
both static and time-varying covariates which may interact with the treatment. Given the 
short time window of the current work, and static nature of the factors used to match 
treatment and control locations, no time-varying covariates are included. 
The method has a primary assumption, which is that parallelism exists between 
the two groups. Meaning, the trend in treatment would have been the same as the control 
in the absence of any intervention. This is an important advantage to the method over 
simply comparing the differences between treatment and control post SCI using a t-test. 
Such an approach assumes, without testing, that the pre-test results exhibit the same 
trend. While matching helps account for this, it does not attempt to model the pre-test 
data overtime, and instead aggregates this information into a single average. While this 
may be useful, there are clearly instances where two entirely different trends could 
produce the same exact pre-test average. For example, take two series of data, one 
ascending over 12 months from 1 robbery per month to 12, the other descending from 12 





series of data are clearly not “equivalent”. Thus, the approach taken in the current work 
takes a more nuanced approach to ensuring pre-test equivalence. 
While not always tenable, nor directly observable, the current work is able to 
document a high degree of covariation in offenses between these two locations prior to 
the intervention, which strengthens the case that the groups trended together prior to the 
intervention. In the 16 months prior to the SCI, treatment and control sites experienced a 
correlation coefficient of .801 that is statistically significant as the .01 level. When 
broken down by offense type, positive and statistically significant correlations (at .01) are 
also noted for violent (r=.77) and property (r=.81) crimes. Because of this high degree of 
covariation any sudden and dramatic divergence in crime between these two seemingly 
parallel trends can more confidently be attributed to the SCI.  
 
Figure 5: Pre-Intervention Parallelism (All Crime) 
 
 
When looking at robbery specifically, the results are similar, with high correlations 
existing between treatment and control sites in the 16 months before the intervention (r= 
.7293). This high degree of parallelism suggests that examining the difference in 

























Figure 6: Pre-Intervention Parallelism (Robbery) 
 
 
Difference in differences are estimated using Stata 12.0 (StataCorp, 2011) with the user 
written command “diff” (Villa, 2013). 
Analytic Approach to Examine Changes in the Placement of Crime 
 
The current work documents the SCI’s impact on the placement of crime by 
tracking changes in both general and specific displacement. General displacement is 
defined as any behavior by any offender that is redirected from the target and control 
sites into nearby buffer zones. Whereas specific displacement tracks an explicit group of 
offenders to document how the SCI impacts their behavior, regardless of where that 
behavior occurs in D.C.  
 
General Displacement (Buffer Zones) 
 
General displacement—the displacement of crime by anyone—will be measured 
using techniques commonly employed in the literature of police crackdowns. Two block 
buffer zones are created around each target and each control location. Equivalence in the 










































Table 18: 16 Month Target and Control Hot Spot Buffer Zone (1000 feet) Offense 
Equivalence (n = 160) 
Offense Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
Aggravated Assault 11.1375 (17.7753) 13.85 (23.8844) 0.4164 
Burglary 18.4 (43.9348) 23.1 (44.7601) 0.5073 
Homicide 0.125 (3.4034) 0.0875 (0.8944) 0.9242 
Prostitution 1.4875 (13.5792) 2.3625 (8.3842) 0.6245 
Robbery 8.4875 (4.5147) 9.8875 (7.6066) 0.1589 
Shootings 8.125 (3.8917) 9.775 (2.5252) 0.0018 
Simple Assault 22.075 (34.4621) 22.7375 (28.1110) 0.8942 
Theft 33.7625 (52.4656) 33.1375 (53.9317) 0.9409 
Weapons 0.0125 (1.0523) 0.0875 (1.5275) 0.7178 
    
As documented, there are largely no differences in prior offense rates per location 
per month during the 16 months before the 2011 SCI. The one exception being the 
number of reported shootings and sounds of gun shots. To determine whether the SCI led 
to general crime displacement, an examination of the difference in difference between 
these locations, as discussed previously, is employed. There is a high degree of 
parallelism among crime between these two locations. Indeed, offenses are highly 
correlated (r=.7611) when also looking robbery CFS (r=.5055) and instrumental CFS 
(r=.5406) (see Appendix for these tables).  
 





































Crime Displacement (Individual Level) 
 
The idea of specific displacement is linked to the individuals who committed 
robbery in the target areas before the crackdown. A cohort of these offenders is selected 
and tracked before, during, and after the three month SCI to determine the degree to 
which their stream of offending changed as a result of the SCI. In the 16 months prior to 
the SCI there were a total of 475 unique individuals who were arrested for a robbery, 244 
within one of the five control hot spots, and 231 within one of the five targeted hot spots. 
There were no offenders who overlapped between targeted and control hot spots during 
this selection period. As documented below, these individuals are equivalent on a number 
of factors tabulated from 1995 through April 2011 that are likely related to their 
displaceability, including their level of offending in the past, age, average journey-to-
crime, and prior number of home addresses. 
Table 19: Equivalence of Robbers Pre-Intervention (n = 475: 244 control, 231 
experimental): 1995 – April 2011
28
 
 Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
Age 33.67 (13.27) 32.41 (13.98) .3148 
% AA 92.64 91.39 .6171 
Prior Arrests 14.12 (20.4) 13.78 (18.16) .8478 
Prior Robbery Arrests 1.2019 (0.6412) 1.1861 (0.6144) .7840 
Prior Violent Crime Arrests 2.02 (4.07) 1.97 (4.54) .8997 
Prior # of home residences 3.4825 (2.9196) 3.6125 (2.6965) .6142 





Age at first arrest 26.9 (10.147) 28.15 (9.0154) .1560 
% of offenses in SCI areas 30.303 2.459 .0000 
% of prior offenses in control areas 1.7316 35.6557 .0000 
 
The only statistically significant differences between the two groups arises when 
looking at the locations they were criminally active in the past. As expected, active 
robbers in the targeted hot spots had a greater share of their total offending in these 
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locations compared to robbers active in the control group hot spots (30.303% versus 
2.459%). Similarly, active robbers in the controls had a greater share of their total 
offending in control locations compared to targeted hot spot robbers (35.5667% versus 
1.7316%). 
To determine whether active robbers targeted by the SCI where more likely to 
reoffend and relocate their crime, a series of z-tests for proportions are examined based 
on rearrest data (Bachman and Paternoster, 2009). In the current work, arrests are used as 
a proxy for reoffending since no self-report data are available. The proportion of targeted 
active robbers who were rearrested during and after the 2011 SCI is compared to this 
same proportion for active robbers from the controls. The location of these offense (based 
on the arrest data
29
) patterns is also examined within the context of the locations laid out 
in the hypotheses from Chapter 2. In addition to this proportional analysis, changes in the 
distance of displacement between active robbers and controls offense location is also 
constructed. The distance between active robbers’ last offense before the SCI and first 
offense during and after the SCI is compared to the same such distance for active 
controls. 
It is important to make a distinction between examining changes between offense 
locations and changes in individual robbers’ journey-to-crime. The current work argues 
that examining changes in the offense location is a better measure of crime relocation 
than changes in journey-to-crime. Journey-to-crime, while a similar measure, examines 
changes in an offenders travel distance from their home to the location of their crime, 
with the theory being that if robbers active in the areas targeted by the SCI increase their 
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 The arrest data are only used to link targeted and control robbers to crimes in order to obtain its date, 






journey-to-crime distance relative to controls, it may be evidence of crime relocation. 
This analysis wholly hinges upon being able to accurately identify a person’s starting 
point (home address). However, these data and moreover the notion of having a “home” 
for the population under study, may be an unrealistic concept. It is an axiom among law 
enforcement professionals that many offenders are highly transient and often live on the 
streets or perpetually couch surf between relatives, girlfriends, and shelters. Therefore, 
when the police collect home address data, it may not be a reliable indicator of the 
journey the arrestee took to get to their crime.  
Even if these data were accurate, it is hard to determine whether simply looking at 
changes in the journey-to-crime alone would offer insights into crime relocation, the 
main question being tested in the current work. For example, if a person moves three 
miles away, and starts committing crimes in new areas, but does so by traveling the same 
distance from their “home” when they were active in the hot spots, it would appear that 
their crimes were not being displaced since there was no change in their average journey 
to crime. This is obviously problematic, thus, the current work relies on examining 
changes in the probability of relocation compared to controls, and changes in the distance 
between offense locations before, during, and after the SCI. 
Finally, to further examine whether the SCI caused previously active robbers to 
relocate their behavior, changes in their stream of offending are examined. To illustrate 
how these analyses portend to detect spatial displacement, two offenders are chosen at 
random (1 targeted, 1 control) and their offense location progression is displayed, 
beginning with their first offense location (documented because of an arrest) through 





Figure 8: Targeted Robber Offense Location Stream (Index Offenses) 
 
*Indicates robbery location that made the offender eligible for the current analysis. Robbery 
locations are aggregated to the Police Service Area for this demonstration. 
 
In the first example, the targeted offender committed 25% (3 of 12) of offenses 
for which they were arrested in one specific SCI hot spot. Thus, they can be said to be 
loosely tied to this location in the sense that most of their offenses that were cleared 


























Figure 9: Control Robber Offense Location Stream (Index Offenses) 
 
*Indicates robbery location that made the offender eligible for the current analysis. Robbery 
locations are aggregated to the Police Service Area for this demonstration. 
 
This control offender committed 57% (4 of 7) of their offenses they were arrested 
for in a specific control area, indicating a stronger tie than the previous example. 
The current work builds on these individual level offense patterns by calculating 
averages for all targeted and control robbers and tracking changes in these streams during 
and after the SCI to identify spatial displacement. For example, if 30% of active robbers 
were getting arrested for crimes committed before the SCI in one specific hot spot 
targeted by MPD
30
, displacement would cause an interruption to this stream of offending 
such that a greater share of their prior activity should be noted during and after the SCI in 
areas not targeted. Thus, if during the SCI 5% of the offenses targeted robbers were 
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 Note, this is based on the single control or targeted hot spot which led the robber to be included in the 
analysis. For example, if offender 1 was arrested for a robbery committed in control location 2 in the 16 
months prior, this hot spot would be used to determine how “tied” they were to said location. However, 
offender 2 may have been arrested for a robbery committed in control location 4, which would thus be used 









arrested for occurred inside the same targeted SCI hot spot (a decrease of 25 percentage-
points from baseline) it may be suggestive of spatial displacement, particularly if the 
active controls do not exhibit a similar locational disruption despite similar rearrest rates.   
Additionally, the analyses will also examine distinctions between locations that 
were a part of the offense stream from completely new locations. If offenders from the 
SCI areas are getting rearrested at greater rates than individuals from the controls, and the 
locations they are committing these crimes outside the SCI areas is greater than their 
prior offending stream, in particular, to completely new locations, it can be cautiously 
concluded that displacement may have occurred, particularly if these noted changes are 
not documented amongst the control cohort. 
 Finally, changes in the intermittency of rearrests are examined. Comparisons are 
made between the pre crackdown frequency of arrests to changes during and after 
between the targets and controls. Increases in the lengths between arrests among targets 
could be suggestive of deterrence. These data, combined with the aforementioned 






Chapter 5: The Impact of the Summer Crime Initiative on the Volume and 
Placement of Robbery 
 
Between May and July of 2011 the Metropolitan Police Department undertook an 
arrest-driven police crackdown in five crime hot spots. This initiative was labeled a 
success by the Department in their 2012 Annual Report (MPD, 2012). Specifically, when 
MPD compared the rates of robbery during the three month initiative to the same three 
months the previous year, reductions were noted. However, as stated previously in 
Chapter 3, this research design, which examines a pre-test post-test with no control 
group, has been called uninterpretable by esteemed research methodologists Cook and 
Campbell (1979) because of myriad threats to its internal validity. Thus, the claims made 
by MPD are likely untenable without addressing these threats. To examine the impact of 
the 2011 SCI with a higher degree of internal validity, the current work uses a pre-test 
post-test with multiple treatment and control groups (Shadish et al., 2002). This type of 
design removes many of the threats to internal validity which limit the strength of 
conclusions drawn within MPD’s 2012 Annual Report. 
While the SCI sought to reduce robbery, crime counts alone cannot necessarily be 
used to directly measure the impact of the intervention. Since the main tactic was 
proactive police patrols, it is likely confounded with the outcome of interest—the more 
police activity the more offenses they are likely going to uncover. Therefore, to parse the 
impact of the initiative from the treatment, changes in citizen-generated calls for service 
(CFS)
31
 are examined among the treatment and control locations in each of the below 
analyses.  
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 Calls for service data provided by the Office of Unified Communications allowed for the separation of 
citizen-generated versus police-generated calls based on response time. By separating police-generated 





The Impact of the 2011 SCI on Citizen-Generated Robbery CFS 
  
There were a total of 2,244 citizen-generated robbery CFS in the targeted and 
control hot spot locations during 2010 and 2011. In the 16 months before the 
intervention, between January 2010 and April 2011, control locations experienced 816 
robbery CFS compared to 782 in the targeted hot spots. When viewing these patterns 
over the course of 16 months, robberies in the control and target hot spots track each 
other relatively closely leading up to the intervention in May of 2011, with a correlation 
of .7293. Robberies are generally lower in these locations in the beginning of the year, 





Figure 10: Total Number of Citizen-Generated Robbery Calls for Service 
 
 
However, while the control and hot spots track closely throughout this 16 month period, 
they diverge once the 2011 SCI begins, when robberies are consistently lower in the 
targeted hot spots. During the intervention, 95 additional robbery calls were received in 
                                                                                                                                                 
the impact of the SCI on police activity. Such data are also used to examine the general displacement of 
crime. 
32



































































































































































































the control compared to targeted locations (180 v. 85). And after the intervention, control 
locations experienced 223 CFS versus 158 in the targeted locations.  
The current analysis confirms to a degree the work of MPD in their 2012 Annual 
Report, where they documented a decrease in robberies based on a comparison of 
changes in these five hot spots from 2011 to the same three month window in 2010. A 
reduction of close to 50% is noted when comparing the three months of robbery data in 
2011 during the SCI, to the same three months in 2010. When including a control group, 
which MPD did not, the current analysis shows that these results are likely not part of 
some larger city-wide or seasonal trend. Indeed, descriptively, robberies in the controls 
remained relatively stable in the periods examined by MPD, whereas a dramatic decline 
was noted among the five locations targeted by the SCI.  
 
Table 20: Change in Total Citizen-Generated Robbery Calls for Service 
 Control Target 
CFS Robberies May – Jul 2010 175 165 
CFS Robberies May – Jul 2011 180 85 
% Change +2.86% -48.48% 
 
When looking at these data by period-place and incorporating statistical 
significance tests, the results are similar. Robberies increase in the controls during the 
three month intervention, but decrease thereafter; whereas robberies in the hot spots 
decrease dramatically, but then increase after the SCI to near pre-intervention levels. 
These data, combined with the aforementioned relocation analyses, will help to discern 









Table 21: Robbery Calls for Service Per Hot Spot Per Month 
 Target (SD) Control (SD) P-value 
16 Months Before 
(n=160) 
 
9.775 (8.5402) 10.2 (9.0251) .7601 
3 Months During 
(n=30) 
 
5.6666 (2.7167) 12 (5.2915) .0003 
5 Months After 
(n=50) 
8.32 (6.9924) 8.92 (7.3706) .7691 
 
The above results are largely confirmed when looking at the difference in 
differences (DiD) as well. DiD’s compares changes in the control locations relative to 
changes in the hot spots. As previously discussed (see Chapter 4), this offers a number of 
potential advantages to simply comparing the two types of locations one point in time 
(eg, hot spot during v. control during). Among the three time periods examined 
(beforeduring, duringafter, and beforeafter), statistically significant differences in 
citizen-generated robbery CFS between controls and hot spots are documented in the 
beforeduring and duringafter time periods. During the SCI, control locations 
experienced an increase of nearly 2 robberies per location per month compared to the 16 
months before, whereas targeted locations experienced 4.1 fewer robberies, for an 
average difference in difference of nearly six robbery incidents per location per month. In 
the five months after the SCI, control locations experienced over three fewer robbery 
calls per location per month, whereas targeted locations experienced an average increase 
of 2.65 offenses. Indeed, the effect of the SCI steadily washed away within the five 
month follow-up period, indicating some “residual deterrence” that predictably decayed 
(Sherman, 1990). No statistically significant difference was noted when looking at the 





back up to “normal” levels by the end of 2011. This is not a unique finding as has been 
documented as early as Sherman (1990). The implications of this residual deterrence and 
decay are further explored in the discussion and conclusion.  
 
Table 22: Robbery Per Hot Spot Per Month Difference in Differences 




Difference |DiD|  P-value 
Control 10.2 12 +1.8 5.908  .0740 
Target 9.775 
 







   
Control 12 8.92 -3.08 5.733  .051 









   
Control 10.2 8.92 -1.28 .175 .949 
Target 9.775 8.32 -1.455 (n=210)  
 
The General and Specific Displacement of Robbery 
 
As the previous section documented, the 2011 Summer Crime Initiative reduced 
robbery in five hot spots during the three month intervention period compared to a group 
of five control hot spot locations. This next section examines whether this reduction in 
crime led to changes in its placement. While much previous empirical work seems to 
refute this possibility, these studies overwhelmingly rely on only capturing displacement 
within small two block buffer zones. Using a unique data set which allows for the linkage 
of an individual’s home location, to an offense location, to an arrest location over a two 
year period, the current work, in additional to examining local displacement, takes an 
approach allowing for the measurement of a broader range of outcomes. By capturing 





adjacent or specific displacement beyond two blocks, avoiding the measurement issues 
and displacement assumptions discussed in Chapter 2. This two-method approach thus 
measures general adjacent displacement through traditional buffer zone approaches, as 




The first type of spatial displacement examined is general displacement, which 
tracks changes in the volume of crime within small two block (approximately 1000 feet) 
buffer zones amongst any offenders.  There were a total of 37,876 citizen-generated CFS 
in the target and control buffers between 2010 and 2011. During this two year period, 
CFS track closely between the two locations with no prima face divergences before, 
during, or after the SCI, which suggests no obvious displacement effects. 
 




Indeed, these offenses are highly correlated (r=.9025) when also looking robbery CFS 
(r=.5055) and instrumental CFS (r=.6406) (see Appendix for these tables). As discussed 

























































































































































































reductions in the target locations to “displaceable” offenses and offenders. When broken 
down by the period before, during, and after the SCI, the results again seem to suggest no 
obvious signs of general displacement. CFS across each category are slightly higher in 
the hot spot buffers before, during, and after the SCI with only minor changes in degree. 
For example, there were 3.8% more robbery CFS is the hot spots buffer zones before the 
SCI, but during there were 6.19% more, an increase of 2.39 percentage points. Similarly, 
before the SCI there were 2.51% more instrumental crime CFS in the hot spot buffers, 
but during there was 3.22% more, an increase of .71 percentage points. However, these 
data are merely descriptive. 
 
Table 23: Total Number of Citizen-Generated Calls for Service in Hot Spot Buffer 
Zones 
 Target Buffers Control Buffers % Difference 
All CFS    
16 Months Before 10571 10220 +3.43% 
3 During 3377 3280 +2.96% 
5 After 5312 5188 +2.39% 
Robbery CFS    
16 Months Before 737 710 +3.80% 
3 During 103 97 +6.19% 
5 After 237 224 +5.80% 
Instrumental CFS    
16 Months Before 5358 5227 +2.51% 
3 During 1187 1150 +3.22% 
5 After 2009 1914 +4.96% 
 
When looking at these data by period-place and incorporating statistical 
significance tests within a DiD framework, the results suggest crime was not displaced to 
areas immediately surrounding those targeted by the 2011 SCI. During the SCI, the 
number of calls for service per location per month did increase within the target buffers, 





92.99 more CFS per location per month for the buffer zones immediately surrounding the 
areas targeted by the SCI, but the controls buffers experienced an increase of 90.17 CFS 
per location per month. This increase is a typical seasonal pattern moving from spring to 
summer in many jurisdictions, and one that was not statistically significantly different 
from the pattern within the buffers that surrounded control locations. A complementary 
pattern is noted when moving from the summer months of the SCI to the fall and winter 
months during the five month follow up period. Hot spot buffers experienced a decrease 
of over 12 CFS per location per month, but the control buffers noted a similar such drop 
that was statistically indistinguishable. Finally, when looking at all CFS before and after 
the SCI, both control and hot spot buffers experience an increase that is again not 
statistically different from one another when looking at the DiD. 
 
Table 24: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences All Calls for Service 




Difference |DiD| P-value 
Control 127.750 218.667 +90.917 2.079 .952 









   
Control 218.667 207.520 -11.147 1.507 .980 







   
Control 127.750 207.520 +79.77 .572 .984 
Target 132.137 212.480 +80.343 (n=120)  
 
When examining robbery and instrumental crimes no evidence of general 
displacement can be documented either. While the increase in robberies in the hot spot 
buffers may suggest general displacement, the increase is also evident within the control 





the SCI, which was less than the .772 more robberies per location per month noted in the 
control buffers, but not statistically significantly different from the .3 DiD. After the SCI, 
both hot spot and control buffers noted a decrease of .387 and .687 respectively, but 
again, this was not statistically significant. As with CFS in the aggregate, no statistically 
significant changes in the DiD can be found beforeduring, duringafter, or 
beforeafter. 
 
Table 25: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences Robbery Calls for Service 




Difference |DiD| P-value 
Control 8.875 9.647 +.772 .118 .913 









   
Control 9.647 8.960 -.687 .3 .846 







   
Control 8.875 8.960 +.085 .183 .940 
Target 9.213 9.480 +.267   
 
Finally, when looking at instrumental crimes, the results again are in line with the 
findings for all offenses and robbery. Instrumental crime CFS are up 12.158 in the hot 
spot buffers during the SCI, but a similar and statistically insignificant increase of 11.329 
was noted in the control buffers when looking at the DiD. After the SCI, these values 
remained relatively stable within each type of buffer. Hot spots gained another 1.227 CFS 
per location per month, while controls lost .107, for a statistically insignificant DiD of 
1.333. And after the SCI, both hot spots and controls gained an average of 11.222 and 
13.385 instrumental crime CFS per location per month respectively, for another 






Table 26: Hot Spot Buffer Zone Difference-in-Differences Instrumental Crime Calls 
for Service 




Difference |DiD| P-value 
Control 65.338 76.667 +11.329 .829 .963 









   
Control 76.667 76.560 -.107 1.333 .951 











Control 65.338 76.560 +11.222 2.163 .888 
Target 66.975 80.360 +13.385   
 
When examining crime displacement within buffer zones, there is no evidence that a 
large reduction in robbery within areas target by MPD led to changes in the placement of 
crime within areas immediately adjacent. These findings are typical of the literature on 




While no general displacement was detected within small catchment areas, the 
next set of analyses focuses on displacement anywhere in the city, by following a cohort 
of 475 active robbers (244 active in the controls, 231 active in the targets) who were 
arrested in the 16 months prior to the SCI. Even at this broader level of analysis there 
appears to be no evidence of crime displacement, at least when using arrest as a proxy for 
offending. When looking at displacement for any offense type, 18.44% of the control 
cohort was rearrested for a new crime during the SCI compared to 16.45% amongst the 





cohort to get rearrested for a crime committed in a new location
33
 during the SCI (14.43% 
versus 12.55%), contrary to what the displacement hypothesis would predict. Thus, 
robbers active in the hot spots were rearrested at lower rates during the SCI more 
generally, and were also less likely to relocate such behavior in locations outside one of 
the five crime hot spots. After the SCI, more targeted robbers were rearrested, but these 
events were not more likely to be relocated compared to the control cohort. These 
differences are not statistically significant and therefore cannot discern whether active 
robbers targeted were more or less likely to reoffend based on arrest patterns. While there 
are subtle differences, the P-values indicate the two groups are indistinguishable from 
one another.  
As discussed in Chapter 2, the measurement of crime displacement needs to 
follow a framework derived from theory. While robbers may not displace their offending 
in any noticeable patterns when looking amongst all types of arrests, patterns may emerge 
when focusing in on specific crimes they are more likely to commit, such as additional 
robberies and instrumental crimes. As argued previously, these are offenses that seek to 
remedy one of main desires of robbers—the pressing need for cash. Again, even when 
looking at the relocation of a cohort of robbers by instrumental and more specifically 
robbery arrests, offenses they are most likely to recommit, there is no prima face 
evidence for displacement. While not statistically significant, the cohort of robbers from 
the areas targeted by the SCI were less likely to get rearrested for a new instrumental or 
robbery offense during the SCI in any location or in a new location. 
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 In this analysis new location is any place not contained within a control (for control cohort) or target (for 





Table 27: Rearrest Rates (Any Offense) (n=475) 
 Control (n = 244) 
(Percentage) 
Target (n = 231) 
(Percentage) 
P-value 
16 Months Before 
 
244 (100%) 231 (100%)  
3 Months During 45 (18.44%) 38 (16.45%) 0.5684 
New Location 
 
35 (14.34%) 29 (12.55%) 0.5682 
5 Months After 51 (22.09%) 55 (23.81%) 0.4468 
New Location 
 
35 (14.34%) 30 (12.99%) 0.6689 
8 Months During 
and After 
90 (36.89%) 89 (38.53%) 0.7126 
New Location 64 (26.23%) 55 (23.81%) 0.5432 
 
Table 28: Rearrest Rates (Instrumental Crime) (n=475) 
 Control (n = 244) 
(Percentage) 
Target (n = 231) 
(Percentage) 
P-value 
16 Months Before 
 
244 (100%) 231 (100%)  
3 Months During 10 (4.1%) 4 (1.73%) 0.1276 
New Location 
 
7 (2.87%) 4 (1.73%) 0.4094 
5 Months After 12 (4.92%) 14 (6.06%) 0.5854 
New Location 
 
10 (4.1%) 4 (1.73%) 0.1276 
8 Months During 
and After 
22 (9.02%) 18 (7.79%) 0.6297 
New Location 17 (6.97%) 8 (3.46%) 0.0875 
 
Table 29: Rearrest Rates (Robbery) (n=475) 
 Control (n = 244) 
(Percentage) 
Target (n = 231) 
(Percentage) 
P-value 
16 Months Before 
 
244 (100%) 231 (100%)  
3 Months During 5 (2.05%) 2 (.87%) 0.2870 
New Location 
 
4 (1.64%) 2 (.87%) 0.4534 
5 Months After 7 (2.87%) 7 (.03%) 0.9180 
New Location 
 
5 (2.05%) 2 (.87%) 0.2870 
8 Months During 
and After 
12 (4.92%) 9 (3.9%) 0.5892 






The only marginally statistically significant (P-value = .0875) result occurs when 
looking at the rearrest rates in the eight months during and after among instrumental 
crimes. Robbers active in the hot spots prior to the SCI were less likely to get rearrested 
for a new instrumental crime in this eight month period compared to robbers active in the 
controls. As a further (if marginal) indication of deterrence rather than displacement, only 
3.46 percent of active targeted robbers were rearrested for an instrumental crime in this 
eight month period compared to close to seven percent of robbers active in controls (n = 8 
vs. 17). This is the only statistically significant evidence which suggests robbers targeted 
by the SCI were less, not more, likely to reoffend during and after the crackdown based 
on arrest patterns. 
Changes in individual level displacement are also examined by looking at the 
journey to next offense. Of those active robbers who were rearrested, the distance 
between their last robbery before the SCI is compared to their first cleared offense 
location during and after the SCI. While few differences were noted in the prevalence of 
being rearrested or relocating, this next set of analyses attempts to uncover changes in the 
degree to which active robbers targeted by the SCI relocated their offending. Thus, while 
it may not be the case that active robbers targeted by the SCI were any more likely to 
relocate, it may change the distances traveled of those few who did reoffend. 
 




 Control (SD) Target (SD) P-value 
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 Results are suppressed when looking at changes in the offense location for new robbery and instrumental 






Results from this analysis indicate that active robbers targeted by the SCI were no 
more likely to change the degree to which they relocated their offending based on those 
who were rearrested. Active robbers’ next offense during and after the SCI was not 
statistically significantly different from the distance between control robbers’ next 
offense either during or after. Indeed, while not statistically significant, the results are in 
the opposite direction as predicted. Active robbers in hot spots traveled a shorter distance 
than their control counterparts in this sample. 
Finally, changes in the offense stream among the target and control robbers are 
examined. As discussed further in Chapter 4, such an analysis seeks to uncover three 
specifics with regard to the offending streams of the treated and control robbers: 1) does 
the proportion of locations for crimes individuals are arrested for change during or after 
the SCI?; 2) Are targeted offenders choosing completely new locations to commit crimes 
in greater proportions than those not targeted?; 3) Does the intermittency of offending 
(days between cleared offenses) change? 
Table 31: Changes in Arrested-Offense Stream (All Cleared Offenses) 
 % of arrested-offenses outside targeted hot spots
35
 
 Before (n = 
231) 
During (n = 38) After (n = 55) During/After 
(n = 89) 
Target  69.6970 76.3158 54.5455 61.7978 
  
% of arrested-offenses outside control hot spots 
 Before (n = 
244) 
During (n = 45) After (n = 51) During/After 
(n = 90) 
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 Targeted and control hot spots are based on the single location (of the 10) which brought the robber into 





Descriptively, offenders targeted by the SCI committed the greatest share of the 
offenses they were arrested for outside of the areas targeted during the three month 
intervention. While 69% were arrested for crimes committed outside the SCI before the 
crackdown, this percentage went up to 76% during the three month intervention. 
However, similar increases were noted among the control cohort as well, who committed 
64% of their crimes in the control areas prior to the SCI, but over 77% thereafter. These 
increases may therefore be a seasonal effect, such that offenders are more mobile during 
the summer months when its warmer out and perhaps more conductive to traveling. 
Moreover, no statistically significant differences are noted within each of the four time 
periods examined, which seems to suggest no disruptions to the offense stream that 
would lead to crime displacement. 
Table 32: Changes in Arrested-Offense Stream New Locations (All Cleared 
Offenses) 
 % of arrested-offenses in completely new location
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 During (n = 38) After (n = 55) During/After (n = 
89) 
Target  13.1578 10 .9090 12.3595 
  
% of arrested-offenses in completely new location 
 During (n = 45) After (n = 51) During/After (n = 
90) 
Control 15.5555 11.7647 14.4444 
 









Robbers targeted by the SCI do not appear to be getting rearrested for crimes 
committed in new locations in any greater proportion than control robbers. Those 
targeted by MPD were rearrested for crimes in new locations just over 13% of the time, 
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 In this analysis new locations are based on the Police Service Area (PSA) where the crime was 
committed. Offenses are labeled as occurring in a completely new location if the individual has no record 





compared to 15% for controls. These differences were not statistically significantly 
different. Similarly, no differences were noted after or during and after the SCI. While 
robbers targeted by the SCI were less likely to get rearrested for new crimes in locations 
they have not been active before, a direction opposite than predicted, none of these results 
are statistically significant. 
Table 33: Changes in Offense Intermittency (Days Between Cleared Offenses) 
 Control (SD) Target (SD) P-value 









Offense Before SCI 
to Next Offense 
During 




Offense Before SCI 
to Next Offense 


















Targeted offenders did not exhibit any statistically significant changes in their cleared 
offense intermittency compared to controls. 
Among those who were arrested, there is no evidence that active robbers in crime 
hot spots relocated their offending any differently than those active robbers from the 
controls. Given these results, the current work does not explore hypothesis IV in Chapter 
2 which related to identifying specific places where crime displacement is more likely to 
occur. Such an exploration is viewed as being conditional upon finding evidence for 
displacement in the first place. Such evidence was not uncovered therefore these 





 To summarize, there is no evidence to support the displacement hypothesis in this 
analysis. Robbers who were arrested in areas targeted by the SCI were subsequently 
rearrested at rates no greater than an equivalent control group despite large reductions in 
such offenses in the places these robbers were previously active. Additionally, these 
targeted robbers did not exhibit differences in their share of cleared offenses committed 
outside the targeted hot spots compared to controls in control hot spots, nor were there 
any changes in the timing between cleared offenses. 
Indeed, virtually all the results, while not statistically significant, provide support 
for the contrary hypotheses put forth in this dissertation. In the 18 comparisons made 
between active control and target robbers (Tables 28-31) during, after, and during and 
after the SCI, those robbers targeted by the SCI had lower re-arrest and re-location rates 
in 15 of such comparisons. Moreover, the only marginally statistically significant 
difference was in the opposite direction from that predicted by the displacement 
hypothesis. When examining re-arrest rates in new locations for all instrumental crimes, 
the evidence showed that, active robbers in target hot spots were less likely to relocate 
their offending to a new location compared to active robbers in the controls in the eight 





Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Robbery is a deeply visceral crime and instills fear in many communities which 
may potentially cripple opportunities for them to generate a consensus around normative 
behavior, develop informal social control, and secure outside economic investment. 
Residents in these communities frequently move, if they can, and victims of such crimes 
often suffer from trauma long after the incident. Robberies are notoriously difficult to 
solve despite clustering in certain areas of the city well known to the police. Therefore, 
many law enforcement agencies seek to prevent such offenses by targeting their activity 
in these crime hot spots. Indeed, such approaches have widely diffused among larger 
police departments and have recently been cited as the most commonly used tactic to 
combat violent crime (PERF, 2008).  
Using a quasi-experimental research design, the current work documented a 
similar approach in Washington D.C. called the Summer Crime Initiative. This three 
month arrest driven crackdown led to a statistically significant and large (Cohen’s d = -
1.5058) decrease in citizen-generated robbery calls for service during a three month 
intervention period. Crime in the areas targeted by the SCI was down over 52%
37
 
compared to similar areas not receiving such increased scrutiny by police. These findings 
are in line with the majority of research to date (see Braga et al., 2012). Whether such 
reductions are illusory remains an important policy question, as a major criticism over 
such approaches is that they merely displace crime to untreated areas of a jurisdiction.  
Research has refuted such claims, consistently demonstrating no appreciable 
displacement in response to hot spots policing initiatives (Bowers et al., 2011). However, 
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 Cohen’s d and the percentage change are based on citizen-generated robbery calls for service per month 





this body of knowledge has overwhelmingly examined the potential of police efforts in 
crime hot spots to displace crime using typically small two block catchment areas. Little 
is thus known about these interventions potential to displace crime beyond such small 
areas. This work set out to more robustly test geographic crime displacement in reaction 
to a pro-arrest police crackdown by tracking changes in offense patterns both locally and 
non-locally. Using a unique data set from the Washington D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department, the current work was able to track changes in individual offender’s crime 
location patterns, allowing for the testing of both adjacent and non-adjacent 
displacement.  
While no theory of crime displacement exists, the current work developed testable 
hypotheses built upon an analytic framework based on Situational Action Theory 
(Wikström et al., 2012), Routine Activities Theory (Cohen and Felson, 1979), and 
important research on the target selection properties of robbers (Conklin, 1972; Feeney, 
1986; Gill, 2000; Jacobs and Wright, 1999; Matthews, 2002; Morrison and O’Donnell, 
1994; Wright and Decker, 1997). This research revealed several characteristics of places 
where crime is most likely to occur and presumable where it is most likely to relocate 
when offenders previous crime opportunities are blocked through police action. 
Specifically, two hypotheses were generated with regards to the displacement of crime in 
response to reductions in robbery:  
 
Hypothesis 1: As a result of the SCI’s impact on robbery, crime in buffer zones 





robbery and instrumental crimes relative to control buffers, but show no 
appreciable differences when examining the displacement of total crime. 
 
Hypothesis 2: When tracking a cohort of active robbers, some of those targeted by 
the SCI will displace their behavior in ways unable to be captured using two block 
buffer zones. The places such non-adjacent behavior is most likely to occur 
includes: locations they current or formerly live; areas with a similar economic 
and racial background as their own; and areas within 1000 feet of a bar, 
ATM/bank, liquor store, or college campus. 
 
This dissertation found evidence that seems to falsify both of these hypotheses. 
Substantial reductions in robbery during the crackdown period were achieved without 
displacing offenders generally in locations immediately surrounding the areas targeted, or 
to any other locations in the city amongst a cohort of active robbers. Rates of crime in the 
buffer zones surrounding the areas targeted by the SCI displayed no statistically 
significant differences from buffer zones surrounding matched untreated controls. 
Similarly, the 231 active robbers from the areas targeted by the SCI were no more or less 
likely to relocate their offending during or after the SCI compared to the 244 robbers 
active in the controls based on those who were rearrested. While no statistically 
significant differences emerged, they were virtually all in the direction favoring the 
deterrence and falsifying the displacement hypothesis. Active robbers targeted by the SCI 
were less likely to be rearrested during and after the three month initiative in 15 of the 18 





offense streams of those targeted by the SCI were disrupted in such a way that would 
cause more cleared offenses to be relocated to areas not targeted by MPD. 
These results further support the literature to date on these types of interventions, 
which have found very little evidence that crime just “moves around the corner” (see 
Bowers et al., 2011). As stated above, much of this literature focuses on localized 
displacement within small two block buffer zones. The current work is able to extend the 
boundaries of these findings amongst a sample of active robbers, by finding that these 
offenders targeted by a police crackdown in a crime hot spot were not just deterred from 
committing crime in the target locations and smaller surrounding areas, but were 
prevented from committing subsequent crime anywhere in the city. 
Limitations 
 
The aforementioned findings must be viewed in light of certain limitations, of 
which several are related to the lack of available data to track specific displacement. 
While the current work documented little evidence of crime displacement when tracking 
a cohort of active robbers, Washington D.C. is less than 70 square miles, with porous 
borders particularly among Wards 7 and 8 where a few of the SCI sites are located. 
Among police practitioners at MPD it is commonly acknowledged that there is a degree 
of cross pollination of offenders between Wards 7 and 8 with Prince George’s County. 
Even Chief Cathy Lanier has stated that D.C. and PG County, “share many of the same 
issues” with “quite a few of our [DC] victims (coming) from Prince George’s County” 
(Klein and Zapotosky, 2011). Even though over 80% of offenders in the current analysis 
live at least 2.5 miles from the Prince George’s County border, tracking offenders into the 





displacement hypotheses. This problem is likely to plague many studies of crime 
displacement without cooperation and data from surrounding jurisdictions, or from such 
multi-agency data-sharing systems as the Washington Area Law Enforcement System 
(WALES), which includes all county and city police agencies bordering the District. It 
can always be argued that offenders moved beyond even these additional geographies, 
but given the known spatial extent of robbers through analyses of their journey-to-crime 
(Conklin, 1972; Van Koppen and Jansen, 1998), the vast majority of crime displacement 
should be captured within the current work. Regardless, collecting data from a larger 
geography would help alleviate some of these concerns.  
However, even with additional data from neighboring jurisdictions, displacement 
at the individual level is harder to disprove. As Black and Park have noted, “It is difficult 
to disentangle whether the absence of displacement effects is a result of a true reduction 
in crime or a result of criminals responding to the interventions by exerting more effort to 
avoid detection or simple problems of measurement (2012, p.330).”  
The current work is based on official crime data, which is problematic for a 
variety of reasons (see Mosher et al., 2011).  Importantly, many crimes are not cleared by 
police, with fewer than 30% of robberies in Washington D.C. having a known offender 
(FBI, 2013). Rates for other instrumental crimes are even worse. For example, according 
to MPD’s 2012 Annual Report, less than 10% of burglaries are cleared through arrest. In 
Peterborough the clearance rates may be even lower. When comparing self versus police 
reported crime within the Peterborough study, participants admitted to 450 robberies, but 






Robberies in particular are notoriously difficult to solve. Eye witness testimony is 
becoming a low standard of evidence in the courts, especially in light of recent advances 
in the fallibility of inter-racial identification (see Meissner and Brigham, 2001), offenders 
often wear masks, attack at night, and leave no forensics at the scene of the crime. 
Without offenses being cleared through arrest, there is no way for the current work to link 
robbers to displaced crimes. Thus, it is entirely possible that crime displacement did 
occur within Washington D.C., but due to additional precautions taken by the cohort of 
active robbers, they were never actually arrested
38
. This problem affects studying 
displacement at the individual level, but not within the buffer zones examined, since it 
does not rely on offenses being cleared. However, a similar limitation of using official 
data arises in the low victim reporting rates. Approximately 50% of all violent offenses 
never get reported to police (Mosher et al., 2011). This may be particularly problematic 
amongst the offenders in the current sample. Research has shown that robbers often favor 
to select targets not likely to contact the police, such as drug dealers (Jacobs, 2000).  
 Finally, the observational nature of the current work prevented the randomization 
of treatment and direct observation of police activities in the crime hot spots. While 
controls were matched to hot spots, there is always a possibility that unobserved 
differences contributed to the documented reductions in robbery. More importantly, 
without observing police activity, there is no way to determine what they were doing in 
these crime hot spots. This is important, especially in the light of a recent Campbell 
Collaboration Review which documented differences in hot spots policing interventions 
that used problem-oriented versus saturation patrol approaches (Braga et al., 2012). The 
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 Decreases in clearance rates in the targeted hot spots may be suggestive of offenders changing their 
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lack of displacement noted in the current work may be limited to the responses chosen by 
MPD, which may not apply to other tactics used in hot spots. In the future it may be 
informative to examine crime displacement by the type of hot spots intervention. The 
current work also documented a strong decaying of deterrence in the hot spots. It may be 
the case that police interventions that last longer and provide more than an ephemeral 
reduction in crime, may displace more offenders once they recognize that the current 
intervention is not just temporary. 
Future Research 
 
Future research can help confirm and extend the current work’s findings by 
addressing several of its limitations. Research that can measure crime through self-reports 
will be better positioned to capture relocated offenses, which are likely underreported in 
the current study. Victims only report a fraction of all crimes to the police, who in turn 
only arrest a yet smaller portion of all offenders. Moreover, if active robbers who are 
targeted by the police take additional precautions clearance rates will only decrease. 
Thus, when using official data it becomes hard to discern whether no displacement was 
identified because none occurred, or whether no displacement was identified because it 
was not detected by police. A clear parsing of these two competing hypotheses through 
self-report data would help strengthen the current work’s findings. 
Such research can also seek to directly measure not only the criminal behavior of 
offenders, but changes in their decision making and criminal propensity. This information 
would help unpack why robbers in the current study were not apparently relocating their 
offending. More data could help separate  those who may have desisted because they 





prospect of searching out new targets, and those  who were not deterred but nonetheless 
were unable to identify other suitable locations (with a lack of capable guardians and 
presence of suitable targets).  
Additional research can also help to identify police tactics in crime hot spots that 
could potentially have longer lasting impacts. This might occur not just by blocking 
crime opportunities temporarily, but by changing a person’s motivation, which may 
ultimately provide the best means to prevent crime displacement and achieve sustained 
reductions in crime. In other words, crackdowns might be designed to aim for desistance, 
and not just deterrence. The current work’s sole focus on an arrest-based approach could 
be compared with other police-led initiatives, evaluated on the basis of their differential 
impact on offender decision-making. 
Further research may also uncover how police crackdowns affect co-offending 
robbers, who may respond differently than lone offenders. Findings from Peterborough 
(2012) indicate that youth are most likely to commit crime when they are in unstructured 
settings with their peers. The least displaceable (and most deterrable) robbers may thus be 
those who co-offend or spend more time with their peers. While the current work found a 
reduction in robbery with no subsequent displacement, policing activities that target 
robbers more likely to reoffend, such as those with co-offenders, may have an even larger 
impact. Police may be able to construct social networks to identify and target the most 
connected robbers. Such work has been employed in gang-oriented initiatives with 






Additional research can examine the displaceability of robbers versus people who 
commit other offenses. The current work is purposively narrow in scope. While there is 
no evidence to suggest robbers relocate their offending in response to a police 
crackdown, there may be other types of offenders that are in fact displaceable. Another 
way to approach such an inquiry is to move beyond offender-offense typologies (robbers, 
burglars, car thieves, etc) and examine criminals more generally. There may be 
characteristics that are related to the relocation of offending for all criminals such as age 
at first offense, gender, current age, prior criminal record, transience, marriage history, 
employment history, etc. Indeed, there is a great deal of information from life-course 
criminology which can help guide such research (Laub and Sampson, 2003; Piquero et 
al., 2007; Sampson and Laub, 1993). Selecting a cohort for study by conditioning on such 
variables may yield useful information regarding the types of offenders most likely to 
relocate in the face of police crackdowns (On the other hand, it may put another nail in 
the crime just moves around the corner coffin). With such information, police can not 
only target places where crime clusters, but also the offenders active in such places that 
are most likely to displace their offending. Such approaches as the SCI may only be 
efficacious amongst certain types of offenders and therefore should not be used to combat 
all crime problems.  
 While the current work documented a quick dissipation of the crime reductions 
caused by the SCI, it is unclear what longer term impacts MPD’s intermittent arrest 
crackdown policy may have on the targeted communities. Pro-arrest policies and other 
similar law and order tactics such as stop and frisk have strained police-community 





cities such as New York. Notably, in New York City (NYC), citizens have long 
complained about race-based discriminatory tactics employed under former Mayor 
Michael Bloomberg and former Police Commissioner Ray Kelly (see Fitzsimmons, 
2013). The NYC Police Department may be losing the trust and confidence of its citizens 
(see Floyd v. City of New York), which would be counter-productive to their crime 
prevention efforts.  
The work of Tom Tyler (1990, 2004) on legitimacy may be relevant to the current 
works focus on the 2011 SCI. Tyler and other researchers have found that citizens who 
believe the police are a legitimate authority, “authorize that authority to determine what 
their behavior will be within a given set of situations” (Tyler, 2004, p.87). Citizens thus 
behave not because they are deterred, but because they feel obligated to do so through 
their trust, confidence, and belief in the police as a legitimate authority. The dramatic rise 
in arrests because of the SCI could potentially erode this legitimacy, and be penny wise 
but pound foolish. Longer terms follow-ups using official crime data and surveys of 
citizens in neighborhoods targeted by the SCI could help inform changes within future 
SCIs that seek the community’s support, build their trust, and ensure the police are 
viewed as a legitimate authority. 
Finally, future research on displacement should utilize an experimental design 
where treatment is randomly assigned amongst locations. Such an approach would help 
to rule out alternative explanations. If done prospectively researchers can better measure 
the activity of the police in more qualitative ways that may provide insights into the types 
of police activities that are more successful in reducing robbery and whether these can 





the opportunity to obtain self-reported data from robbers as well as insights into their 
decision making and changes to their decision making. Such work may also help to 
identify offenders who were planning on committing a robbery, but did not because of 
the SCI. This would perhaps disentangle the impact of similar initiatives on the 
participation versus prevalence of offending.  
Policy Implications 
 
Hot spots policing is the most commonly used tactic to combat violent crime. 
While crime displacement has long been a criticism of these interventions, the current 
work adds to a long list of studies that refute this criticism. Evidence from the current 
work indicates that police can reasonable implement similar initiatives targeted at robbers 
and reduce crime without displacement. This added reassurance means police should 
continue to use these interventions. However, such arrest-driven initiatives tend not to 
have lasting effects, often decaying in the months immediately after the crackdown. This 
was true in the current work and other such efforts (see Sherman 1990).  
If police are going to reduce crime more permanently, a different approach may 
need to be taken. A more successful policing intervention for a lasting impact on crime 
might presume that arrests alone are not a panacea. Some departments are already 
varying the tactics they use in crime clusters. The best evidence to date indicates that 
departments which take a problem-oriented approach not only reduce crime without 
displacement, but are able to sustain such declines more permanently (Braga et al., 2012). 
The Metropolitan Police Department and law enforcement agencies more generally could 
utilize such approach in the future in controlled comparisons to arrest-focused tactics. 





factors. Police may need to alter the environment in more permanent ways by increasing 
the lighting, changing patterns of foot traffic, cutting back shrubs, or increasing the usage 
of CCTVs. Such approaches are commonly referred to as Situational Crime Prevention 
(Lab, 2010), and have been implemented in a number of successful problem-oriented 
policing approaches (Center for Problem-Oriented Policing, 2014; Weisburd et al., 2008).  
Beyond targeting crime hot spots, MPD and other departments may be able to 
achieve more lasting impacts if they focus on specific robbers and offenders. Such an 
approach is particularly germane in the current work, where MPD focused their efforts 
not on environmental or sociological factors that are underlying the rates of crime in the 
places targeted, but instead focused on arresting individuals who happened to be in these 
locations. Thus, the police used place-based crime clusters, but individual level tactics. A 
more effective approach could attempt to marry the two. One such approach could 
leverage the environmental approaches discussed above with an individual and group 
level strategy, Operation Ceasefire (Boston), which has gained national attention and has 
been labeled an evidence-based practice by the National Institute of Justice. This 
initiative is based on what David Kennedy (2011, p.53) calls “coerced demand 
reduction,” which is essentially group-level deterrence. High rate offenders in Boston 
who were responsible for a disproportionate share of violent crime and shootings were 
called into a meeting of police, prosecutors, community members, and influential people 
in their lives, and given a chance to turn their behavior around or face a united and 
coordinated criminal justice response. Other cities could emulate Boston’s engagement of 
community stakeholders and non-profits to help alleviate the “pressing need for cash” 





can include securing federal entitlements and welfare. Community members in 
Washington D.C. often work closely with employers who are willing to look past a 
person’s criminal history, and proposed legislation to “ban the box” (DC Council) which 
could help eliminate the barrier altogether. 
Finally, one unique approach being used nationally attempts to dry up the 
secondary market for stolen cell phones by making them inoperable, colloquially referred 
to as “bricking.” Law enforcement agencies in coordination with the Federal 
Communication Commission pressured cell phone carriers such as Verizon and AT&T to 
disable the phones of their customers if reported stolen (FCC, 2013). This effort 
essentially renders the phones useless which in-turn may dramatically reduce their value 
or reward for robbers. Similar efforts can be undertaken for other commonly robbed 
goods, with the police and regulatory agencies additionally cracking down on stores who 
distribute stolen merchandise. 
Whatever else might be done to prevent crime in hot spots, the issue of 
displacement will remain a central concern. By taking a unique approach to the 
measurement of crime displacement locally and more globally throughout an entire city, 
the current work documented no evidence of offense relocation. This is an important 
extension of the prior research which almost universally focuses on displacement within 
small typically two block buffer zones, and suggests that police can prevent crime 
without measurable displacing it within the city limits. However, such results are the first 










Appendix 1: DC Code and UCR 
 DC CODE INDEX OFFENSE DEFINITIONS   FBI UCR PART I CRIME DEFINITIONS  
The MPD relies on the DC Code Index Offenses for daily 
operational and deployment decisions. Offenders who are 
arrested in the District of Columbia are prosecuted for the 
offenses represented in the DC Code.  
The UCR provides a consistent measure of serious crime that can 
be compared across time periods or regions.  
 
Homicide: Killing of another purposely, in perpetrating or 
attempting to perpetrate an offense punishable by imprisonment, 
or otherwise with malice aforethought.  
 
Murder: The willful non-negligent killing of a person.  
 
Sex Assault: One of many sexual acts against another, either 
forcibly or without his/her permission, and/or against someone 
who is otherwise incapable of communicating unwillingness.  
 
Forcible Rape: The carnal knowledge of a female forcibly and 
against her will.  
 
Robbery: The taking from another person, or immediate actual 
possession of another, anything of value, by force or violence, 
whether against resistance or by sudden or stealthy seizure or 




Robbery: The taking or attempting to take anything of value 
from the care, custody, or control of a person or persons by force 
or threat of force or violence and/or by putting the victim in fear.  
Assault with a Dangerous Weapon (ADW): Knowingly or 
purposely causing serious bodily injury to another person, or 
threatening to do so; or under circumstances manifesting extreme 
indifference to human life, knowingly engaging in conduct that 
creates a grave risk of serious bodily injury to another person, 
and thereby causes serious bodily injury. Weapons include, but 
are not limited to, firearms, knives and other objects.  
 
Aggravated Assault: An unlawful attack by one person upon 
another for the purpose of inflicting severe or aggravated bodily 
injury. This type of assault is usually accompanied by the use of 
a weapon or by means likely to produce death or great bodily 
harm.  
Burglary: Breaking and entering, or entering without breaking, 
any dwelling, bank, store, warehouse, shop, stable, or other 
building or any apartment or room, whether at the time occupied 
or not, or any steamboat, canal boat, vessel, other watercraft, 
railroad car, or any yard where any lumber, coal, or other goods 
or chattels are deposited and kept for the purpose of trade, with 
intent to break and carry away any part thereof or any fixture or 
other thing attached to or connected with the same.  
 
Burglary: The unlawful entry of a structure to commit a felony 
or theft.  
Theft/Other: This includes conduct previously known as 
larceny. The Theft/Other category excludes theft of items from a 
motor vehicle or the motor vehicle itself, which are captured 
under other categories, and excludes fraud.  
 
Larceny/Theft: The unlawful taking, carrying, leading or riding 
away of property from the possession or constructive possession 
of another.  
Theft F/Auto: Theft of items from within a vehicle, excluding 
motor vehicle parts and accessories.  
 
Stolen Auto: Theft of a motor vehicle (any automobile, self-
propelled mobile home, motorcycle, truck, truck tractor, truck 
tractor with semi trailer or trailer, or bus).  
Motor Vehicle Theft: The theft or attempted theft of a motor 
vehicle. “Motor vehicle” includes automobiles, trucks and buses, 
and other self-propelled vehicles that run on land surfaces and 
not rails.  
 
Arson: The malicious burning or attempt to burn any dwelling, 
house, barn, or stable adjoining thereto, or any store, barn, or 
outhouse, or any shop, office, stable, store, warehouse, or any 
other building, or any steamboat, vessel, canal boat, or other 
watercraft, or any railroad car, the property, in whole or in part, 
of another person, or any church, meetinghouse, schoolhouse, or 
any of the public buildings in the District, belonging to the 
United States or to the District of Columbia.  
Arson: Any willful or malicious burning or attempt to burn, with 
or without intent to defraud, a dwelling house, public building, 









Appendix 2: Hot Spot and Control Census Tract Crosswalk 
Hot Spot  Census Tract 
501  33.02 
  46.00 
48.01 
  48.02 
  47.01 
504  88.02 
  88.04 
  89.03 
  89.04 
602  78.07 
  78.08 
604  77.07 
  99.07 
706  97.00 
98.02 
98.10 
  98.11 
Control   
1  28.01 
  28.02 
  29.00 
  30.00 
  31.00 
2  91.02 
3  77.03 
  77.08 
96.03 
4  73.04 
  74.03 
  74.04 
  74.09 
5  98.04 







Appendix 3: Average Arrests Per Month in SCI 
Arrest Category Before During % Change 
Aggravated Assault 11.94 16.33 36.82% 
Burglary 2.75 3.00 9.09% 
Disorderly Conduct / POCA 36.06 60.67 68.23% 
Gambling 0.00 0.33  
Larceny/Theft 3.88 6.33 63.44% 
Liquor Laws 0.06 0.33 433.33% 
Narcotic Drug Laws 129.44 189.00 46.02% 
Rape/Sexual Abuse 0.19 1.00 433.33% 
Release Violations/Fugitive 39.44 75.33 91.02% 
Robbery/Carjacking 5.31 7.33 38.04% 
Simple Assault 40.81 49.00 20.06% 
Stolen Property 2.06 2.33 13.13% 
Theft from Auto 0.44 1.33 204.76% 
Traffic Violations 72.94 112.33 54.01% 
UUV 7.56 12.67 67.49% 
Vandalism 4.69 6.33 35.11% 
Vending Violations 0.88 2.00 128.57% 





Appendix 4: Hot Spot City Comparison 
Population / Geography DC Philadelphia Sacramento Jacksonville Lowell Jersey City Minneapolis Kansas City Indianapolis 
Population 601,723 1,526,006 466,488 821,784 106,519 247,597 382,578 459,787 820,445 
Persons under 18 years 17.00% 22.50% 24.90% 23.90% 23.70% 21.10% 20.20% 24.20% 25.00% 
Persons 65 years and over 11.40% 12.10% 10.60% 10.90% 10.10% 9.00% 8.00% 11.00% 10.50% 
Female persons, percent 52.70% 52.80% 51.30% 51.50% 50.40% 50.60% 49.70% 51.50% 51.70% 
Land area in square miles, 2010 61.05 134.1 97.92 747 13.58 14.79 53.97 314.95 361.43 
Persons per square mile, 2010 9,856.50 11,379.50 4,764.20 1,100.10 7,842.10 16,736.30 7,088.30 1,459.90 2,270.00 
          
Race 
         
White 35.30% 36.90% 34.50% 55.10% 52.80% 21.50% 60.30% 54.90% 58.60% 
Black 50.70% 43.40% 14.60% 30.70% 6.80% 25.80% 18.60% 29.90% 27.50% 
Hispanic or Latino 9.50% 12.30% 26.90% 7.70% 17.30% 27.60% 10.50% 10.00% 9.40% 
Asian persons 3.70% 6.30% 18.30% 4.30% 20.20% 23.70% 5.60% 2.50% 2.10% 
American Indian and Alaska Native 0.60% 0.50% 1.10% 0.40% 0.30% 0.50% 2.00% 0.50% 0.30% 
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander 0.10% Z 1.40% 0.10% Z 0.10% Z 0.20% Z 
Persons reporting two or more races 2.50% 2.80% 7.10% 2.90% 3.60% 4.40% 4.40% 3.20% 2.80% 
Foreign born persons, percent, 2006-2010 13.00% 11.50% 22.20% 9.20% 24.60% 38.20% 15.10% 7.50% 8.10% 
Lang other than English spoken at home, % age 5+, 2006-2010 14.60% 20.90% 36.60% 12.90% 42.50% 52.00% 19.60% 11.60% 11.50% 
          
Education 
         
High school graduates, percent of persons age 25+, 2006-2010 86.50% 79.40% 81.40% 86.90% 77.70% 83.10% 87.90% 86.40% 83.70% 
Bachelor's degree or higher, pct of persons age 25+, 2006-2010 49.20% 22.20% 29.60% 24.00% 22.70% 39.60% 43.60% 29.60% 27.30% 
          
Housing 
         
Living in same house 1 year & over, 2006-2010 80.00% 86.00% 76.60% 79.90% 81.60% 83.70% 73.90% 79.90% 79.70% 
Housing units, 2010 298,902 670,171 190,911 366,273 41,431 108,720 178,287 221,860 379,856 





Housing units in multi-unit structures, percent, 2006-2010 61.70% 32.80% 32.20% 28.20% 61.50% 84.20% 51.00% 30.20% 31.70% 
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2006-2010 $443,300  $135,200  $311,900  $171,500  $249,700  $360,400  $228,700  $135,000  $122,100  
Households, 2006-2010 257,317 574,488 173,938 311,064 38,978 93,026 167,141 192,695 324,474 
Persons per household, 2006-2010 2.12 2.53 2.59 2.55 2.59 2.59 2.17 2.33 2.44 
          
Income 
         
Per capita money income in past 12 months (2010 dollars) 2006-2010 $42,078  $21,117  $25,427  $25,227  $22,730  $30,490  $29,551  $25,683  $24,334  
Median household income 2006-2010 $58,526  $36,251  $50,267  $48,829  $50,192  $54,280  $46,075  $44,113  $43,088  







Appendix 5: Experimental and Control Hot Spots Demographics 
 
Census Tract 33.02 46 47.01 48.01 48.02 
 
Hot Spot 501 501 501 501 501 
 
Experimental / Control Experimental Experimental Experimental Experimental Experimental 
 
Area with HS/Control 198,608 428,943 220,560 227,083 80,183 
 
% within HS/Control 100% 
    
 
Total Area 198,608 436917.338256 321218.203507 317459.981357 288098.105378 
 
% of HS/Control 
1,242,150.91 
15.99% 
    
Population 
Total Population 2134 3028 3986 2143 2922 
Pop 15 to 19 years 67 153 263 51 147 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 3.1 5.1 6.6 2.4 5 
Pop 20 to 24 years 272 343 352 234 339 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 12.7 11.3 8.8 10.9 11.6 
Pop 25 to 29 years 331 433 530 372 457 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 15.5 14.3 13.3 17.4 15.6 
Median age (years) 32.7 32.7 30.9 34 32.9 
Pop 18 years and over 1856 2537 3066 1934 2492 
% Pop 18 years and over 87 83.8 76.9 90.2 85.3 
Pop 62 years and over 178 310 584 290 347 
% Pop 62 years and over 8.3 10.2 14.7 13.5 11.9 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 33 81 118 34 74 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 1.5 2.7 3 1.6 2.5 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 128 175 158 110 150 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 6 5.8 4 5.1 5.1 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 163 238 232 189 244 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 7.6 7.9 5.8 8.8 8.4 





Male Pop 18 years and over 946 1298 1316 1037 1194 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 44.3 42.9 33 48.4 40.9 
Male Pop 62 years and over 73 114 214 119 117 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 3.4 3.8 5.4 5.6 4 
Pop White 792 883 636 921 923 
% Pop White 37.1 29.2 16 43 31.6 
Pop Black or African American 1273 2024 2799 1011 1512 
% Pop Black or African American 59.7 66.8 70.2 47.2 51.7 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 128 221 108 191 223 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 6 7.3 2.7 8.9 7.6 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 887 1268 2002 1078 1382 
% Occupied housing units 90.3 86.6 93.6 89.2 88.5 
# Vacant housing units 95 197 136 130 179 
% Vacant housing units 9.7 13.4 6.4 10.8 11.5 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 9.9 8.5 2.8 6.4 7 
# Owner-occupied housing units 531 557 431 452 297 
% Owner-occupied housing units 59.9 43.9 21.5 41.9 21.5 
# Renter-occupied housing units 356 711 1571 626 1085 
% Renter-occupied housing units 40.1 56.1 78.5 58.1 78.5 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 87.3 75.1 57.9 70.1 76.3 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 76.7 67.6 37.1 64.4 70.5 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 11.8 8.7 34.7 8 7.7 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 39 186 355 109 152 
# with HS Degree 237 512 515 180 629 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 298 283 294 209 320 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 941 781 422 702 671 
Income 
Median Household Income 80039 76623 15119 76618 42244 







Census Tract 88.02 88.04 89.03 89.04 
 
Hot Spot 504 504 504 504 
 
Experimental / Control Experimental Experimental Experimental Experimental 
Population 
Total Population 4119 2412 2633 3309 
Pop 15 to 19 years 296 196 197 293 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 7.2 8.1 7.5 8.9 
Pop 20 to 24 years 335 175 181 246 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 8.1 7.3 6.9 7.4 
Pop 25 to 29 years 302 132 152 208 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 7.3 5.5 5.8 6.3 
Median age (years) 38.5 39.6 37.1 38.6 
Pop 18 years and over 3301 1883 1992 2569 
% Pop 18 years and over 80.1 78.1 75.7 77.6 
Pop 62 years and over 702 292 382 410 
% Pop 62 years and over 17 12.1 14.5 12.4 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 159 110 97 145 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 3.9 4.6 3.7 4.4 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 159 89 75 109 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3.9 3.7 2.8 3.3 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 151 60 67 71 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 3.7 2.5 2.5 2.1 
Median age (years) 36 37.9 36.1 38.3 
Male Pop 18 years and over 1541 890 859 1164 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 37.4 36.9 32.6 35.2 
Male Pop 62 years and over 248 129 150 180 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 6 5.3 5.7 5.4 





% Pop White 8.7 5 2.5 1.5 
Pop Black or African American 3675 2214 2531 3229 
% Pop Black or African American 89.2 91.8 96.1 97.6 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 172 130 67 61 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 4.2 5.4 2.5 1.8 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1746 1096 1150 1539 
% Occupied housing units 87.3 78.5 82.2 86.1 
# Vacant housing units 253 300 249 249 
% Vacant housing units 12.7 21.5 17.8 13.9 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 10.5 13.5 11.9 10.2 
# Owner-occupied housing units 758 283 317 150 
% Owner-occupied housing units 43.4 25.8 27.6 9.7 
# Renter-occupied housing units 988 813 833 1389 
% Renter-occupied housing units 56.6 74.2 72.4 90.3 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 64.4 59.2 72.6 66.6 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 51 49.2 58.1 51.2 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 19.6 16.8 20 23.1 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 355 478 265 546 
# with HS Degree 630 565 549 735 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 641 402 309 398 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 664 171 141 261 
Income 
Median Household Income 38859 25978 26556 27620 







Census Tract 78.07 78.08 
 
Hot Spot 602 602 
 
Experimental / Control Experimental Experimental 
Population 
Total Population 2139 3646 
Pop 15 to 19 years 205 401 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 9.6 11 
Pop 20 to 24 years 158 267 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 7.4 7.3 
Pop 25 to 29 years 125 185 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 5.8 5.1 
Median age (years) 36.3 32.9 
Pop 18 years and over 1593 2544 
% Pop 18 years and over 74.5 69.8 
Pop 62 years and over 309 550 
% Pop 62 years and over 14.4 15.1 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 95 205 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 4.4 5.6 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 77 136 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3.6 3.7 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 58 82 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 2.7 2.2 
Median age (years) 33.2 28.9 
Male Pop 18 years and over 679 1111 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 31.7 30.5 
Male Pop 62 years and over 124 217 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 5.8 6 
Pop White 30 48 





Pop Black or African American 2083 3542 
% Pop Black or African American 97.4 97.1 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 49 77 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 2.3 2.1 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 810 1352 
% Occupied housing units 89.4 84.6 
# Vacant housing units 96 246 
% Vacant housing units 10.6 15.4 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 9.3 12.2 
# Owner-occupied housing units 366 564 
% Owner-occupied housing units 45.2 41.7 
# Renter-occupied housing units 444 788 
% Renter-occupied housing units 54.8 58.3 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 57.7 56.3 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 45.7 38.7 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 20.9 30.6 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 188 378 
# with HS Degree 509 710 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 195 190 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 84 198 
Income 
Median Household Income 27917 27531 







Census Tract 77.07 99.07 
 
Hot Spot 604 604 
 
Experimental / Control Experimental Experimental 
Population 
Total Population 3867 2836 
Pop 15 to 19 years 292 312 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 7.6 11 
Pop 20 to 24 years 250 205 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 6.5 7.2 
Pop 25 to 29 years 251 186 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 6.5 6.6 
Median age (years) 36.8 29.2 
Pop 18 years and over 2841 1893 
% Pop 18 years and over 73.5 66.7 
Pop 62 years and over 739 284 
% Pop 62 years and over 19.1 10 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 136 156 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 3.5 5.5 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 110 89 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 2.8 3.1 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 104 60 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 2.7 2.1 
Median age (years) 32.8 23.5 
Male Pop 18 years and over 1181 724 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 30.5 25.5 
Male Pop 62 years and over 271 105 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 7 3.7 
Pop White 62 32 





Pop Black or African American 3777 2810 
% Pop Black or African American 97.7 99.1 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 64 30 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 1.7 1.1 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1555 1097 
% Occupied housing units 90.4 93.3 
# Vacant housing units 166 79 
% Vacant housing units 9.6 6.7 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 4.7 4.1 
# Owner-occupied housing units 797 250 
% Owner-occupied housing units 51.3 22.8 
# Renter-occupied housing units 758 847 
% Renter-occupied housing units 48.7 77.2 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 60.3 62.1 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 52.1 50.9 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 13.7 18 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 203 260 
# with HS Degree 647 424 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 540 350 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 282 36 
Income 
Median Household Income 38571 26612 












Census Tract 97 98.02 98.1 98.11 
 
Hot Spot 706 706 706 706 
 
Experimental / Control Experimental Experimental Experimental Experimental 
Population 
Total Population 3177 1693 2507 4365 
Pop 15 to 19 years 341 157 176 367 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 10.7 9.3 7 8.4 
Pop 20 to 24 years 219 135 235 389 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 6.9 8 9.4 8.9 
Pop 25 to 29 years 203 137 216 368 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 6.4 8.1 8.6 8.4 
Median age (years) 32.7 28.4 29.3 28.2 
Pop 18 years and over 2256 1136 1734 2945 
% Pop 18 years and over 71 67.1 69.2 67.5 
Pop 62 years and over 435 164 192 359 
% Pop 62 years and over 13.7 9.7 7.7 8.2 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 160 72 96 175 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 5 4.3 3.8 4 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 97 55 79 135 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 77 58 80 139 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 2.4 3.4 3.2 3.2 
Median age (years) 30.5 24.6 28.1 26.5 
Male Pop 18 years and over 922 436 710 1169 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 29 25.8 28.3 26.8 
Male Pop 62 years and over 176 55 81 136 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 5.5 3.2 3.2 3.1 
Pop White 30 17 23 49 





Pop Black or African American 3132 1677 2479 4311 
% Pop Black or African American 98.6 99.1 98.9 98.8 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 32 27 22 37 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 1 1.6 0.9 0.8 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1179 677 1103 1819 
% Occupied housing units 90.2 79.8 94.2 91.9 
# Vacant housing units 128 171 68 160 
% Vacant housing units 9.8 20.2 5.8 8.1 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 6.7 18.2 5 7.3 
# Owner-occupied housing units 461 223 86 223 
% Owner-occupied housing units 39.1 32.9 7.8 12.3 
# Renter-occupied housing units 718 454 1017 1596 
% Renter-occupied housing units 60.9 67.1 92.2 87.7 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 66.3 47.3 53.9 58.4 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 52 42.3 47.4 43.4 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 21.6 10.5 12.1 25.7 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 78 86 169 167 
# with HS Degree 656 211 531 1093 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 198 167 356 227 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 121 61 27 115 
Income 
Median Household Income 31549 23633 26234 21713 








Census Tract 28.01 28.02 29 30 31 
 
Hot Spot 1 1 1 1 1 
 
Experimental / Control Control Control Control Control Control 
Population 
Total Population 3773 4277 3962 3398 2885 
Pop 15 to 19 years 155 164 175 179 140 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 4.1 3.8 4.4 5.3 4.9 
Pop 20 to 24 years 442 500 436 416 367 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 11.7 11.7 11 12.2 12.7 
Pop 25 to 29 years 656 689 704 650 451 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 17.4 16.1 17.8 19.1 15.6 
Median age (years) 30.9 31.3 31.3 30.1 31.4 
Pop 18 years and over 3145 3568 3364 2854 2439 
% Pop 18 years and over 83.4 83.4 84.9 84 84.5 
Pop 62 years and over 334 438 308 285 275 
% Pop 62 years and over 8.9 10.2 7.8 8.4 9.5 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 89 77 88 86 74 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 2.4 1.8 2.2 2.5 2.6 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 219 229 219 156 189 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 5.8 5.4 5.5 4.6 6.6 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 343 340 373 333 250 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 9.1 7.9 9.4 9.8 8.7 
Median age (years) 31.1 31.8 31.6 30.1 31.5 
Male Pop 18 years and over 1637 1813 1792 1334 1318 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 43.4 42.4 45.2 39.3 45.7 
Male Pop 62 years and over 127 174 127 100 110 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 3.4 4.1 3.2 2.9 3.8 





% Pop White 35.9 45.4 45.4 43.4 36 
Pop Black or African American 1428 1134 1298 1529 1124 
% Pop Black or African American 37.8 26.5 32.8 45 39 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 1382 1843 1370 532 1037 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 36.6 43.1 34.6 15.7 35.9 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1646 1935 1448 1489 1009 
% Occupied housing units 90.4 90.3 88.1 93.1 89.2 
# Vacant housing units 174 207 195 110 122 
% Vacant housing units 9.6 9.7 11.9 6.9 10.8 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 9.8 6.1 5.4 4 7.6 
# Owner-occupied housing units 306 344 662 429 551 
% Owner-occupied housing units 18.6 17.8 45.7 28.8 54.6 
# Renter-occupied housing units 1340 1591 786 1060 458 
% Renter-occupied housing units 81.4 82.2 54.3 71.2 45.4 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 67.3 78.1 75 79.9 69.2 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 61.9 73 65.9 68 63.8 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 8.1 6.6 11.6 14.3 7.8 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 750 1037 745 309 351 
# with HS Degree 425 345 545 139 326 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 285 275 309 370 298 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 835 917 991 1238 584 
Income 
Median Household Income 43661 41453 56000 52228 69063 
Median Family Income 52866 58704 58083 47989 67981 







Census Tract 91.02 
 
Hot Spot 2 
 
Experimental / Control Control 
Population 
Total Population 4127 
Pop 15 to 19 years 410 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 9.9 
Pop 20 to 24 years 301 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 7.3 
Pop 25 to 29 years 235 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 5.7 
Median age (years) 35.5 
Pop 18 years and over 3039 
% Pop 18 years and over 73.6 
Pop 62 years and over 635 
% Pop 62 years and over 15.4 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 188 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 4.6 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 155 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3.8 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 95 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 2.3 
Median age (years) 33.3 
Male Pop 18 years and over 1285 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 31.1 
Male Pop 62 years and over 241 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 5.8 
Pop White 154 





Pop Black or African American 3871 
% Pop Black or African American 93.8 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 173 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 4.2 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1662 
% Occupied housing units 89.6 
# Vacant housing units 192 
% Vacant housing units 10.4 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 7.1 
# Owner-occupied housing units 642 
% Owner-occupied housing units 38.6 
# Renter-occupied housing units 1020 
% Renter-occupied housing units 61.4 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 58.6 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 50.2 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 14.3 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 523 
# with HS Degree 908 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 697 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 358 
Income 
Median Household Income 32806 








Census Tract 77.03 77.08 96.03 
 
Hot Spot 3 3 3 
 
Experimental / Control Control Control Control 
Population 
Total Population 5187 2486 3373 
Pop 15 to 19 years 492 220 248 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 9.5 8.8 7.4 
Pop 20 to 24 years 390 151 207 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 7.5 6.1 6.1 
Pop 25 to 29 years 376 178 231 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 7.2 7.2 6.8 
Median age (years) 31.8 35.6 40.9 
Pop 18 years and over 3665 1837 2646 
% Pop 18 years and over 70.7 73.9 78.4 
Pop 62 years and over 606 349 665 
% Pop 62 years and over 11.7 14 19.7 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 234 115 120 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 4.5 4.6 3.6 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 177 67 99 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3.4 2.7 2.9 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 162 87 93 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 3.1 3.5 2.8 
Median age (years) 27.9 32.5 38.5 
Male Pop 18 years and over 1470 763 1148 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 28.3 30.7 34 
Male Pop 62 years and over 223 134 243 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 4.3 5.4 7.2 
Pop White 76 33 60 





Pop Black or African American 4996 2460 3289 
% Pop Black or African American 96.3 99 97.5 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 186 35 62 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 3.6 1.4 1.8 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 2103 1084 1588 
% Occupied housing units 89.9 85.9 90.7 
# Vacant housing units 235 178 162 
% Vacant housing units 10.1 14.1 9.3 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 8.4 11.3 6 
# Owner-occupied housing units 510 208 459 
% Owner-occupied housing units 24.3 19.2 28.9 
# Renter-occupied housing units 1593 876 1129 
% Renter-occupied housing units 75.7 80.8 71.1 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 70 59.6 64.2 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 53.7 48 51.6 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 22.7 19.5 19.6 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 580 105 192 
# with HS Degree 878 802 537 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 858 453 636 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 277 204 262 
Income 
Median Household Income 31955 35534 38404 








Census Tract 73.04 74.03 74.04 74.09 
 
Hot Spot 4 4 4 4 
 
Experimental / Control Control Control Control Control 
Population 
Total Population 3546 2859 3310 3499 
Pop 15 to 19 years 351 293 410 288 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 9.9 10.2 12.4 8.2 
Pop 20 to 24 years 253 290 236 316 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 7.1 10.1 7.1 9 
Pop 25 to 29 years 265 244 245 285 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 7.5 8.5 7.4 8.1 
Median age (years) 30 26.8 26.4 26.6 
Pop 18 years and over 2429 1956 2100 2291 
% Pop 18 years and over 68.5 68.4 63.4 65.5 
Pop 62 years and over 468 223 214 259 
% Pop 62 years and over 13.2 7.8 6.5 7.4 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 173 132 189 149 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 4.9 4.6 5.7 4.3 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 106 104 110 121 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 3 3.6 3.3 3.5 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 108 94 109 92 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 3 3.3 3.3 2.6 
Median age (years) 26.3 24.7 21.1 22.6 
Male Pop 18 years and over 970 769 795 860 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 27.4 26.9 24 24.6 
Male Pop 62 years and over 175 78 51 92 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 4.9 2.7 1.5 2.6 
Pop White 51 22 69 37 





Pop Black or African American 3475 2835 3223 3461 
% Pop Black or African American 98 99.2 97.4 98.9 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 38 24 64 34 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 1.1 0.8 1.9 1 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 1198 1092 1106 1417 
% Occupied housing units 87.1 92.5 84.6 94 
# Vacant housing units 178 88 202 90 
% Vacant housing units 12.9 7.5 15.4 6 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 12.7 6.5 7.4 6 
# Owner-occupied housing units 292 99 275 327 
% Owner-occupied housing units 24.4 9.1 24.9 23.1 
# Renter-occupied housing units 906 993 831 1090 
% Renter-occupied housing units 75.6 90.9 75.1 76.9 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 49.6 58.5 55.5 61.4 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 40.8 50.1 47.4 52.4 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 17.8 14.4 14.5 14.8 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 360 415 253 243 
# with HS Degree 666 721 446 844 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 438 215 314 464 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 236 46 242 155 
Income 
Median Household Income 31856 27333 26250 26636 








Census Tract 98.04 104 
 
Hot Spot 5 5 
 
Experimental / Control Control Control 
Population 
Total Population 2473 4365 
Pop 15 to 19 years 233 298 
% Pop 15 to 19 years 9.4 6.8 
Pop 20 to 24 years 207 327 
% Pop 20 to 24 years 8.4 7.5 
Pop 25 to 29 years 154 348 
% Pop 25 to 29 years 6.2 8 
Median age (years) 32.5 37.7 
Pop 18 years and over 1778 3362 
% Pop 18 years and over 71.9 77 
Pop 62 years and over 302 518 
% Pop 62 years and over 12.2 11.9 
Male Pop 15 to 19 years 111 143 
% Male Pop 15 to 19 years 4.5 3.3 
Male Pop 20 to 24 years 105 150 
% Male Pop 20 to 24 years 4.2 3.4 
Male Pop 25 to 29 years 60 147 
% Male Pop 25 to 29 years 2.4 3.4 
Median age (years) 29.9 41.8 
Male Pop 18 years and over 758 1743 
% Male Pop 18 years and over 30.7 39.9 
Male Pop 62 years and over 112 258 
% Male Pop 62 years and over 4.5 5.9 
Pop White 63 166 





Pop Black or African American 2401 4190 
% Pop Black or African American 97.1 96 
Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 56 85 
% Pop Hispanic or Latino (of any race) 2.3 1.9 
Housing 
# Occupied housing units 955 1528 
% Occupied housing units 89.2 83.6 
# Vacant housing units 116 300 
% Vacant housing units 10.8 16.4 
Rental vacancy rate (percent) [9] 7.2 13.4 
# Owner-occupied housing units 364 489 
% Owner-occupied housing units 38.1 32 
# Renter-occupied housing units 591 1039 
% Renter-occupied housing units 61.9 68 
Employment 
% in Labor Force (Age 16 and up) 51.8 65.3 
% Employed  (age 16 and up) 40.2 40.2 
Unemployment Rate (Age 16 and up) 22.3 32.6 
Education 
# Less than HS Degree 327 386 
# with HS Degree 436 1293 
# with Some College or Associate's Degree 386 680 
# with Bachelor's degree or higher 133 257 
Income 
Median Household Income 46554 33500 





Appendix 6: Pre-Intervention Buffer-Zone Parallelism (Robbery) 
 
 











































































Appendix 8: Targeted Cohort Characteristics by Hot Spot 
 Average by Hot Spot 
SCI Hot Spot Label 1t 2t 3t 4t 5t 
# of robbers 72 70 34 32 23 
Age 31.32 34.31 33.35 35.38 37.23 
% African-American 86.11 92.85 96.96 100.00 95.65 
# prior arrests 15.75 17.02 11.55 9.47 10.48 
# prior robbery arrests 1.41 1.22 1.03 1.02 1.03 
# prior violent crime arrests 2.06 1.96 2.17 2.11 1.80 
prior # of home residences 4.14 3.57 2.48 2.93 3.42 
Avg distance to crime (meters) 2726.32 2588.43 1981.46 2081.91 2489.78 
Age at first arrest 25.96 26.50 28.21 28.11 27.70 
% of prior offenses in SCI areas 29.10 28.78 32.99 32.57 30.01 
% of prior offenses in SCI buffers 6.29 7.30 6.25 4.72 5.40 
% of prior offenses inside SCI and SCI buffers 35.39 36.08 39.24 37.30 35.41 
% of prior offenses outside SCI and SCI buffers 64.61 63.92 60.76 62.70 64.59 
% of prior offenses in control areas 0.99 1.50 2.41 2.64 2.48 
% of prior offenses in control buffers 0.25 0.34 0.74 0.63 0.63 
% of prior offenses inside control and control buffers 1.24 1.85 3.15 3.27 3.11 
% of prior offenses outside control and control 
buffers 
98.76 98.15 96.85 96.73 96.89 
# arrests per year 0.98 1.06 0.72 0.59 0.66 
Avg # days between arrests 355.24 328.73 484.42 590.81 533.87 

























Appendix 9: Control Cohort Characteristics by Hot Spot 
 Average by Hot Spot 
Control Hot Spot Label 1c 2c 3c 4c 5c 
# of robbers 69 62 53 33 27 
Age 30.25 33.21 34.54 35.98 32.83 
% African-American 84.05 95.15 94.33 90.90 96.29 
# prior arrests 15.19 12.28 13.57 12.47 15.62 
# prior robbery arrests 1.30 1.03 1.10 1.26 1.29 
# prior violent crime arrests 2.39 1.50 1.78 2.10 2.28 
prior # of home residences 3.98 3.20 3.62 3.50 3.73 
Avg distance to crime (meters) 2945.03 2196.16 2681.49 2427.92 2837.25 
Age at first arrest 27.79 28.85 27.37 28.54 28.57 
% of prior offenses in SCI areas 1.97 2.64 2.95 2.41 2.37 
% of prior offenses in SCI buffers 0.48 0.74 0.73 0.54 0.62 
% of prior offenses inside SCI and SCI buffers 2.45 3.38 3.68 2.95 2.98 
% of prior offenses outside SCI and SCI buffers 97.55 96.62 96.32 97.05 97.02 
% of prior offenses in control areas 34.86 38.36 36.18 35.17 31.03 
% of prior offenses in control buffers 6.28 4.29 4.83 5.83 5.30 
% of prior offenses inside control and control buffers 41.13 42.65 41.01 41.00 36.33 
% of prior offenses outside control and control 
buffers 
58.87 57.35 58.99 59.00 63.67 
# arrests per year 0.95 0.77 0.85 0.78 0.98 
Avg # days between arrests 368.40 455.45 412.23 448.57 358.11 
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